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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
 
 
 
THE INFLUENCE OF LIFE DOMAINS ON ADOLESCENT AND ADULT 
OFFENDING: TESTING AN EXTENSION OF AGNEW’S GENERAL THEORY 
 
 
More than a decade has passed since Agnew (2005) introduced his General 
Theory of Crime and Delinquency (GTCD). Despite this interval, GTCD remains a 
relatively untested theory. Drawing on previous testing efforts, the current research 
provides a systematic assessment of Agnew's theoretical propositions. It also provides 
only the second empirical examination of Cochran's (2015) extension of GTCD, which 
incorporates religion as a sixth distinct life domain. Nested negative binomial regression 
modeling and Poisson regression modeling are used to assess the effects of life domains 
on several diverse forms of self-reported criminal behavior at two distinct stages of 
development: adolescence and adulthood. Data are drawn from two waves of the second 
generation of the Kaplan Longitudinal and Multigenerational Study. Consistent with prior 
empirical tests, results provide mixed support for theoretical propositions, highlighting 
the complexity of Agnew’s initial theory. Specifically, general support is provided for the 
direct effects of both theories’ variables, indicating they are important to the explanation 
of crime. Also, in line with Cochran's findings, initial observed effects of religious 
variables on criminal behavior are reduced to non-significance when all other predictors 
are introduced in most regression models, hinting that the incorporation of such variables 
may be incongruous with Agnew's chosen method of theoretical integration. However, 
religious variables emerge as significant predictors of general crime during adulthood, 
suggesting that the relationship between these variables and crime is more complex than 
anticipated. Additionally, strong support is found for the proposition that the effects of 
life domains are primarily contemporaneous. Results offer weaker support, however, for 
the assertion that life domain effects are largely mediated by constraints against crime 
and motivations towards it. Policy implications for the creation of theoretically-informed 
crime prevention and intervention strategies tailored to specific developmental stage are 
discussed. 
 
KEYWORDS: Crime and Deviance, Correlates of Crime, Criminological Theory, 
Constraints, Motivations, Life Domains 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Statement of the Problem 
Why do criminals offend? Agnew (2005) poses this question as the title of one of 
his manuscripts on criminal behavior. This seemingly simple and innocuous question has 
proven exceptionally complex and difficult to answer. Indeed, criminologists have 
disagreed, sometimes vehemently and bitterly, on which factors cause criminal behavior 
for decades. This highlights the importance of such a question for the social sciences, as 
providing a satisfactory answer to it is the chief goal of the majority of criminological 
theories. Such disagreement has produced a large number of theoretical explanations for 
crime and ensuing research has yielded a high number of empirically-verified correlates 
of crime (Bernard 1990; Bernard and Snipes 1996). Despite this, there exists much debate 
and little consensus on the true causes of crime. 
According to Sutherland (1939), scientific inquiry in the discipline of criminology 
is broadly separated into three primary areas: the sociology of criminal law, the sociology 
and social psychology of crime and criminal behavior, and the sociology of punishment. 
For this reason, criminological theories typically address “lawmaking, lawbreaking, and 
law enforcing” (Akers, Sellers, and Jennings 2017:2). In other words, these theories 
either attempt to account for the design and evolution of the law, to explain criminal and 
deviant behavior, or to describe methods of crime control and law enforcement. The 
second variant may be referred to as the etiology of crime, as such theories generate 
predictions about the causes of various forms of proscribed behavior. Etiological theories 
of crime far outnumber theories of the law; within this domain alone rest such notable 
families of theory as strain and anomie, social control, social disorganization, social 
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learning, development and life course, rational choice and deterrence, and labeling, 
among many others. Indeed, scholars routinely identify as many as fifteen distinct 
families of etiological theory (Akers et al. 2017; Bernard, Snipes, and Gerould 2016; 
Weisburd and Piquero 2008). It is precisely for this reason that criminology as a 
discipline is accused of suffering from an abundance of theoretical explanations of 
behavior (Bernard and Snipes 1996; Bernard et al. 2016; Elliott 1985; Liska, Krohn, and 
Messner 1989; Muftić 2009; Weisburd and Piquero 2008).  
There exist two primary means of addressing the problem of theoretical 
overcrowding in criminology, with each aiming to reduce the overall number of extant 
theories and enhance the discipline’s ability to explain its dependent variable (i.e., illicit 
or otherwise prohibited behavior). First, theory competition, or falsification, refers to the 
process of testing the propositions of various extant theories against one another as a 
means of empirically supporting one theory and falsifying the other. Falsified theories are 
subsequently disregarded. The second option is theoretical integration. This process 
entails combining some or all elements of disparate theories to produce a new 
explanation of criminal behavior. Where there once may have existed several separate 
theories, a single, integrated theory remains. Elliott, Ageton, and Canter (1979) are noted 
for their attempt at the theoretical integration of strain, social control, and social learning 
theories into a unified explanation. In fact, this early attempt is widely regarded as the 
catalyst that ignited a major debate regarding the methods and merits of integration in 
criminology.  
Theoretical integration enjoyed substantial initial interest (Akers 1973; 
Braithwaite 1989; Burgess and Akers 1966; Krohn 1986; Thornberry 1987) and remains 
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a popular contemporary alternative to theory competition (Agnew 1992, 2005; Akers 
1998; Bernard and Snipes 1996; Colvin 2000; Farrington 2005; Messner and Rosenfeld 
2012; Moffitt 1993; Robinson 2004; Sampson and Laub 1995; Thornberry 1987; Tittle 
1995, 2004). Note that the aforementioned citations indicate works that propose 
integrated theories of crime. Integrated explanations have also garnered scholarly 
attention in that they inspire empirical testing efforts. For instance, Weisburd and Piquero 
(2008) analyzed 169 published tests of sixteen families of theory between 1968 and 2005. 
Of these, studies testing integrated theories accounted for 5.9% of the entire sample. 
Additionally, Pratt and colleagues (2010) performed a meta-analysis of empirical tests of 
social learning theory, an integrated theory, in which they examined the results of 133 
published studies between 1974 and 2003.  
Robert Agnew is one of the strongest advocates for theoretical integration. He has 
proposed multiple integrated theories and authored several defenses of and 
recommendations for the practice of integration (Agnew 1992, 2001, 2003, 2005, 2011, 
2013a, 2013b, 2016, with White 1992). Agnew’s (2005) General Theory of Crime and 
Deviance (GTCD) is one of his most recent integrated attempts to explain human 
behavior. It represents a notable departure from his (1992) exceedingly famous general 
strain theory (GST), which is one of the leading and most widely-tested explanations of 
deviance in the field of criminology. GTCD primarily integrates elements of strain, 
control, rational choice, deterrence, and social learning theories to explain the 
mechanisms by which reduced constraints against crime and increased motivations 
towards it ultimately increase one’s likelihood of criminal and deviant behavior. Agnew 
(2005) argues that the variables affecting one’s constraints and motivations have common 
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root causes, and thus should be grouped according to these roots in categories referred to 
as life domains. The five life domains of family, self, peer, school, and employment 
include all variables that may affect crime and are said to be the true causes of criminal 
and deviant behavior, exhibiting both direct and indirect effects on illicit behavior.  
Agnew’s (2005) integration of numerous disparate theories into a unified 
explanation aims to reduce the number of extant criminological theories and to 
parsimoniously explain all forms of criminal and deviant behavior, in all social contexts, 
among people inhabiting all social strata. Therefore, if empirically supported, it may 
reduce the abundance of criminological theories and explain a greater variety of criminal 
and deviant behavior. GTCD is also potentially valuable as it may significantly improve 
the discipline’s ability to explain and predict criminal behavior, which builds credibility 
for the field. In his review of integration attempts, Elliott (1985) demonstrates how such 
theories indeed result in a greater level of overall explanatory power. Overall, he finds an 
average net increase of 4 percentage points and a relative increase of 12 percent over 
previous explanations of criminal behavior. However, in their more recent review of the 
literature, Weisburd and Piquero (2008) find that integrated theories explain slightly less 
variation in crime than the average for all theories tested. The potential for increased 
explanatory power also has practical implications as it facilitates the formulation of 
policies that have an enhanced probability of effecting real, positive change. GTCD is 
also an age-graded theory, as Agnew specifies that the effects various variables exhibit on 
crime change according to the developmental stage inhabited by the individual. This 
means that policies and interventions derived from its propositions may be tailored 
according to developmental stage, further increasing the likelihood of their success. 
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Agnew’s GTCD is at once an attempt to reduce the number of explanations in 
criminology and a case study in the consequences of theoretical overcrowding. Despite 
its ambitious goal and resultant potential utility for all areas of crime and justice, GTCD 
remains a severely understudied theory. It was born into an overabundance of theoretical 
explanations and remains buried among a plethora of theories of deviant behavior 
(Bernard 1990; Bernard and Snipes 1996). This scholarly neglect is evidenced by the 
mere handful of empirical tests to which it has subjected since its inception over a decade 
ago (Cochran 2015; Muftić et al. 2014; Ngo et al. 2011; Ngo and Paternoster 2014; 
Zhang, Day, and Cao 2012). This poses several problems, as theories must be evaluated 
in order to determine their worth to the field (Akers et al. 2017). First, one cannot 
ascertain the theory’s ability to explain crime and deviance. As such, the goal of theory 
reduction through integration cannot be reached. Additionally, its arguments cannot be 
used to effect positive change in the form of crime reduction and intervention policies. 
Similarly, the theory has not seen significant revision or improvement. In fact, only one 
scholar (Cochran 2015) has proposed any such revision, extending GTCD to include an 
additional set of predictor variables. Specifically, Cochran introduces religion a sixth life 
domain, arguing that religious commitment and involvement should significantly 
decrease the likelihood of criminal and deviant behavior.  
Further, those few empirical tests that exist are limited in a number of ways. 
Specifically, they exhibit limitations related to sample characteristics, methodology, and 
theory interpretation. This small pool of tests and their inherent limitations identifies a 
key gap in the scientific literature surrounding this potentially important theory. 
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The Current Study 
The goal of this dissertation is to empirically investigate the claims of GTCD and 
assess its explanatory power. In doing so, this dissertation aims to add to and improve 
upon the small pool of literature surrounding the GTCD by providing the most 
comprehensive test to date. This is accomplished by taking careful measures to avoid the 
shortcomings of previous testing efforts, investigating a number of the theory’s 
propositions, utilizing a large number of items to construct variables within each life 
domain, incorporating a large sample drawn from two waves of data, and examining a 
number of criminal outcome variables. 
This dissertation also aims to explore the utility of extending the general theory to 
include religion as a sixth and separate life domain by providing only the second test of 
Cochran’s (2015) General Theory of Crime and Deviance-Extended (GTCD-E). Though 
it is the second test, the current research utilizes a significantly larger sample than that 
employed by Cochran. Testing the propositions of GTCD and GTCD-E allows for an 
assessment of value in terms of explanatory power. This facilitates the reduction of the 
number of criminological theories and improves the discipline’s ability to explain 
criminal and deviant behavior. It also enables the creation of theoretically-informed and 
empirically-validated social control policies that permit targeted intervention and 
prevention efforts based on one’s developmental stage. 
Research questions. 
Agnew’s (2005) GTCD proposes that crime is most likely when constraints 
against it are low and motivations towards it are high. It further specifies that the 
variables causing constraints and motivations to either attenuate or strengthen have root 
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causes and are best sorted into clusters called life domains. That is, the variables that 
affect constraints and motivations may be separated into mutually exclusive categories 
related to the family, self, peer, school, and employment arenas in one’s life. As the true 
causes of crime, they are composed of variables exhibiting both direct and indirect effects 
on crime. Life domain variables should exhibit a direct effect on crime and deviance, as 
well as an indirect effect through their influence on constraints and motivations. 
Research Question 1: Are all five life domains directly related to recent criminal 
behavior? Specifically, do each of Agnew’s five life domains, and the variables 
within them, exhibit a direct effect on such crime?  
Research Question 2: Are the effects of life domain variables on recent crime 
mediated by constraints against it and motivations towards it? 
Another argument Agnew (2005) proposes is that the life domains with the largest 
effect on crime vary according to one’s stage of development. In other words, different 
life domains, and specific variables within them, exhibit greater or lesser effect sizes 
depending upon the life stage inhabited by the individual. During adolescence, the self 
and peer domains are expected to have a large effect on crime, relative to others. 
Additionally, in adulthood, the self, peer, family, and employment domains are predicted 
to exert the largest relative effects on criminal behavior. 
Research Question 3: Do the life domain variables with the largest relative effect 
on crime vary according to one’s developmental stage in the manner predicted by 
the general theory? That is, do the life domain variables with the greatest effect in 
adolescence differ from those in adulthood? 
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As a general theory, Agnew’s theoretical propositions should apply to all forms of 
crime in all contexts committed by all types of offenders.  
Research Question 4: Does the general theory predict all types of criminal 
behavior? Specifically, do the causal variables and the size of their effects differ 
in predicting general crime, person/property crime, and drug crime? 
Agnew’s (2005) theory also contends that life domains exhibit both 
contemporaneous and lagged effects on crime. In other words, life domain variables 
should exhibit an effect on recent crime and an effect on crime at a later developmental 
stage. Further, contemporaneous effects are expected to be larger than lagged effects as 
“crime is largely a function of current constraints and motivations rather than those 
experienced in the past” (Agnew 2005:124).  
Research Question 5: Are life domain variables more strongly related to recent, 
rather than future, criminal behavior? 
Cochran (2015) extends the general theory to include religion as a sixth life 
domain. He contends that the key variables within this domain are religiosity and 
religiousness. The former refers to the frequency of engaging in religious practices, while 
the latter is “the integration of religion and God into one’s daily life” (2015:9). He 
combines elements of both into a single scale referred to as religious commitment. In his 
analysis, Cochran finds that religious commitment significantly decreases academic 
dishonesty among his sample of young adults enrolled in college. However, once the 
constraint and motivation measures are added into the regression equation, the effect of 
religious commitment is reduced to non-significance. Agnew (2005, 2017) does not 
include such variables in his original formulation as they tend to produce a relatively 
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small effect on crime and therefore do not fit very well with his variable-centered 
approach to integration, which focuses on those variables that have consistently produced 
a moderate to large effect (Bernard and Snipes 1996). 
Research Question 6: Do religious variables affect crime enough to warrant 
inclusion as a separate life domain? Specifically, does introducing religion as a 
separate life domain increase the explanatory power of the general theory to 
explain crime? 
Research Question 7: Does GTCD-E predict all types of criminal behavior? 
Specifically, do the causal variables and the size of their effects differ in 
predicting general crime, person/property crime, and drug crime? 
Significance.  
The dearth of extant examinations of Agnew’s (2005) GTCD along with the 
theoretical and methodological limitations inherent to existing in prior studies exposes a 
significant gap in the criminological literature. This dissertation contributes to the 
scholarly literature by addressing the previously mentioned limitations, providing a more 
comprehensive systematic test of Agnew’s (2005) GTCD, and exploring the utility of 
Cochran’s (2015) GTCD-E. 
This dissertation significantly improves upon previous studies in a number of 
ways. First, it incorporates a large number of variables to measure relevant life domains, 
constraints against crime, and motivations towards crime. It also utilizes a large sample 
drawn from longitudinal data at two time points, each representing distinct developmental 
stages. Further, this dissertation measures a variety of criminal outcomes. Finally, it tests 
two iterations of the theory: Agnew’s (2005) original formulation (i.e., GTCD) and 
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Cochran’s (2015) elaboration that proposes religion as a sixth distinct life domain (i.e., 
GTCD-E).  
This project draws from an extant dataset, the Kaplan Longitudinal and 
Multigenerational Study (KLAMS), that allows for a more nuanced and comprehensive 
measurement of both life domains and delinquent outcomes. For one, KLAMS provides a 
large number of items with which to construct variables. Whereas previous tests used 
single-item indicators or smaller scales to measure the variables within life domains, 
constraints, motivations, and deviant outcomes, this dissertation incorporates multi-item 
scales for most variables within the relevant life domains. Additionally, KLAMS drew 
data from thousands of respondents. Where other studies rely on data drawn from 
hundreds of respondents (Cochran 2015) or barely reach one thousand participants 
(Zhang et al. 2012), this dissertation incorporates a sample of over 1,600 participants 
drawn from two waves of KLAMS data collection. 
KLAMS is a longitudinal study consisting of waves that span multiple 
developmental stages as participants age throughout the life course. This is important 
because Agnew (2005) urges that the best way to test the general theory is to incorporate 
multiple waves of data from the same sample. Specifically, KLAMS permits the 
examination of the age-graded component of the general theory and the lagged effects of 
life domains on crime.  
Additionally, this dissertation examines several criminal outcomes. This is 
notable since all but one of the prior tests of the general theory explore only a single 
criminal or deviant outcome (Cochran 2015; Ngo et al. 2011; Ngo and Paternoster 2014; 
Zhang et al. 2012). Specifically, three dependent variables are incorporated for each stage 
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of development, which amounts to six total outcome variables. These include self-
reported general crime, person/property crime, and drug crime during both adolescence 
and adulthood. Only one prior study measured multiple forms of criminal outcomes to 
assess whether Agnew’s predictions hold true across crime type (Muftić et al. 2014).  
The current research also explores the potential utility of extending GTCD by 
introducing a sixth life domain: religion. Cochran (2015) is the first to propose any such 
an extension. He also performs the only test of an extension of Agnew’s (2005) GTCD. 
Consequently, this study represents only the second test of GTCD-E. 
Chapter Outlines 
The second chapter of this dissertation focuses on a deeper discussion of the 
theoretical background of the current study. That is, it describes theoretical competition 
and integration as opposing strategies of theory reduction, assesses the merits and 
shortcomings of each approach and argues in favor of continuing the practice of 
theoretical integration. In addition, the second chapter reviews methods of theoretical 
integration in criminology and identifies GTCD as an exemplar of Bernard and Snipes’ 
(1996) variable-centered approach to integration.  
The third chapter provides an in-depth discussion of GTCD’s foundation, 
arguments, and predictions. Next, it reviews the criminological literature surrounding 
GTCD, including empirical tests and their findings, criticisms, and Cochran’s (2015) 
proposed elaboration. Chapter 4 moves into a discussion of the analytic plan for the series 
of empirical tests performed on both theories. It provides a comprehensive discussion 
describing study hypotheses, the source from which data were drawn, the method by 
which items were selected and variables were constructed, and the analyses utilized to 
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conduct such tests. Chapter 5 is devoted to a discussion of the results of testing a number 
of GTCD’s and GTCD-E’s propositions. The sixth and final chapter seeks to discuss the 
findings reported in the previous two chapters and concludes the dissertation, providing 
policy implications that may be inferred from these tests.  
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CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Theory Reduction in Criminology: The Great Debate between Competition and 
Integration 
As alluded to in the preceding chapter, the discipline of criminology is allegedly 
plagued by a gratuitous amount of theoretical explanations for behavior and, seemingly 
ironically, an inability to adequately explain its subject matter (Bernard 1990; Bernard 
and Snipes 1996; Bernard et al. 2016; Elliott 1985; Muftić 2009; Weisburd and Piquero 
2008). This overabundance of theories directly impacts the discipline of criminology in a 
negative fashion by stagnating scientific progress, or the “accumulation of research 
findings in the context of theories” (Bernard 1990:326; Bernard and Snipes 1996). While 
most criminologists agree that too many separate theories exist within the field, 
disagreement arises regarding which solution is best to alleviate this problem (Bernard 
and Snipes 1996). The process of theory competition, or falsification, is one of two 
primary means by which to reduce the number of extant theories. Advocates of this 
method argue that separate criminological theories contain competing or contradictory 
propositions or predictions. Therefore, the process of theory competition should be 
employed to empirically pit separate theories against one another with the aim of 
supporting one and falsifying the other (Muftić 2009). Ideally, those that are empirically 
falsified are dropped from consideration, thereby reducing the overall number of 
explanations of criminal behavior. However, scholars in the other camp argue that the 
falsification process has failed thus far to reduce the number of theories and that these 
disparate theories incorporate different, but not necessarily contradictory, assumptions, 
propositions, and arguments (Bernard and Snipes 1996). Therefore, theoretical 
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integration is a welcomed alternative. This process involves merging or integrating two 
or more existing theories into a larger, unified explanation of behavior, also reducing the 
overall number of extant theories.  
Specifically, theoretical integration in criminology refers to the formulation of a 
theory that “combines variables from divergent theoretical perspectives based upon some 
logical reconciliation of different basic assumptions. It also provides some explanation of 
how the new combined predictors are related to one another as well as to criminal 
behavior in a coherent interrelated set of propositional statements" (Elliott 1985:130). 
The prospect of theoretical integration in criminology caused a rift in the discipline after 
Elliott and colleagues (1979) first attempted to unify strain, social control, and social 
learning theories into a single explanation for criminal behavior. That same year Hirschi 
(1979) authored a response to their effort in which he resolutely argued against the 
practice of integration, famously declaring that “separate and unequal is better” for the 
discipline of criminology (34). In his article, he outlines three principal forms of 
integration, critiquing each as an inadequate method of theoretical development in 
criminology. A major debate ensued during which arguments and counterarguments were 
exchanged for decades in academic journals and books (Meier 1985; Liska, Krohn, and 
Messner 1989). 
Though it has quieted in recent years, the debate is still yet to be settled. The 
scholarly literature remains quite divided with some maintaining that integration is 
beneficial and others claiming it is merely an exercise in “futilitarianism” (Tittle 
1985:95). Agnew ignited renewed interest with his call for the unification of criminology 
in 2012; however, this too seems to have fizzled of late. 
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The following discussion presents the primary scholarly arguments submitted 
regarding the limitations and virtues of theoretical integration in criminology. Arguments 
against integration are addressed first, as this is the manner in which the initial debate 
unfolded temporally, with Hirschi (1979) critiquing Elliott and colleagues’ (1979) initial 
integration attempt.  
Arguments against integration. 
“There were much of the beautiful, much of the wanton, much of the bizarre, something 
of the terrible, and not a little of that which might have excited disgust.” 
Edgar Allan Poe, The Masque of the Red Death, 2004 
Hirschi is perhaps the staunchest and most vocal opponent of theoretical 
integration (1979, 1989). His position on the matter may be summed up with a single 
quote: “To my mind, differential association is at least of some theoretical interest. I 
would not be able to speak so highly of an integrated theory of delinquency” (Hirschi 
1979:36). This statement makes clear Hirschi’s stance that integrated theories offer no 
theoretical interest or value to the discipline. 
 The chief argument against the practice of theoretical integration in criminology 
is arguably that competing theories are unfit for unification because they make 
incompatible assumptions that cannot be logically reconciled (Akers 1989; Bernard and 
Snipes 1996; Farnworth 1989; Hirschi 1969, 1979, 1989; Liska, Krohn, and Messner 
1989; Muftić 2009; Thornberry 1989; Wheeldon, Heidt, and Dooley 2014). Indeed, as 
Bernard and Snipes (1996) contend, the stances of many opponents to integration rely on 
this foundational claim. For instance, Hirschi (1969) argues that the three fundamental 
criminological theories (i.e., strain, social control, and social learning) each offer 
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contradictory assumptions about the motivation to commit crime and delinquency. Strain 
theories argue that this motivation varies as stressors pressure individuals toward crime; 
control theories claim that it is invariable, with unrestrained individuals committing crime 
due to a deterioration of ties to conventional society; and cultural deviance theories posit 
that crime is the result of subcultural norms that run counter to those of conventional 
society. They also make incompatible assumptions about human nature, with the strain 
tradition arguing that people are essentially oriented towards upholding the law but are 
pressured to break it; the control tradition stating that people are hedonistic and will 
violate norms absent sufficient checks on behavior; and the cultural deviance tradition 
claiming that people are veritable blank slates that either maintain or break the law 
according to that which they are taught (Muftić 2009). This leads him to claim that it is 
“impossible” and “pointless” to combine them in a way that honors each constituent 
theory (Hirschi 1989:39).  
In Hirschi’s (1979) opinion, the process of integration, or merging theories with 
incompatible differences, necessarily involves making inappropriate concessions on at 
least one level. In attempting to unify disparate theories, integrationists must either ignore 
inherent irreconcilable differences among component theories or misrepresent these 
constituent theories by altering them in ways that render them unrecognizable. In the 
former option, integrationists compromise their integrity by negligently or purposefully 
overlooking the fact that component theories are incompatible. This is an option that 
Thornberry (1989) notes is “logically contradictory and inappropriate” (54). The latter 
option involves the formidable task of reconciling these differences by accepting the 
assumptions of one theory and dropping those of the other. However, making such a 
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concession “compromises the integrity” of the constituent theories (Thornberry 1989:56). 
In sum, Hirschi (1979) considers integrating disparate theories to be foolish, as it results 
in a finished product that is either illogical or makes unreasonable concessions to the 
propositions of constituent theories. As such, the integrated theory will either be 
irrational, or it will be an aberration unrepresentative of its core theoretical roots: the 
theoretical equivalent of Dr. Frankenstein’s infamously calamitous creation. 
Hirschi (1979) also complains that integrational theorists often blindly accept the 
propositions of component theories as true, even if they are logically compatible. He 
seems to suggest that the reasoning for not questioning the propositions of component 
theories is rather selfish and lazy, since the more partial theories for which one accounts, 
the more explanatory power their theory achieves. He says this "appears to be unusual 
reasonableness" but may actually be "nothing more than the failure to invoke required 
scientific bases of discrimination" (36). 
Another important concern of critics is that integrated theories are far too 
complex. They require numerous propositions that link together hordes of variables in 
highly intricate ways, creating an end product that is not parsimonious (Farnworth 1989; 
Liska et al. 1989; Tittle 1985). Critics argue that this is a notable limitation because 
parsimony is a hallmark of a quality theory and facilitates the process of falsification 
(Akers 1989; Bernard 1990; Hirschi 1989). Therefore, not only may complex integrated 
theories be tough to grasp intellectually, they also may be difficult to subject to rigorous 
empirical testing. Specifically, scholars note that proper testing would be cumbersome at 
all stages of the process, including data collection, management, and analysis (Agnew 
2005). To illustrate, Agnew’s GTCD contains nearly a dozen propositions that identify 
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complex relationships (i.e., direct, indirect, linear, non-linear, interaction, and reciprocal) 
among a large number of variables. Even he admits that such integrated theories run the 
risk of overwhelming readers, hindering testing efforts, and impeding policy formation. 
Potentially as a result of this complexity, though perhaps also partially due to its 
relatively young age, GTCD has only been subjected to a handful of tests. Further, those 
that do exist are partial in that they only test one or a few specific propositions. This 
problem is somewhat ironic as integration was originally introduced as a new way to 
reduce the abundance of theories. Therefore, if integrated theories cannot be falsified, 
then they are not fulfilling one of their primary purposes (Bernard and Snipes 1996; 
Muftić 2009). 
 A final key argument against the practice of integration is that so far, all attempts 
have failed to yield the intended results (Hirschi 1979; Tittle 1985). That is, critics argue 
that integrated theories have thus far failed to explain the levels of variance in crime 
expected of them, which is their “avowed goal” (Hirschi 1979:34). This is unacceptable 
considering they have also been unsuccessful in sufficiently reducing the number of 
extant theories.  
Arguments for integration. 
“All for one; and one for all! 
Alexander Dumas, The Three Musketeers; or, The Feats and Fortunes of a Gascon 
Adventurer, 1844 
As Liska and colleagues (Liska et al. 1989) point out, Delbert Elliott is arguably 
the firmest supporter of theoretical integration in criminology. As an author of the 
catalytic study that sparked the initial theoretical debate about integration, he has spent 
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considerable energy developing and defending this practice  (Elliott 1985; Elliott, 
Ageton, and Canter 1979). Many of the arguments in favor of integration revolve around 
the perceived limitations of specific theories and integration’s potential improvements 
over the method of theory competition (Akers 1998; Bernard and Snipes 1996; Elliott 
1985; Muftić 2009; Thornberry 1987; Tittle 1985, 1995). This is perhaps due to the way 
the debate originally unfolded, as integrationists responded to Hirschi’s forceful stance 
against integration. While Hirschi (1979) views such competition as healthy, 
integrationists argue that in practice it has not been effective and produces a variety of 
negative consequences. 
Regarding the effectiveness of theory competition, Bernard (1990) states that it is 
unsuccessful and rarely leads to the rejection of theories. Instead most of the time, some 
support is found for nearly all theories, yet no theory “has been able to explain all 
variations in crime” (267). Indeed, Hirschi’s (1969; with Gottfredson 1990) own 
competitive testing efforts have failed to fully discount any of the rival theories in his 
models. For instance, in pitting his social bond theory against strain and cultural deviance 
theories, he reports that school strains are virtually, though not fully, unrelated to 
delinquency. He notes that those who “feel nervous and tense in school” are slightly more 
likely to commit delinquent acts (Hirschi 1969:127). The competitive testing efforts of 
many others have, while perhaps showing stronger support for one theory over others, 
yielded at least some level of explained variance or predictive power for most contending 
theories. In their recent test, Chouhy and colleagues (2016) find empirical support for 
three out of five core criminological theories among their sample. To further illustrate 
that competitive testing has been unsuccessful in reducing the number of theories, 
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consider that Hirschi abandoned his previous social bond theory in favor of his more 
recent general theory. Yet, while developing this new theory, he admits that social 
control, social learning, and strain theory are all “alive and well,” some even despite 
decades of empirical “pounding” (Hirschi 1989:44–49).  
The principal argument in favor of integration is that such theories exhibit 
considerably more explanatory power than traditional singular theories (Bernard et al. 
2016). This broader explanatory power involves two levels: theoretical and empirical. At 
the theoretical level, integrated theories aim to explain a greater variety of criminal 
actions, among a greater variety of offenders, in a greater number of social contexts. 
Since many integrated theories are general theories, they incorporate a broadly-defined 
dependent variable that allows them to explain a greater variety of behavior. This is also 
seen as a way to increase their explanatory power, as they are able to account for the 
widest range of behavior. For instance, Sutherland (1939) defines his dependent variable 
as acts that are in violation of the legal code, while Tittle’s (1995) integrated theory 
defines it as behavior that is generally regarded as unacceptable and that which tends to 
elicit a negative collective response upon detection. Additionally, integrated theories tend 
to incorporate a larger number of causal factors, or independent variables, than traditional 
theories. Integrationists see this as a benefit because it allows them to explain not the just 
the variation in criminal behavior, but also that of many intervening variables (Agnew 
2005; Bernard and Snipes 1996; Bernard et al. 2016; Elliott 1985).  
At the empirical level, this strength is typically referred to in terms of an increase 
in explained variance or predictive power. Many integrationists point to the inability of 
traditional theories to explain high levels of variance as problematic. As Elliott (1985) 
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asserts, these theories “typically account for only 10 percent to 20 percent of the variance 
in illegal behavior” (124). He then reviews a variety of integration attempts and 
demonstrates how they have, indeed, resulted in a greater level of overall explanatory 
power. In all, he finds an average net increase of 4 percentage points and a relative 
increase of 12 percent over previous explanations. Studies that attempted cross-level 
integration demonstrate even larger gains in the level of explained variance. This leads 
him to conclude that “traditional theories are best viewed as partial theories, and that 
integrated theoretical models can increase the level of explanatory power" (Elliott 
1985:141-142). Liska and colleagues (1989) concur with Elliott’s observation, though 
cautiously noting that an absence of definitive results from empirical testing efforts does 
not “itself call for the adoption of alternative theorizing” (4). 
Advocates of integration also argue that it promotes new modes of thinking about 
relationships among propositions and variables that will facilitate one of the theorist’s 
primary aims: explaining the dependent variable (Muftić 2009). Traditional theories and 
the process of theory competition are seen as hindering this task. Robinson (2012) 
laments about the seemingly endless cycle of “testing the same limited and disciplinary 
theories in mostly the same ways” (28). Theory competition produces specialists, 
frustrating efforts at innovation and interdisciplinary collaboration. Robinson states that 
this has produced “obstinate and stubborn” criminologists who refuse to learn alternative 
theories (32). These symptoms of theory competition impede progress, plateauing the 
discipline’s scientific trajectory and reducing its public policy utility. 
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Assessing the evidence.  
The proceeding discussion reflects on the arguments presented above in an effort 
to make an educated decision about whether attempts at theoretical integration should be 
abandoned or pursued. First, those against integration are considered. This is followed by 
an assessment of supportive arguments.  
None of the arguments against integration presented above preclude the merger of 
extant theories as a theoretical activity, except for Hirshi’s (1969, 1979, 1989) repeated 
claim that the core theories of criminology present different and fundamentally 
incompatible assumptions or propositions. Wheeldon and colleagues (2014) agree that 
this is the primary argument about the impossibility of integration and that the other 
arguments only question its utility. It is wholeheartedly agreeable that theories making 
such incompatible assumptions cannot and should not be integrated (Bernard and Snipes 
1996). However, the argument that component theories propose irreconcilable 
propositions is unconvincing. This conclusion is based primarily on the counterarguments 
proposed by Bernard and Snipes (1996) and Agnew (2011). 
Bernard and Snipes (1996) provide a commendable response to Hirschi’s 
argument that the core theories in criminology are fundamentally incompatible and 
therefore, cannot be integrated logically or without misrepresenting the spirit or intent of 
constituent theories. They agree that theories whose core arguments are incompatible 
should not and cannot be integrated, stating that any integration attempt that alters a 
constituent theory’s fundamental arguments, or otherwise fails to accurately represent the 
theory, cannot be labeled as an integration. However, they disagree that the most 
criminological theories make incompatible arguments. They demonstrate that Hirschi 
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(1979) and other detractors of integration, like Kornhauser (1978), reach this conclusion 
erroneously. In stating his case, Hirschi does not accurately represent many of the 
theories that he claims are incompatible. Hirschi's distortion of strain and cultural 
deviance theories renders his argument against integration unconvincing. Once 
interpreted correctly, strain, control, and cultural deviance theories can be integrated 
(Bernard and Snipes 1996). This is somewhat ironic, since one of Hirschi’s chief 
concerns is that constituent theories may be misrepresented during an integration attempt. 
Specifically, Bernard and Snipes (1996) argue that the location of independent 
variation of crime (i.e., social structural or individual characteristics) and the direction of 
causation of criminal behavior are valid means by which to categorize theories. 
Therefore, in terms of these two concepts, strain and cultural deviance theories are not 
incompatible. This is because both identify the location of independent variation in the 
social structure and map the direction of causation as flowing from culture to criminal 
actions (Bernard and Snipes 1996). Recall that both strain and cultural deviance theories 
propose that one’s location within the social structure is variable. Due to this variation, 
the cultural beliefs and social strains to which one is exposed vary and directly influence 
the likelihood of criminal behavior. 
More recently Agnew (2011) demonstrates how the seemingly incompatible 
primary assumptions about human nature (i.e., self-interest, altruism, or blank slate) may 
be interpreted as compatible. He argues that it is not the case that humans are simply one 
or the other, but instead can be all three. Indeed, actors can be self-interested, altruistic, 
and shaped by environmental factors at different stages along the life course. These 
modes of thought also show how different theoretical explanations are not actually 
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incompatible, as previously believed. Therefore, the only argument that precludes 
integration, indeed the point on which much of the debate against it rests, is sufficiently 
dismantled.  
Additionally, Hirschi’s claim that integrationists may misrepresent component 
theories or misconstrue their core propositions in order to force separate theories together 
in a logical fashion is a valid concern. However, it is undermined by the fact that the very 
same mistake can happen when any researcher other than the creator of a theory attempts 
an empirical test, regardless of whether the theory is integrated or not (Agnew 1991). For 
instance, it can be argued that many empirical tests finding support for Hirschi’s own 
general theory employ measurements or variables that misrepresent the spirit of the 
original theory. Hirschi and Gottfredson (1993) provide a review of select tests of their 
theory and identify some that misconstrue or conflate the concept of self-control to be a 
personality concept, as opposed to a social one. This is particularly egregious, as the 
concept of self-control as the product of parenting and other social processes is 
fundamental to the theory. Consequently, they concede that some measures of self-
control follow a “logic we explicitly reject” (49).  
Further, the onus of blame does not rest entirely on the integrationist should an 
integration attempt misrepresent a key theoretical concept. The creator of the original 
theory may also share this burden, as they may be ambiguous in their propositions or 
otherwise unclear in their theoretical formulation. For instance, Akers (1991) criticizes 
Gottfredson and Hirschi’s (1990) general theory for being unclear in its core concept’s 
connection to social bond theory, noting that aspects of self-control are similar to those of 
other social control theories; employing a confusing definition of positivism; and 
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espousing tautological propositions. Therefore, an integrationist who interprets any of 
these concepts in a way that is different from that originally intended by Gottfredson and 
Hirschi is not fully to blame. Indeed, Bernard and Snipes (1996) argue that the 
formulation of such abstract theories is the primary reason that theory competition has 
been unsuccessful in reducing the number of theories in criminology. 
While many of the other arguments against theoretical integration are strong and 
point out legitimate concerns, they are not sufficient reasons to halt the pursuit of 
unification. Rather, they may better be considered as points that facilitate the laying out 
of best practices for the integration process, identifying potential problem areas that 
should be thoughtfully considered before attempting integration. For instance, Liska and 
colleagues (1989) and Bernard and Snipes (1996) outline steps that can be taken in order 
to integrate theories without violating the spirit of constituent theories or forcing 
incompatible assumptions or arguments together.  
One may also take issue with Hirschi’s (1979) critique that integrationists blindly 
accept the propositions of component theories when incorporating them into an integrated 
model. Elliott (1985) offers a response to the statement that integrationists should not 
accept the propositions of other theories at face value. He argues that the burden in this 
case falls on the person who formulates and proposes a potential constituent theory. After 
running tests, they should revise their propositions or offer other explanations if they are 
inconsistent with empirical results. Therefore, criminological theories should not be 
introduced in the scientific literature if they contain propositions or postulates that oppose 
empirical findings. So, it is natural for the integrationist to accept some of these 
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hypotheses and other propositions "on purely logical grounds" (135). However, they are 
not blindly accepted. 
Hirschi (1979) also implies that accepting the claims of other theories is done 
selfishly for the sake of explaining more variance in criminal behavior. However, this 
practice is arguably an efficient, rather than selfish, use of extant theories. The peer-
review process exists to weed out untested or unscientific claims. Therefore, it is 
reasonable and efficient to accept the findings of peer-reviewed tests of theoretical 
propositions when incorporating them into an integrated theory. Again, it is prudent to 
use all available scientifically-derived information when attempting to explain the 
phenomenon of criminal behavior. Integrationists argue that doing so utilizes all available 
information on the strongest known correlates with and predictors of crime that have 
been gathered via scientific, systematic investigation. From this point of view, to not use 
such information is negligent, irresponsible, and the antithesis of unbiased scientific 
inquiry. They ask, is it not the basis of science to use all available information to answer 
a question? Bernard (1990) argues that positive learning, through the accumulation of 
verified knowledge, must be relied upon. So, it is a positive aspect of integration that 
such theories take scientifically-verified findings for granted, as this represents scientific 
progress. 
The claim that integrated theories are too complex, rendering them free of 
parsimony and essentially non-falsifiable is an argument which has merit. Indeed, many 
integrated theories are quite complex, involving propositions about the direct, indirect, 
reciprocal, linear, non-linear, and interactive effects found among a multitude of micro- 
and macro-level variables. Even Agnew (2005) mentions the potential difficulty inherent 
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in fully testing his theory. Still, this was certainly a more powerful argument in the past. 
This is chiefly due to advances in technology and statistical analysis. As Muftić (2009) 
points out, hierarchical linear modeling and similarly sophisticated techniques allow 
researchers to “control for the effect of both proximal (micro) and distal (macro) level 
variables on crime and delinquency,” making the process significantly more manageable 
(55). The scientific community is much more capable of collecting, managing, and 
analyzing the data required to measure complex, integrated theories. Not only is it not 
logically impossible to reconcile elements of competing theories through integration, but 
such theories are also not technically impossible to test thanks to advances in analytical 
methods and technology.  
It is also important to note that integrated theories are arguably quite 
parsimonious as they bridge multiple theories, many of which contain separate sets of 
propositions and explain various forms of deviance in differing contexts, into a single 
theoretical explanation. This is especially true for the method of conceptual integration 
and absorption exhibited by Akers (1989, 1998), as this process identifies overlap and 
commonalities among competing theories, thereby reducing redundancy. In this sense, 
integrated theories are highly parsimonious (Akers and Sellers 2017). 
Scholars point out that integration attempts have not been as successful as 
originally thought. Obviously, in many ways this is a very similar argument to that made 
by integrationists about theory competition. First, as Elliott (1985) points out, integrated 
theories have been demonstrated to produce higher levels of explained variance than 
traditional theories, though apparently not as high as Hirschi (1979) expects. There is 
another crucial difference, rendering the integrationists’ argument more compelling. In 
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this case, the argument in favor of integration is stronger if only because it advocates for 
the exploration of alternative avenues as a supplement to falsification, not the outright 
abandonment of competition (Bernard and Snipes 1996). Opponents of integration, like 
Hirschi, however, call for the total abolition of integration because it has not been 
perceived by them to produce the intended results. This is a thin argument as one need 
only turn to the likes of Albert Einstein, Nikola Tesla, the Wright brothers, or Elon Musk 
as examples. Should the Wright brothers have abandoned their efforts at flight in 1901, 
two years before their first mechanically-powered flight, because their many to-date 
efforts had previously failed to reach expectations? It seems history would suggest 
otherwise. Indeed, the scientific method is an iterative process, which involves 
incorporating and adjusting to feedback. Scientific study encourages the pursuit of 
previously unexplored frontiers. Using the scientific process to attempt that which was 
formerly thought implausible or impossible is an admirable endeavor. 
The argument that integrated theories provide increased explanatory power of 
deviance is a powerful argument in this author’s opinion. As a criminologist, the promise 
of explaining criminal behavior to a greater degree is a substantial draw because it 
demonstrates that scholars are improving in their predictive and explanatory ability, 
which builds credibility for the discipline. It also provides the important benefit of 
facilitating the formulation of policies that have an enhanced probability of effecting real, 
positive change. The importance of this cannot be overstated. 
For opponents of theoretical integration, the assertion that the sum is greater than 
its parts is a veritable siren song magnetically attracting foolish integrationists. Hirschi 
(1979) addresses this claim by arguing that much of this increase in explained variance is 
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illusory or misattributed. He argues that in many instances, due to the type of integration 
attempted, any gains in explained variance are attributable to the integrationist’s use of a 
broad and unrestricted definition of crime. However, Elliott (1985) responds to this claim 
by arguing that Hirschi draws an erroneous conclusion that is “logically unwarranted and 
contradicted by the empirical evidence” (132). Hirschi (1979) also argues that in end-to-
end integration, the last theory in the causal chain (i.e., that which is theorized to be the 
most proximate cause) subsumes all the explained variance of the previous theories. Once 
again, Elliott (1985) refutes this idea, arguing that “sequential ordering does not negate 
any causal argument about the effect of the initial variable in the causal chain” (133). 
Further, though some have attempted such restructuring of causal sequences, they are far 
from simple end-to-end integrations.  
Hirschi (1979) and Farnworth (1989) also point out that an increase in explained 
variance is not a particularly impressive feat. This is because integrated theories tend to 
involve a significantly larger number of independent variables than traditional theories. 
This alone should result in an increase in the amount of variance explained. Farnworth 
notes that the quantitative indicator of explained variance “is not synonymous with 
understanding and explanation, the real goal of a theory” (99). This is an important 
distinction and one that integrationist should pay particular attention to when evaluating 
their efforts and defending their practice. However, it is not a convincing argument to 
abandon these attempts. Additionally, it may be argued that that an increase in the 
number of independent variables included in one’s model is beneficial for causation 
analysis, as it reduces the probability of omitted variable bias. Further, modern statistical 
methods may be employed to account for any artificial increase in explanatory power that 
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may result from the inclusion of additional predictor variables, like the adjusted R-
squared coefficient calculated for multiple linear regression models. 
To say that the attempts at integration offer no unique contribution to the field of 
criminology is also an unconvincing argument to this author. With this point, Hirschi 
(1979) seems to imply that invention is the only theoretical method that would that would 
add such a unique contribution. This is curious, as he later argues that the general theory 
he produced with Gottfredson (1990) was derived not from invention, but from analyzing 
an old problem in a new manner. This is precisely what many integrationists strive to 
accomplish. This author argues that integration efforts, like those of Cloward and Ohlin 
(1960), Elliott and colleagues (1979), Tittle (1995), Thornberry (1987), Moffitt (1993), 
Akers (1998), Messner and Rosenfeld (2012), and Agnew (2005) offer at least the level 
of unique contribution to criminology as Hirschi’s (1969; with Gottfredson 1991) own 
theories. 
Integration also aids theoretical development. It fosters cooperation and often 
entails approaching issues from new vantage points, as is evidenced by Bernard and 
Snipes’ (1996) and Agnew’s (2011) arguments above regarding the compatibility of 
different theories. Tittle (1985) also discusses the ways in which integration contributes 
to the scholarly understanding of the complex relationships surrounding criminal 
behavior. According to him, integration facilitates the criminological examination of 
reciprocal relationships. While others may be concerned with one side of the chicken-
and-egg question, whether delinquent friends precede delinquent behavior or vice versa, 
Tittle argues that integrationists examine the possibility “that both are correct” 
(1985:143). Along the same lines, other integrated explanations have been employed to 
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examine common criminological correlates and problems, like the age-crime curve, the 
gender gap in offending, and the SES-delinquency link, in new light (Akers 1998; Broidy 
and Agnew 1997; De Coster and Zito 2010; Friedman and Rosenbaum 1988; Hagan, 
Gillis, and Simpson 1985; Hagan, Simpson, and Gillis 1987; Moffitt 1993; Singer and 
Levine 1988; Steffensmeier and Allen 1996; Tittle, Ward, and Grasmick 2003). More 
recently, Agnew (2011) and Robinson (2012) demonstrate that outside the box thinking, 
open-mindedness, and reconceptualization of taken-for-granted ideas is beneficial. Note 
that this is even what Hirschi (1989) argues for himself.  
In this author’s opinion, the crux of the argument against theoretical integration, 
namely that integration is logically impossible because component theories propose 
incompatible and irreconcilably different assumptions, has been sufficiently dismantled 
by the likes of Bernard and Snipes (1996) and Agnew (2013a). Hirschi has misconstrued 
strain and cultural deviance theories in building a foundation for his argument against 
integration. Therefore, the only argument that renders full integration impossible 
crumbles. As a result, this author remains unconvinced that integration attempts should 
be halted. Additionally, the potential for increasing the discipline’s ability to explain 
delinquent behavior is of utmost importance, as it facilitates the ability of practitioners to 
offer effective solutions and policy recommendations. The possibility of what integration 
hopes to accomplish is too promising and important to ignore. This author does not 
believe integration to be a fool’s errand, as Tittle (1985) puts it, or some sort of 
theoretical alchemy in which naïve scientists futilely attempt to achieve the impossible. 
Instead, this author remains hopeful and optimistic about the promise of theoretical 
integration in criminology. However, the burden lies with the integrationist, as they must 
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take great care in following the proper steps in their attempts to bridge disparate theories 
into a unified whole. The process must be done systematically and carefully in order to 
avoid creating “theoretical mush” (Akers 1989:24; Bernard and Snipes 1996:322). 
Methods of Theoretical Integration 
As stated previously, theoretical integration broadly refers to the combination of 
interrelated theoretical propositions into a unified whole with the intent of creating a 
more comprehensive explanation of a given phenomenon (Tittle 1985). Since the 
definition is so broad, there exist a variety of methods by which one may combine 
theoretical propositions. Liska and colleagues (1989) identify two broad categories of 
theoretical integration: propositional and conceptual. The former refers to the integration 
of constituent theories that proffer differing propositions and the latter refers to the 
combination of constituent theories that articulate similar concepts. In Hirschi’s (1979) 
critique of Elliott and colleagues’ (1979) integration attempt, he outlines three primary 
means of propositional theoretical integration: end-to-end, side-by-side, and up-and-
down. One can infer from Hirschi’s description that these methods are not mutually 
exclusive, and that a given attempt at integration may incorporate more than one strategy. 
Additionally, they may all be employed at any level of theoretical explanation: micro-, 
macro-, and between-level analysis (Liska et al. 1989). Recently, Muftić (2009) called for 
renewed efforts at micro-macro theoretical integration. In sum, theoretical integration in 
criminology may be approached by a variety of means. Each is described below with 
examples provided throughout. This section concludes with a discussion of Bernard and 
Snipes’ (1996) variable-centered approach, since it is employed by Agnew (2005) to 
create GTCD. 
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The first method of theoretical integration outlined by Hirschi (1979) is end-to-
end, or sequential, integration. This process involves arranging the concepts or 
propositions of various theories together into a new developmental sequence. In creating 
this temporal sequence, the dependent variables of some theories become the independent 
variables of others. In essence, the concepts of constituent theories are laid out end-to-end 
to form a longer causal chain. As Liska and colleagues (1989) note, this form of 
integration is best-suited for circumstances that permit organizing the causal variables 
along a continuum, ranging from indirect to immediate, direct causes. For instance, the 
order may begin by arguing that social disorganization impedes access to legitimate 
opportunities, increasing exposure to delinquent peers, which then influences individual 
delinquency.  
Elliott and colleagues (1979) are noted for their early attempt at the end-to-end 
propositional integration of strain, social control, and social learning theories in order to 
explain sustained patterns of delinquency. This is an appropriate example to discuss as it 
is widely regarded as the impetus of the debate about integration in criminology. They 
argue that juveniles differ in the socialization they experience from an early age, resulting 
in varying levels of strength of internal and external bonds to conventional society. The 
authors define internal bonds as commitment to conventional society and external bonds 
as integration into conventional groups or institutions. These bonds are malleable; 
therefore, their strength may be altered by a variety of adolescent experiences. 
Attenuating variables are those that negatively impact and weaken such ties. These 
include strains like limited opportunities, failure in conventional activities or institutions, 
negative labeling experiences, and social disorganization. According to the authors, an 
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attenuation or complete severing of ties to the conventional social order cannot account 
for sustained delinquency by itself. Noting that not all who have such ties engage in 
delinquency, they argue that criminal behavior must be learned and reinforced to persist. 
Therefore, they must introduce variables from social learning theories, demonstrating the 
importance of delinquent peer groups. Elliott and colleagues propose that early 
socialization affects the strength of one’s social bonds (control), which influences their 
social experiences (strain), which affects the strength of their social bonds (control), 
which affects their bonding to peer groups (social learning), which influences individual 
delinquent behavior. The authors note that social bonds and strain can directly lead to 
delinquency. However, they maintain that the effect of these variables is primarily 
indirect, operating through delinquent peer groups. 
In the end, Elliott and colleagues (1979) propose two paths to delinquency, with 
each identifying social learning processes, principally strong bonding to delinquent peer 
groups, as the immediate cause of delinquency. Their first model is a merger of social 
control and social learning theories that applies to individuals whose early socialization 
resulted in weak bonds to conventional society.  Here, inadequate socialization leads to 
weak bonds to society, which results in an increased strength of bonds to delinquent peer 
groups, which then facilitates the social learning of crime, resulting in sustained patterns 
of delinquent behavior. The second path is an integration of strain, social control, and 
social learning theories aimed at explaining delinquency among individuals whose early 
socialization produced strong bonds to conventional society. In this case, strong initial 
bonds are weakened by strain and other attenuating experiences. This leads to the 
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creation of strong bonds to delinquent peer groups, increasing the social learning of 
delinquency, and ultimately increasing the likelihood of patterns of criminal behavior. 
Next, side-by-side, or parallel or horizontal, propositional integration involves 
placing constituent theories next to one another and identifying the cases to which each 
applies (Hirschi 1979). To explain, the propositions of various partial theories may be 
chosen to explain diverse categories of offenders (e.g., adolescent or adult, male or 
female) or forms of criminal behavior (e.g., violent crime, drug crime, or financial 
crime). For this reason, such integration tends to produce typologies of criminal behavior 
and/or offenders (Muftić 2009). Hirschi (1979) also notes that side-by-side integration 
avoids having to confront the issue of reconciling the incompatible assumptions of 
constituent theories.  
Moffitt’s (1993) developmental taxonomy is an oft-cited example of side-by-side 
propositional integration as an attempt to explain antisocial behavior exhibited among 
two types of offender. This theory draws upon neuropsychological concepts in addition to 
those of social control theory, social learning, and social disorganization perspectives. It 
involves partitioning delinquents into two types based on the developmental pathways 
they follow; one is pathological while the other is normative. The two qualitatively 
distinct groups comprising this dual-taxonomy are life-course-persistent offenders (LCPs) 
and adolescence-limited offenders (ALs). Therefore, antisocial behaviors exhibited by 
each group have distinct etiologies, affecting the characteristics and continuity of their 
deviance. 
Moffitt (1993) argues that LCPs comprise a small fraction of the total number of 
delinquent adolescents. For LCPs, delinquency is developed early in life. The root cause 
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of criminal behavior for LCPs lies in neuropsychological risk and a criminogenic 
environment. Neuropsychological problems influence difficult behavior and interact with 
the effects of criminogenic environments. In childhood, LCPs exhibit neuropsychological 
variation that is manifested in “subtle cognitive deficits” and “difficult temperament” 
(2001:356). Criminogenic social environments are characterized by poor parenting, poor 
family bonds, poverty, and later poor relations to peers and teachers. This sets the stage 
for antisocial behavior through a process of evocative interaction, in which children with 
such problems may evoke changes from their social setting that exacerbate, rather than 
moderate, their deviant behavior, which makes them "more vulnerable to criminogenic 
environments" (Moffitt 1993:682). These failures and difficulties experienced early on 
add up through cumulative and contemporary continuity, limiting future opportunities for 
these youths. They also have a snowball effect, accumulating and eventually impeding 
prosocial behavior. In the face of “narrowing life options” and diminished ability to 
achieve goals through conventional behavior, along with their “maladaptive individual 
dispositions,” LCPs turn to illegitimate, deviant means (Moffit 1993:695). They persist in 
their antisocial behavior as they age, failing to learn prosocial alternative behaviors and 
becoming ensnared in a deviant pattern of behavior due to the consequences of past 
criminality. As a result of this cumulative effect, Moffitt expects that the life-course 
transitions that normally influence desistence from crime, like marriage or employment, 
to have little effect on LCPs. 
LCPs engage in a variety of criminal behaviors individually and in groups, 
committing a wider variety of delinquent acts than do ALs. Though it may manifest itself 
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differently, in the form of different kinds of deviance, as an LCP ages, the underlying 
disposition remains constant. 
ALs are youth who came of age in a normal, healthy manner. For ALs, 
delinquency develops at a later stage in life. The motivation of their delinquent behavior 
is a maturity gap arising during puberty, in which youth are biologically mature, but 
socially immature. These adolescents are becoming adults biologically, but since they 
still inhabit the role of a minor, do not enjoy the social or legal privileges that accompany 
adulthood. As a result of this maturity gap, they experience dysphoria and tend to adapt 
through social learning, especially mimicry, of delinquency exhibited by LCPs. Such 
delinquency allows them to “demonstrate autonomy from parents, win affiliation with 
peers, and hasten social maturation” (Moffitt and Caspi 2001:356). ALs tend to engage in 
group delinquency. Their delinquent behaviors tend to symbolize independence and 
adulthood, including status offenses, public order offenses, vandalism, and theft. This is 
found among males with a “tendency to endorse unconventional values, with a 
personality trait called social potency, and with nonviolent delinquent offenses” (Moffitt 
and Caspi 2001:357). This delinquent behavior is then sustained according to the 
reinforcement principals of social learning theory. 
The delinquent patterns of behavior do not persist indefinitely, however. As these 
youths age, the maturity gap closes, and they are bestowed with the rights and 
responsibilities of adulthood. For this reason, their delinquency is temporary. They 
eventually desist as they progress through the life-course because the motivation towards 
delinquency is lost as there is no longer a need to demonstrate one’s maturity and 
autonomy. Aging introduces new social roles and responsibilities which are perceived as 
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things that should be held onto and not lost due to criminal activity. Crime is 
incompatible with their responsibilities as adults. For instance, substance abuse makes it 
hard to get to work, arrests make it hard to keep one’s job, and DUI’s may cause 
considerable financial loss. As a result, ALs weigh “commitment costs” as they decide to 
desist in their offending. This process is facilitated by their healthy development because, 
without the cumulative and contemporary continuity or cognitive deficits of their LCP 
contemporaries, ALs enjoy significantly greater options to for altering their behavior in 
prosocial ways. Moffitt (1993) argues that the vast majority of delinquent adolescents are 
ALs, leading to the description of such deviance as “normative rather than abnormal” 
(692). 
Side-by-side integration is achieved in DTT as Moffitt (1993) selects propositions 
from diverse disparate theories and fields (i.e., neuropsychology and social control), to 
explain the behavior of two separate groups of criminal offenders across the life course. 
Separate causal explanations are presented to account for the differences in onset and 
continuity of criminal offending. These extant explanations are separated according to the 
type of case to which each applies (Hirschi 1979). 
Up-and-down, or deductive, integration is the final method of theoretical 
integration proposed by Hirschi (1979) as well as the least-commonly employed strategy 
by integrationists (Muftić 2009). In this case, the integrationist “raises the level of 
abstraction” of a theory until it can incorporate the concepts of another theory (36). In 
other words, a general theory is formed by rising to a level of generality that accounts for 
at least some of the principles of various constituent theories (Liska et al. 1989). 
Therefore, the propositions of more specific theories may be arranged in such a way that 
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they logically follow, and thus may be deduced, from the “conceptually broader theory” 
(Bernard and Snipes 1996:308). For instance, the integrationist may argue that a given 
theory offers more abstract propositions than another theory and, as such, may 
incorporate some of the latter theory’s elements (Liska et al. 1989). This is referred to as 
theoretical reduction. Another form of up-and-down integration is known as theoretical 
synthesis. In this case, the integrationist argues that the level of abstraction for multiple 
existing theories may be raised to form an entirely new general theory. 
Distinct from propositional integration, conceptual integration, or conceptual 
absorption, involves identifying similar or related concepts among disparate theories and 
combining them into a single explanation (Liska et al. 1989). Though such terms 
themselves may be different, the meanings and operationalizations “overlap 
conceptually” and are arguably similar (Akers 1989). Therefore, those of one theory may 
simply be subsumed by the other. Akers (1989) argues that concepts from several leading 
criminological theories, like anomie/strain and social control, may be conceptually 
absorbed into social learning theory. For instance, the social learning concept of 
reinforcement, in the form of rewards and punishments, is conceptually similar to anomie 
theory’s concept of strain, or the disconnect between legitimate goals and culturally-
approved means of goal attainment (Cohen 1955; Cloward and Ohlin 1959; Merton 
1939). Specifically, the inability to obtain one’s goals through appropriate methods is 
arguably a response to one’s efforts, through which one either learns to continue or 
discontinue a given behavior. Therefore, Akers (1998) argues that social learning theory 
can absorb this concept from anomie theory, along with a variety of others. 
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Bernard and Snipes’ (1996) variable-centered method of integration.  
More recently, Bernard and Snipes (1996) propose a variable-centered method of 
theoretical integration that, as its name implies, focuses on the known correlates of crime. 
The authors argue that theoretical criminology neglects the concrete variables that have 
been demonstrated to cause crime themselves. A focus on the known predictors of crime 
promises to create powerful theories by paying less regard to the various constituent 
theories and dedicating more attention to explaining the nature of the relationship 
between individual predictor variables and crime, as well as each other. Indeed, Bernard 
and Snipes (1996) contend that criminologists should not be concerned with which 
constituent theory “owns” which variables but should instead examine “which variables 
are related to crime in which ways” (322).  
As mentioned previously, Bernard and Snipes (1996) first argue that 
criminological theories should be interpreted according to where they locate independent 
variation and their direction of causation. They further contend that the level of data 
analysis should match the level of theoretical argument and that theories should be built 
using the same level of data for their dependent and independent variables. Structural 
variation theories attempt to explain how variable structural conditions influence 
otherwise “normal” individuals to commit crime. Here, variables like social 
disorganization, low collective efficacy, social learning environments, cultural pressures, 
and social expectations influence deviant and criminal behavior (Akers 1973, 1998; 
Bandura 1977; Burgess and Akers 1966; Cloward and Ohlin 1960; Cohen 1955; Cohen 
and Felson 1979; Merton 1938; Park 1936; Park and Burgess 1926; Sampson 1986, 2012; 
Sampson and Groves 1989; Shaw and McKay 1942; Sutherland 1939). Structural 
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variation theories tend to explain aggregate-level outcomes (e.g., crime rates) and, 
therefore, should use aggregate-level data (e.g., group-level characteristics). 
Additionally, individual difference theories identify the location of independent 
variation as characteristics of the individual. That is, they identify the mechanisms by 
which variation in individual characteristics cause crime, despite experiencing similar 
structural conditions (Gottfredson and Hirschi 1991; Hirschi 1969, Nye 1958; Sykes and 
Matza 1957). Therefore, it is inherent differences between individuals (e.g., irritability, 
level of self-control, treatment by peers, parental relationships, and academic 
achievement) that are the causes of deviant and criminal behavior. As a result, these 
theories should be examined using individual-level data.  
This characterization of theories represents a prominent shift away from the 
practice of categorizing theories as either strain, control, or cultural deviance (Bernard 
and Snipes 1996). Both structural variation and individual difference theories, however, 
attribute variation in criminal behavior and crime rates to the influence of multiple factors 
(Bernard and Snipes 1996). It is precisely these factors and the relationships between 
these variables to which criminologists should pay particular attention. Doing so has the 
added benefit of being easily translatable to law- and policymakers.  
Bernard and Snipes (1996) also contend criminologists should move away from 
competitive testing, as the falsification process is flawed and ultimately fails to reduce the 
number of existing theories. Indeed, they claim that pitting theories against one another is 
“almost always inappropriate at the theoretical level” (1996:303). This is because almost 
all different theories explain some variation in the dependent variable. That is, all or most 
of the theories involved contribute some level of explanation for criminal behavior.  
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Therefore, the authors propose a variable-centered approach, arguing that the 
focus should be on “variables and the relations among variables” (Bernard and Snipes 
1996:322). This proposed approach facilitates empirical testing since the concrete factors 
related to crime, like low self-control, are readily observable and measurable. This is 
highly significant, as abstract or ambiguous propositions and concepts are difficult to 
measure and falsify. Once again, the primary focus on variables and relationships among 
them is shown. Bernard and Snipes (1996) argue that through this method, criminological 
theories can be integrated within the same classification and between classifications. 
 Chouhy and colleagues (2016) seem to support this method of integration as they 
promote efforts to identify criminogenic risk factors associated with deviance. They 
argue that the first step in this process is to organize existing theories in a way that 
permits scholars to identify the “relative importance of the sources of criminal 
involvement” (244). Ultimately, Agnew (2005) is inspired by Bernard and Snipes’ (1996) 
work, as he employs their variable approach to integration in formulating GTCD.  
Agnew’s (2005) GTCD is an individual difference theory according to Bernard 
and Snipes’ (1996) classification, since it asks, “why are some individuals more likely 
than others to engage in crime” (Agnew 2005:2)? Agnew begins by outlining seven 
questions he argues a general theory must answer to be complete, or to exhibit a 
sufficiently broad scope. This set of questions closely aligns with the variable-centered 
approach’s focus on relations among variables. For Agnew, a complete general theory 
must first identify: (a) the major causes of crime, (b) why these factors increase the 
likelihood of crime, (c) how they relate to one another, and (d) how they interact in 
influencing crime. A complete theory must also address: (e) the reciprocal effects crime 
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exhibits on its causes, (f) the time and form of causal affects, and (g) what factors affect 
the level and operation of the direct causes of crime. That is, these questions must be 
answered to fully explain the dependent variable and to provide actionable information 
that policymakers may use to develop effective crime control, intervention, and 
prevention programs. The influence of Bernard and Snipes’ (1996) variable approach and 
Agnew’s commitment to explaining the relations among multiple factors related to crime 
is abundantly clear. Agnew (2005) disparages the temptation for theorists (e.g., Colvin 
2000) to focus on only one or a handful of causal variables, as this inevitably neglects 
other major, empirically-demonstrated causes of crime. 
While the utility of a theory that answers these questions is obvious, one that 
addresses each of these runs the risk of being too complex, abstract, and difficult to test. 
Indeed, these characteristics describe a theory that is not parsimonious, which essentially 
negates any potential benefits derived from the broad scope. Therefore, theorists must 
tread a fine line between these two competing aims of scope and parsimony when 
formulating a general theory. They face the formidable task of generating a theory that is 
“reasonably complete,” yet “not so complex as to overwhelm readers” (Agnew 2005:10). 
Agnew finds middle ground by proposing a theory that broadly focuses on the majority 
of, though not all, known major and direct causes of crime. He also attempts to explain a 
wide variety of, again not all, relationships between the factors that are linked to criminal 
behavior. 
How can such a theory be organized to best facilitate the examination of the 
factors affecting crime and the relations among them? For Agnew, the answer lies in 
parsing these causal variables out according to life domain: self, family, peer, school, and 
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employment. The variables that comprise each of these life domains share common root 
causes and primarily exert direct effects on crime, or “behaviors that are generally 
condemned and that carry a significant risk of sanction by the state if detected” (Agnew 
2005:12). Life domain variables are also argued to increase the likelihood of crime by 
decreasing individual constraints against such behavior and/or increasing one’s 
motivations towards it.  
Following Bernard and Snipes’ (1996) variable-centered method of integration, 
Agnew’s (2005) primary theoretical concern is explaining the various and intricate 
associations between life domain variables and crime, as well as their relations among 
each other. Also following Bernard’s (1990) advice, Agnew parsimoniously presents his 
theory in a series of “separate falsifiable propositions” to facilitate empirical evaluation 
and testing of GTCD (335). In doing so, Agnew (2005) proactively confronts the 
common criticisms that integrated theories are too abstract or gratuitously complex, 
rendering them difficult to test and ultimately, unfalsifiable (Akers 1989; Bernard 1990; 
Bernard and Snipes 1996; Farnworth 1989; Hirschi 1989; Liska et al. 1989; Muftić 2009; 
Tittle 1985).  
Agnew (2005) devotes considerable attention to justifying why he separates 
GTCD’s propositions in an effort to show how the falsification of one, or a set, would or 
would not affect the others. Not only does this follow Bernard’s (1990) recommendation, 
but it proactively promotes theoretical modification and elaboration. This demonstrates 
Agnew’s (2005) dedication to explaining criminal behavior and the scientific process. It 
also highlights a lack of concern with GTCD belonging only to him (Bernard 1990; 
Bernard and Snipes 1996). Indeed, at several points, Agnew states that he is highly open 
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to modification of GTCD if empirical evidence contradicts its propositions at any stage. 
The chapter that follows is dedicated to a more thorough review of GTCD and a 
discussion of previous attempts to empirically evaluate its propositions.  
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CHAPTER 3: LITERATURE REVIEW 
Agnew’s General Theory of Crime and Deviance 
Agnew’s (2005) GTCD begins with the foundational argument that criminal 
behavior is most likely to occur when constraints for committing such acts are low and 
motivations towards them are high (Agnew 1992; Akers 1973, 1998; Akers et al. 1979; 
Anderson 1999; Bandura 1977; Beccaria 1872; Bentham 1823; Burgess and Akers 1966; 
Cloward and Ohlin 1960; Cohen 1955; Cohen and Felson 1979; Gottfredson and Hirschi 
1990; Hagan et al. 1985; Hagan et al. 1987; Hirschi 1969; Merton 1938; Nye 1958; Park 
1936; Park and Burgess 1926; Sampson 1986, 2012; Sampson and Groves 1989; 
Sampson and Laub 1992, 1994, 1995; Shaw and McKay 1942; Sutherland 1939; Sykes 
and Matza 1957). A wealth of existing scientific research shows that myriad individual 
and social variables affect constraints and motivations, from social psychological ones, 
like low self-control and irritability, to more social variables, like peer relations and work 
conditions.  
Agnew’s (2005) principal contribution lies in his innovative method of grouping 
these causal variables. Criminological theorists may be tempted to group these variables 
according to the type of constraint (i.e., external control, stake in conformity, and internal 
control) or motivation (i.e., strain, reinforcements for crime, exposure to successful 
criminal models, and beliefs favorable to crime) they index. But Agnew (2005) cautions 
against this practice, claiming that many variables “affect more than one type of 
constraint or motivation” or both (39). For example, poor academic performance may 
reduce one’s stake in conformity, a constraint against crime, and increase one’s strain, a 
motivation towards criminal behavior.  
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Instead, in his second proposition, he advocates grouping them into five clusters 
called life domains: self, family, school, peer, and work. He states that the life domains 
directly and indirectly promote crime by means of reducing the constraints against such 
behavior and increasing the motivations for it. The next sections delve into a deeper 
discussion of Agnew’s theory, including constraints, motivations, life domains, and 
additional propositions. 
Constraints against crime.  
As stated previously, Agnew’s (2005) initial theoretical proposition is that crime 
is most probable when constraints against it are low and motivations towards it are high. 
Briefly, constraints are factors that discourage an individual from committing crime. 
Here, Agnew draws heavily upon social control theory, self-control theory, deterrence 
theory, rational choice theory, routine activities theory, and social learning theory (Akers 
1973, 1998; Akers et al. 1979; Anderson 1999; Bandura 1977; Beccaria 1872; Bentham 
1823; Burgess and Akers 1966; Cohen 1955; Cohen and Felson 1979; Gottfredson and 
Hirschi 1991; Hagan et al. 1985; Hagan et al. 1987; Hirschi 1969; Nye 1958; Sampson 
and Laub 1992, 1995; Sutherland 1939; Sykes and Matza 1957).  
Agnew (2005) identifies three primary forms of constraints: external control, 
stake in conformity, and internal control. First, external control refers to process of others 
identifying and punishing an individual’s delinquent behavior on a consistent basis. 
Agnew notes that the external control exercised by significant others, like parents or 
spouses, is often more substantial than external control exercised by formal entities, like 
school authorities or law enforcement officials. Indicators of high external control exerted 
upon an individual include the implementation of clearly-defined rules and expectations 
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for behavior, regular supervision of behavior, and consistent and proportionate 
sanctioning of deviant behavior. Clear rules that define appropriate behavior increase 
one’s exposure to definitions unfavorable towards delinquency (Akers 1973, 1998, Akers 
et al. 1979; Anderson 1999; Bandura 1977; Burgess and Akers 1966; Sutherland 1939) 
and often signal the consequences of violating such rules (Beccaria 1872; Bentham 1823; 
Hirschi 1969). Both direct and indirect forms of supervision are powerful deterrents to 
deviant behavior and association with delinquent peers (Anderson 1999; Bentham 1823; 
Cernkovich and Giordano 1987; Nye 1958; Vazsonyi and Flannery 1997; Warr 2005). 
Lastly, discipline that is commensurate with an offense and consistently applied provides 
the strongest deterrent effects (Akers 1973, 1998; Akers et al. 1979; Anderson 1999; 
Bandura 1977; Beccaria 1872; Bentham 1823; Burgess and Akers 1966). As Beccaria 
(1872) proposes, “The certainty of a small punishment will make a stronger impression, 
than the fear of one more severe” (93). 
Next, stake in conformity refers to one’s “investment in conventional society,” or 
that which they stand to lose should they commit crime (Hirschi 1969:20). This draws on 
Hirschi’s concept of commitment as a constraint against criminal behavior. It is 
constraining because persons with a greater stake in conformity have much to lose if they 
are arrested and punished for illegal acts. One’s stake in conformity may be cultivated 
through strong social bonds to conventional others, taking part in activities with 
conventional others, strong school and employment performance, and positive 
reputations from conventional others. The consequences of crime may jeopardize one’s 
relations with others, standing in various organizations, and ability to engage in desirable 
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activities, and level of capital. It is the threat of losing something valuable that deters 
criminal behavior (Beccaria 1872; Bentham 1823). 
The third type of constraint, internal control, refers to one’s ability to refrain from 
crime due to either an internalized belief that crime is wrong or a high level of self-
control. Those high in internal control are better equipped to successfully resist the draw 
of criminal behavior. This form of constraint arises from Nye’s (1958) conscience as a 
cluster of control and Hirschi’s (1969) social bond elements of attachment and belief. 
Nye (1958) identifies one’s conscience as the profound sense of guilt that dissuades one 
from violating rules. It is theorized as the most powerful source of control preventing 
humans from engaging in criminal or deviant behavior. Hirschi (1969) expands on this 
concept by introducing attachment as the level of care afforded to the opinions of others 
and belief as the level of understanding and endorsement of conventional rules and 
values. Individuals that care little about other’s reactions to their deviant behavior are less 
likely to be deterred by the potential of hurting or disappointing them through crime. 
Similarly, those that do not accept conventional rules as legitimate are less likely to abide 
by them. 
Motivations towards crime.  
Motivations for crime are essentially the opposite of constraints in that they are 
forces that either entice or pressure an individual to violate norms. Those factors that 
draw a person into crime are primarily drawn from deterrence theory, rational choice 
theory, routine activities theory and social learning theory (Akers 1973, 1998; Akers et al. 
1979; Anderson 1999; Bandura 1977; Burgess and Akers 1966; Cohen and Felson 1979; 
Sutherland 1938). Those that pressure a person into crime are derived from strain theory 
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(Agnew 1992, 2001; Agnew and White 1992; Cloward and Ohlin 1960; Cohen 1955; 
Merton 1938). Agnew (2005) categorizes motivations that encourage criminality into 
three types: reinforcements for crime, exposure to successful criminal models, and 
exposure to beliefs favorable to crime. These all stress the mechanisms by which criminal 
behaviors and attitudes are learned. Lastly, Agnew refers to those motivations that push 
an individual towards crime as strains. 
Reinforcements for crime strengthen the likelihood that a behavior will be 
repeated or continued (Akers 1973, 1998; Akers et al. 1979; Burgess and Akers 1977; 
Bandura 1977). Reinforcements may be positive or negative. The former strengthens a 
behavior by introducing a reward for the respondent, like the euphoria following 
substance use, the monetary gain from burglary, or the ensuing feelings of peer 
affirmation and prestige arising from gang membership. On the other hand, negative 
reinforcements strengthen a behavior by removing a negatively-valued stimulus or 
stopping an event that the respondent desires to be stopped. For example, a negative 
reinforcement for truancy might be the experience of respite from the physical 
harassment of schoolmates. Similarly, the act of running away from home may be 
negatively reinforced since it may provide a desired break from parental abuse and family 
conflict. 
Agnew (2005) argues that exposure to successful criminal models and beliefs 
favorable to crime promote criminal behavior because humans tend to imitate the 
behaviors of and adopt the values of significant others. Therefore, an individual is more 
likely to engage in criminal behavior when they are differentially exposed to significant 
others espousing definitions favorable towards crime, modeling efficient and successful 
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techniques of committing criminal behavior, and reaping the rewards of such action 
repeatedly over time (Akers 1973, 1998; Akers et al. 1979; Anderson 1999; Burgess and 
Akers 1977; Bandura 1977; Sutherland 1938). For example, a child that witnesses their 
mother successfully steal on multiple occasions is likely to imitate that behavior.  
In addition to those motivations that encourage criminality through enticement, 
there are also motivations that pressure or coerce individuals into criminal behavior, to 
which Agnew refers as strains. Strains are negative social relationships through which an 
individual develops negative emotions. Criminal behavior, then, is an adaptation to strain 
that attempts to alleviate the individual’s negative affective state. There exist three 
primary forms of strain: the actual or anticipated failure to achieve positively-valued 
goals, the removal of positively-valued stimuli, and/or the introduction of negatively-
valued stimuli (Agnew 1992, 2001; Agnew and White 1992; Cloward and Ohlin 1960; 
Cohen 1955; Merton 1938). These are derived directly from Agnew’s (1992, 2001; with 
White 1992) GST.  
Agnew (2001) notes that not all strains are equal and that some characteristics of a 
strain increase the likelihood that an individual will cope via deviant or criminal means. 
For example, strains are more likely to elicit a criminal reaction if they are perceived by 
the individual as unjust or unfair. This includes those that the strained individual feels 
undeserving of (e.g., bullying and discrimination), rather than those whose cause is 
attributed to chance (e.g., an accident or illness). Those perceived by the strained 
individual as high in magnitude are also more strongly related to criminal behavior. This 
includes those high in degree (e.g., financial cost or subcultural beliefs), frequency, 
duration, recency, or centrality (e.g., threatening the core aspects of the individual).  
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Additionally, strains related to low social and self-control increase the probability 
of crime. This specifically includes those associated with low levels of supervision, 
commitment, and belief in conventional norms or values. For instance, Agnew (2001) 
argues that a strain experienced by an individual whose behavior is rarely monitored and 
who exhibits low levels of belief in conventional society is more likely to produce 
criminal behavior than a comparable strain experienced by an individual upon whom 
higher levels of social control are exerted. Finally, strains that create pressure for criminal 
coping are also more likely to provoke criminal behaviors. Examples of such strains 
include those that are associated with exposure to successful criminal models, increased 
reinforcement for crime, and enhanced exposure to beliefs favorable towards crime (e.g., 
child abuse and peer conflict). Agnew (2001) considers each of these four characteristics 
to be of equal theoretical import.  
Life domains.  
Agnew’s (2005) life domain-oriented grouping scheme allows those variables 
with similar root causes to be clustered together. According to him, each cause should be 
part of only one category. Admittedly, variables in different life domains may also have 
common causes, but Agnew states that these instances are few in number and weak in 
association. Agnew’s rationale for this argument is that the variables within each life 
domain tend to be socially, physically, and temporally isolated from those in other life 
domains. The five life domains (i.e., self, family, school, peer, and employment) contain 
only those variables which previous research has confirmed to exhibit moderate to large 
direct effects on crime. All variables within any given life domain either directly reduce 
constraints against crime or increase motivations towards crime. 
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The self domain is divided into the two traits of low self-control and irritability. 
According to the Agnew (2005), low self-control is indicated by impulsivity, lack of 
ambition, and lack of consideration of future consequences of behavior. Irritability is 
evidenced by showing little concern for others, being antagonistic, and feeling intense 
emotional reactions to negative events. These two key variables directly diminish 
constraints against crime and increase the motivations for it. For example, those with low 
self-control are expected to have low internal control and fewer stakes in conformity. 
They are also more likely to hold beliefs favorable to crime, find crime rewarding, and 
respond to strain with crime. Similarly, those possessing the trait of irritability are 
typically low in internal control and resistant to external control. They are also more 
likely to perceive events or situations as strain and to respond with crime. Finally, they 
are also more likely to hold beliefs favorable to crime.  
 The family domain promotes crime in children and adolescents through negative 
bonding to parents, poor supervision and discipline, family conflict and abuse, absence of 
positive parenting, and criminal family members. Agnew presents a different set of 
variables for adults: failure to marry, negative bonding to spouse and/or children, 
negative bonding to children, having a criminal spouse, low levels of supervision and 
discipline from one’s spouse, family conflict or abuse, and low levels of spousal social 
support. 
Agnew (2005) proposes that the key variables affecting criminality in the school 
domain are negative bonding to teachers or school, poor academic performance, little 
time spent completing homework, low educational and occupational aspirations, poor 
school supervision and discipline, negative treatment by teachers, and the absence of 
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positive teaching. As with the family domain, the general theory states that the significant 
variables in this domain are different for adults than youths, as the majority of adults are 
not enrolled in school. Therefore, he states that adults are more susceptible to crime if 
they have low levels of education. However, Agnew notes that this effect is likely to be 
indirect, only affecting crime through other life domains (e.g., work and family). 
The peer domain causes criminality in youth whose close friends commit crime, 
experience peer conflict or abuse, and spend much time in unstructured and unsupervised 
settings. Agnew posits that adults are not as likely as adolescents to be acquainted with 
delinquent peers. This is due primarily to the fact that crime tends to decline with age and 
that peer relations are often less of a priority than family and work relations. Despite this, 
Agnew posits that the peer domain should have a significant effect on crime for some 
adults, specifically those with poor or no work or marital ties.  
The employment domain is GTCD’s final grouping. Unemployment, poor work 
supervision or discipline, negative bonding to work, poor work performance and 
conditions, and criminal coworkers are the most important variables in this domain that 
affect crime.  
GTCD also proposes that the relative effect on crime exhibited by specific life 
domains varies according to the developmental stage the individual inhabits. In other 
words, it is an age-graded theory in that it outlines specific predictions about the causes 
of crime for each stage of development throughout the life course. The variables within 
the life domains expected to have the largest effect on crime are different for children, 
adolescents, and adults. Further, within each stage of development, some variables are 
predicted to have larger effects than others.  
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For example, the family and self domains exhibit the largest effect during 
childhood. Specifically, Agnew (2005) predicts that poor parenting, irritability, and low 
self-control reduce constraints against delinquency and increase motivations for it. Since 
children spend relatively little time in school or among peers at this age, these domains 
are expected to exert only small to moderate effects on criminal behavior.  
It is the self and peer domains, specifically low self-control, irritability, and peer 
delinquency, that emerge as the most significant influences on delinquency during 
adolescence. During this time period, the family’s influence is replaced by that of peers, 
as the individual spends increasing amounts of time with friends. The school and 
employment domains should only minimally or moderately affect criminality at this age 
because educators and employment do not yet “play a central role in their lives” (Agnew 
2005:57).  
During adulthood the self, peer, family, and employment domains are expected to 
exhibit the strongest effects on crime. Specifically, the two personality traits, peer 
delinquency, no or poor marriages, and unemployment or bad jobs are likely to produce 
crime. The school domain is expected to have only have a small or moderate effect at this 
stage, as most adults have completed their education by the time they enter adulthood. 
According to Agnew (2005), the school domain may exhibit an indirect effect on crime 
through other life domains. Additionally, the effect of parenting should be minimal since 
parents play a less central role in the lives of adults than children. Figure 1 illustrates 
GTCD’s proposed effects of life domains on constraints against crime, motivations 
towards it, and criminal behavior. 
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SELF     
Irritability  
Low Self-Control 
  
Irritability  
Low Self-Control 
  
   
FAMILY   
Negative Bonding 
Poor Supervision/Discipline 
  
CONSTRAINTS AGAINST CRIME 
Failure to marry 
Negative bonding to 
spouse/children 
Family conflict/abuse 
Poor supervision/Discipline 
External control 
Stake in conformity 
Internal control 
 
 
   
PEER   
Peer delinquency 
Peer conflict/abuse 
Unstructured/unsupervised activities 
 CRIME 
 
Peer delinquency   
   
SCHOOL MOTIVATIONS FOR CRIME  
Negative bonding to teachers/school 
Poor academic performance 
Little time spent on homework 
Low educational/occupational goals 
Poor school supervision/discipline 
Poor treatment by teachers 
Absence of positive teaching 
Reinforcements for crime 
Exposure to criminal models 
Beliefs favorable to crime 
Strains 
 
 
Low educational attainment   
   
EMPLOYMENT   
Unemployment 
Poor work supervision/discipline 
Negative bonding to work 
Poor work 
performance/conditions 
Criminal coworkers 
  
     
Notes: Variables with relatively large effects are indicated by bold font. Variables affecting adolescence are 
illustrated with a gray background and those affecting adulthood are shown with a white background. 
Source: Agnew, Robert. 2005. Why Do Criminals Offend? A General Theory of Crime and Delinquency. New York, 
NY: Oxford University Press. Adapted with permission. 
     
Figure 1 Agnew’s (2005) General Theory of Crime and Delinquency 
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The General Theory’s remaining propositions.  
Recall Agnew’s (2005) argument that the variables influencing crime have similar 
root causes and should be grouped together into one of five life domains. True to Bernard 
and Snipes’ (1996) variable-centered approach to integration, his next six propositions 
spend a great deal of time specifying the relationship between the variables within his 
five life domains. GTCD’s third proposition states that life domain variables exhibit 
reciprocal effects on one another in addition to their effect on crime. Agnew notes that 
these affects differ in magnitude according to one’s life stage. For example, the family 
domain is expected to exhibit a large effect on the self domain during childhood. 
Specifically, the absence of positive parenting and poor parental supervision may 
negatively affect an individual’s level of self-control, as prosocial responses to strain are 
taught early in life. Additionally, the peer domain, is expected to have a large effect on 
negative school experiences. This is because criminal peers may discourage time spent 
studying, encourage truancy, or discredit the authority of teachers. Further, peer 
delinquency in adolescence may produce moderate reciprocal effects on poor parenting 
practices and low self-control. As a final example, consider how low self-control might 
affect the school domain. Those high in irritability and low in self-control might be 
treated more negatively by teachers or alienated from organized activities. In sum, the 
variables comprising each life domain exert effects of varying magnitude on each other in 
addition to their effect on criminal behavior. 
Agnew’s (2005) fourth proposition claims that prior crime indirectly affects 
subsequent crime through its effect on the various life domains. That is, prior crime often 
produces significant effects in life domain variables, thereby indirectly increasing the 
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likelihood of future crime. For instance, individuals that successfully commit crime 
undetected or are seldom punished for crime may develop a reduced “fear of external 
sanctions” and an increased mastery of techniques of crime (Agnew 2005:93). 
Additionally, crime may increase a variety of strains. Examples of such strains associated 
with a criminal conviction include the burden of paying court fees and fines, the 
revocation of a driving or professional license, or the loss of custody of one’s children. 
Further, crime also tends to yield only short-term benefits. For example, consuming 
illegal drugs results in a finite period of euphoria. Once this interval ends, an individual 
may likely seek to use the substance again. This outcome is especially likely if prior 
crime is responded to by others with indifference, approval or justification, or in a 
disproportionately harsh manner. For example, criminal behavior in adolescence may 
exacerbate harsh parental discipline, increase association with delinquent peer groups, 
and negatively affect school performance.  
Consider as a final example that prior crime in adolescence may indirectly affect 
subsequent crime through the school and peer domains. An individual who has been 
caught ingesting illicit drugs may be labeled as a deviant by teachers, administrators, 
peers, and other parents. This might seriously attenuate one’s bond to school. The 
individual may internalize the deviant label and begin only associating with deviant 
others, thus increasing exposure to criminal models and definitions favorable towards 
crime. Ultimately, the likelihood of criminal behavior is indirectly increased. Each of 
these changes in life domain variables increases the likelihood of subsequent crime. 
Next, Agnew (2005) proposes that life domain variables interact with one another 
in affecting criminal behavior. That is, a given life domain’s effect on crime is moderated 
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or “influenced by the individual’s standing on the other life domains” (110). This 
proposition states that a particular life domain is more likely to cause delinquency if the 
individual’s position in other life domains encourages crime. To explain, the effect of 
poor parenting on crime is expected to be stronger in those individuals with low levels of 
self-control and negative attachment to school than in those with high levels. Similarly, 
Agnew states that the life domains interact in affecting one another. For example, 
irritability and low self-control will have a stronger deleterious effect on school 
experiences and peer relations for those who are subjected to poor parenting practices.  
Agnew’s sixth proposition states that the effects of life domains on delinquency 
are primarily contemporaneous. In using this term to describe effects, Agnew (2005) 
refers to those that occur within a few months after exposure to a given life domain 
variable, like peer conflict. That is, life domain variables in adolescence should have a 
large effect on adolescent delinquency, but a weaker effect, if any, on adult criminality. 
In some instances, the effect may be immediate, while in others it takes longer to 
manifest. For example, associating with delinquent others in adolescence might lead to 
crime more quickly than negative bonding to school. He further specifies that life 
domains should exhibit contemporaneous effects on one another and large lagged effects 
on themselves. For instance, poor peer relations in childhood are expected to negatively 
affect peer relations during adolescence.  
In his seventh proposition, Agnew (2005) argues that life domains exert nonlinear 
effects on crime, meaning that a given life domain’s effect on crime will increase as the 
life domain increases. For instance, one’s level of self-control may produce an 
exponential effect on crime as it increases or decreases. Put differently, the magnitude of 
 60 
the effect of a life domain variable on crime will become increasingly larger as one 
progresses along the x-axis. As an example, individuals with three delinquent friends may 
hypothetically be 1.5 times as likely to use substances as those with two delinquent 
friends. However, those with eight delinquent friends may be twice as likely as those with 
only seven delinquent friends.  
In in the final proposition, GTCD states that outside factors, like those of the 
larger social structure (e.g., community disorganization) and biological factors (e.g., age 
or sex) indirectly and directly influence life domains. These macro-level variables 
influence the level one inhabits in various life domains. For instance, community 
disorganization may situate those that live in such areas in a position of poor parenting 
practices, diminished school experiences, and increased levels of peer delinquency. 
Agnew (2005) argues that such an influence ultimately causes low-socioeconomic status 
adolescent males to exhibit the highest level of criminal propensity. Such a statement is 
supported by the extant literature, as sex and socioeconomic status are among the 
strongest correlates of deviant and criminal behavior. 
Cochran’s Extension of the General Theory 
Theoretical elaboration.  
Where Agnew (2005) created GTCD via theoretical integration, Cochran (2015) 
engaged in the practice of theoretical elaboration. Such elaboration should not be 
conflated with theoretical integration. Thornberry (1989) identifies the core motivation of 
elaboration as “maximizing the explanatory power of a particular theory without the 
attendant concern of reconciling differences across theories” (59). This may be 
accomplished through the introduction or removal of particular propositions, adjustment 
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to the temporal ordering, and/or the re-evaluation of assumptions. The end goal or 
elaboration in general is to produce a final product that boasts enhanced power over its 
original form. Cochran’s (2015) GTCD-E illustrates this by introducing a set of predictor 
variables that may increase the theory’s ability to explain crime. While the end goals may 
be similar, theory elaboration “involves the logical extension of a particular theory, in an 
attempt to improve its adequacy” (Bernard and Snipes 1996:309).  
Religion as a distinct life domain. 
  Cochran (2015) concludes that elements of religion, like religiousness and 
religiosity, may influence criminal and deviant behavior sufficiently to warrant inclusion 
in GTCD as a distinct life domain. First, religiousness refers to the salience one attributes 
to their religious beliefs as a part of their daily life. Next, religiosity refers to behaviors or 
actions related to one’s religious beliefs, like personal prayer, partaking of religious 
sacraments, or attending religious services. Cochran’s own research and review of the 
extant religious literature suggests a strong relationship between elements of religion and 
crime (Baier and Wright 2001; Cochran and Akers 1989; Hill and Pollock 2015; 
Pirutinsky 2014; Ulmer and Harris 2013). These studies generally report a deterrent 
effect, with religious variables acting as protective factors against criminal behavior. 
First, Cochran and Akers (1989) report a moderate negative relationship in which 
religious adolescents are significantly less likely to use marijuana and alcohol than their 
non-religious counterparts. Cochran and colleagues (1994) later find a similar negative 
relationship for a variety of criminal and deviant behaviors among their youth sample. 
However, these effects are completely attenuated for all but alcohol and cigarette use 
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when self-control and arousal theory variables (e.g., impulsivity, thrill-seeking, and 
physicality) are introduced into the regression equation.  
More recently, Pickering and Vazsonyi (2010) report that religiosity is moderately 
and consistently associated with reduced deviance among adolescents, controlling for the 
effects of family process. This effect remains robust across sexes and age groups. 
Pirutinsky’s (2014) research reveals a significant deterrent effect of religion on serious 
crime among adolescents. The author further specifies this relationship by finding that 
religiousness is also associated with higher levels of self-control and that 
contemporaneous increases in religiousness are associated with lagged increased levels of 
impulse control.  
Other robust support for the inclusion of religion as a life domain comes from 
Baier and Wright’s (2003) meta-analysis of the effects of religion on criminal and deviant 
behavior. Baier and Wright analyze 60 extant studies and report a moderate deterrent 
effect at the individual level (r = -0.12), which they argue provides “confidence that 
religion does indeed have some deterrent effect” on crime (16). Notably, the authors 
report that the more recent studies in their sample provided larger deterrent effect sizes. 
They attribute this trend to the tendency for these studies to incorporate a greater number 
of predictor variables and to utilize smaller sample sizes. Finally, turning toward a 
different level of analysis, Ulmer and Harris (2013) find that religious social contexts are 
associated with reduced rates of violence among both white and black populations at the 
aggregate level. Additionally, certain religious contexts (i.e., increased religious 
adherence and religious homogeneity) appear to moderate the effect of economic 
disadvantage on violent behavior among black populations. 
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Cochran (2015; et al. 1994) posits that such a deterrent effect operates mainly 
through increased levels of self-control and social control exerted upon religious 
individuals, specifically the bonds of attachment, commitment, involvement, and belief 
(Hirschi 1969). However, one may also argue that elements of religion also act as 
protective factors against many of the motivations to commit crime, like strain, exposure 
to successful criminal models, and exposure to definitions favorable towards crime. This 
is because religion may moderate the effects of stressful life events, like neglect, divorce, 
harassment, or financial strain, through the collective resources it provides and 
worldview it promotes.  
Specifically, religiousness and religiosity may increase one’s level of social 
capital. Bourdieu (1986) differentiated social capital from other forms of capital (i.e., 
economic, cultural, and symbolic) by defining it as the sum total of resources made 
available to an individual through their membership in a social network. Similarly, Burt 
(1992) posited that social capital is embedded in the network of relationships that one has 
with others, through which the focal actor can access resources. In this context, such 
resources may include positive coping strategies, spiritual support, medical and financial 
aid, and expressions of affection and love (Pargament 2002). Religiousness and 
religiosity also reduce motivations towards crime by emphasizing the existence of a 
divine plan, ultimate explanations for aversive events, a benevolent deity, and a greater 
sense of purpose in life. Therefore, this support and worldview may promote and 
facilitate prosocial adaptations to strain while simultaneously reducing exposure to pro-
criminal models and attitudes. 
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For this reason, Cochran (2015) elaborates on GTCD by formulating GTCD-E 
and introducing religion as a life domain that affects crime at all stages of development. 
Specifically, this extended theory incorporates two principal variables within the religion 
life domain: religiosity and religiousness. Both are expected to reduce the likelihood of 
criminal and deviant behavior among individuals. Figure 2 outlines GTCD-E’s addition 
of religion as a sixth life domain. It shows the effects of life domains on constraints 
against crime, motivations towards it, and criminal behavior. 
It should be noted that, although Cochran’s (2015) GTCD-E proposes religion as 
a sixth life domain, Agnew’s (2017) review of the relevant literature finds only relatively 
small effects of religious variables on crime. Therefore, the inclusion of such a life 
domain may be incongruous with Bernard and Snipes’ (1996) variable-centered approach 
to integration, through which Agnew (2005) includes only those factors that have 
exhibited moderate or large effects on criminal behavior. As mentioned above, Cochran 
and colleagues (1994) find that the effects of religious variables on crime are reduced to 
non-significance for most of the criminal behaviors in their model (e.g., assault, illicit 
substance use, and theft) when controlling for the effects of other predictors, like social 
control and arousal theory variables.  
Cochran’s (2015) own tests of GTCD and GTCD-E later reveal a similar pattern. 
That is, religiousness and religiosity exert significant effects at one point, but these are 
reduced to non-significance when all predictor variables are included in the model. 
Additionally, Antonaccio and associates (2010) find a consistent negative relationship 
between religiosity and crime among their international sample of adults in their initial 
bivariate analyses.  
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Notes: Variables with relatively large effects are indicated by bold font. Variables affecting adolescence are 
illustrated with a gray background and those affecting adulthood are shown with a white background. 
Source: Agnew, Robert. 2005. Why Do Criminals Offend? A General Theory of Crime and Delinquency. New York, 
NY: Oxford University Press. Adapted with permission. 
 
Figure 2 Cochran’s (2015) General Theory of Crime and Delinquency – Extended 
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 However, this is not the case with their multivariate analyses, as the religion-related 
significant predictors are both fewer in number and smaller in size than in the bivariate 
analyses. These two studies suggest that any effects of religious variables are driven by 
other factors. They also hint that religion variables may initially exhibit moderate to large 
effects in the present study, but such effects will be diminished as other life domains, 
constraints, and motivations are incorporated into the regression equation. 
Lastly, Pargament (2002) argues that the beneficial effects of religious variables 
may vary according to characteristics of one’s religion, one’s present social context, and 
one’s own traits. Specifically, the author concludes that religions that are self-selected, 
exhibit robust connectedness with other adherents, and are characterized by a strong 
relationship with a deity produce the most beneficial outcomes. By contrast, religions 
characterized by imposed beliefs, spiritual alienation, and a poor relationship with a deity 
produce poor outcomes (Pargament 2002). Further, the efficacy of religion is enhanced 
for those whose religion efficiently blends beliefs, motivations, and practices; those 
marginalized along other social strata; those facing stressful situations; and those living in 
social environments supportive of their faith. 
Agnew (2017) further argues that, should religious variables produce sufficiently 
large effects, they may better fall under other pre-existing life domains, like the self and 
peer domains. This highlights the importance of the current research, as Agnew states, “If 
religious variables do turn out to have a relatively large effect on crime, they will have to 
be better incorporated into the model” (n.p.). 
 67 
Prior Empirical Testing Efforts 
Findings.  
GTCD has not been extensively empirically tested. This is perhaps due to its 
complexity, relatively young age, or both. Regardless of the exact reason, only a handful 
of partial scientific tests have been performed. While generally favorable, yet modest, 
previous testing has produced mixed results. That is, these tests find support for some of 
the general theory’s propositions but fail to find support for others. For example, Zhang, 
Day, and Cao (2012) find that all three of the life domains tested (i.e., family, school, and 
peer) influence general self-reported delinquency in the expected direction for their 
sample of high-school youth. However, the fact that the life domains in their model 
contain many variables that do not exhibit a significant effect on delinquency is 
indicative of only minimal support. In their full regression model, which includes 
measures of constraints and motivations, the authors’ find that the peer domain variables 
produce the only observed significant direct effects of all the life domain variables. This 
supports Agnew’s hypothesis that the peer domain is one of the most important predictors 
of delinquency during adolescence. Additionally, Zhang and colleagues (2012) find that 
life domains exhibit both direct and indirect effects on delinquency. This finding offers 
support for Agnew’s hypothesis that life domains affect constraints and motivations, 
which then influence delinquency.  
Ngo, Paternoster, Cullen, and Mackenzie (2011) find only minimal support for the 
effect of life domains on official recidivism for their sample of adolescents and young 
adults who completed a correctional boot camp. This is because only two of the five life 
domains in their model demonstrate significant correlations (i.e., school and 
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employment). Further, the coefficients are relatively weak. In testing for nonlinear effects, 
Ngo and colleagues (2011) only find negative employment to be significantly, although 
weakly, associated with their delinquent outcome variable (i.e., recidivism). Again, this 
only offers minimal support for the general theory’s assertion that the effect of life 
domains becomes increasingly more robust as the conditions of a given domain worsen. 
After further testing, the authors conclude that the relationship between life domains and 
crime appears to be neither linear nor nonlinear and are unable to support the proposition 
that a given life domain’s effect on crime will be influenced by the other life domains 
(Ngo et al., 2011).   
Next, Ngo and Paternoster (2014) find limited support for the general theory’s 
proposition that life domains will produce contemporaneous and lagged effects on crime 
and on each other. Regarding contemporaneous effects, three (i.e., self, family, and peer) 
of the four life domains tested (i.e., self, family, peer, and school) exhibit the 
hypothesized direction and size of effect on self-reported substance use among their 
sample of adolescents. They also find that the contemporaneous effects of life domains 
on crime are larger than lagged effects, which provides limited support for Agnew’s 
(2005) assertion that the life domains produce largely short-term effects on crime. 
Finally, the authors support the general theory’s claim that life domains exert 
contemporaneous effects on one another and that any observed lagged effects are smaller 
in effect size. However, this support is limited in that there are a few instances in which 
the lagged effects of variables within life domains are higher in magnitude than their 
contemporaneous counterparts.  
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Muftić and colleagues (2014) test the general theory on an international sample of 
adolescent students from Bosnia and Herzegovina. Their analysis reveals that variables 
within all four of the life domains tested (i.e., self, family, peer, and school) directly 
affect self-reported violent and property crime in the expected direction. However, all but 
the family domain significantly predicts substance use. They also find moderate support 
for the proposition that life domains interact in causing crime. For instance, as level of 
self-control increases, the effect of parental bonds on substance use is strengthened. They 
also find support for indirect effects of variables on offending. Namely, age, sex, 
neighborhood collective efficacy, and level of self-control all indirectly affect violent 
crime through the life domains.   
More recently, Cochran (2015) tests Agnew’s (2005) GTCD and his own GTCD-
E, which incorporates religious variables. The author finds that four of the six life 
domains (i.e., self, family, school, and religion), several constraints (i.e., shame and 
formal sanctions), and all four motivations separately significantly predict academic 
dishonesty in a convenience sample of college students. Additionally, the life domain 
model explains a greater amount of variance in dishonesty than either the constraints or 
motivation models. However, in the full model, which includes all three groupings of 
predictor variables (i.e., life domains, constraints, and motivations), all of the life domain 
and constraint variables are reduced to non-significance. This leaves only the motivation 
variables with a significant effect on dishonesty. Overall, Cochran’s (2015) test only 
offers modest support for both theories and is unsupportive of Agnew’s claim that life 
domain variables have largely direct effects on deviance. Instead, this finding may 
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indicate that the effects of life domains are mediated by those exhibited by constraints 
and motivations. 
Notable limitations.  
There are some important limitations to note regarding these previous partial tests 
of the general theory. First, most of the previous studies only measure a single outcome 
variable, with only one testing GTCD with multiple forms of crime. Zhang and 
colleagues (2012) use a 15-item scale to measure self-reported general delinquency. This 
scale includes items that ranged from petty theft and vandalism to carrying weapons and 
assault; there is no distinction between types of offenses. Along similar lines, Ngo and 
associates (2011) measure detected crime committed upon release from a correctional 
boot camp, or recidivism. This is measured as a dichotomous indicator of having at least 
one post-release arrest. This measurement also does not delineate between types of crime. 
Ngo and Paternoster (2014) utilize a dichotomous indicator of two types of self-reported 
substance use: alcohol and marijuana. Cochran’s (2015) outcome variable is an index of 
various forms of self-reported academic dishonesty. Only Muftić and colleagues (2014) 
examine the effects of life domains on multiple forms of crime. This is problematic as the 
researchers are unable to explore the generality of Agnew’s (2005) GTCD.  
GTCD is a general theory; as such, Agnew’s propositions should hold true for all 
forms of crime and deviance. Therefore, it is valuable to examine multiple forms of crime 
and deviance as one’s dependent variables. This allows for directly assessing the theory’s 
ability to explain multiple criminal and deviant behaviors reported by the same sample. 
The present research measures the impact of predictor variables on three forms of 
criminal behavior: general crime, person/property crime, and drug crime. 
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Additionally, only two previous tests of GTCD (Zhang et al. 2012; Cochran 2015) 
organize their predictor variables in a manner that parses out life domain variables from 
constraint and motivation variables. Agnew (2005) states that, while it may be a difficult 
task, doing so permits assessing the direct effect of life domains on crime and the indirect 
effects, as the life domains operate through reduced constraints against criminal behavior 
and increased motivations towards it. Recall Agnew’s argument that the five life domains 
are the true cause of delinquency, “affecting both the constraints against and motivations 
for crime” (40).  
Many previous tests are also limited in their construction of the variables that 
comprise Agnew’s life domains. Specifically, many use a small number of items to 
construct each scale, omit certain variables within a given life domain, or omit certain life 
domains altogether. For example, Zhang and colleagues (2012) evaluate only three of the 
five life domains (i.e., family, school, and peer). Notably, the authors do not measure the 
self domain. This is a significant limitation because Agnew’s theory predicts that this 
domain, which is comprised of irritability and low self-control, is one of the two major 
causes, along with peer delinquency, of delinquency in all stages of development. That is, 
it is expected to exhibit a large effect relative to the other life domains at all ages. With a 
mean age of 15, their sample falls squarely into the adolescent age grouping and their 
results may be affected by this omission. Further, only 10 variables are used to measure 
these 3 life domains, with many being single-item measures. Admittedly, Zhang and 
colleagues (2012) caution that their “findings are relevant to imperfect 
operationalizations of the concepts in his original theory” and that future studies should 
 72 
examine “more refined” and comprehensive measures of the life domains (Zhang et al. 
2012:875). 
While Ngo and colleagues (2011) attempt to measure all five life domains, they 
incorporate a relatively small number of variables in their analysis. The self, peer, and 
employment domains are each comprised of a single variable and the family and school 
domains are constructed of two variables each.  Ngo and Paternoster (2014) incorporate a 
larger number of variables but still omit some that the general theory considers vital, like 
irritability within the self domain. In addition to such omissions, the authors measure self-
control by means of behaviors exhibited during school (i.e., homework completion, 
absence, tardiness, attentiveness, and disruptiveness). These are arguably measures of the 
school domain, not the self domain. The authors admit that this conceptualization is “not 
optimal” and offer several defenses for this decision (8). 
Muftić and colleagues (2014) measure four life domains, yet all are constructed 
using only one or two variables. For example, the family domain is simply measured by a 
two-item index of parental bonding and the peer domain is measured by a five-item scale 
of peer delinquency. According to Agnew (2005), the family domain should also include 
family criminality, conflict, poor supervision and discipline, among other variables. 
Further, their measure of the self domain excludes irritability, which is one of only two 
variables in this domain. Cochran (2015) provides only the second attempt to measure all 
five life domains. Yet again, relatively few variables are used for each domain. 
Additionally, Cochran’s measure of the family domain is constructed of two variables: 
parental attachment and parental supervision. This is problematic because Agnew 
predicts that these two variables influence adolescent, not adult, deviance. Cochran draws 
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data from a “non-random sample of adult (i.e., 18 years of age or older) undergraduate 
students (5). Therefore, the family domain should be measured using different variables, 
like failure to marry, negative spousal bonding, negative bonding to children, and having 
a criminal spouse, among others. Further, Cochran’s (2015) items for parental 
supervision measure past behavior. They do not measure the current level of supervision 
for the adults. This means that any effects observed by this construct are lagged rather 
than contemporaneous, as the dependent variable is a measure of current (i.e., within the 
last 12 months) deviant behavior. 
An additional shortcoming of previous testing is that some researchers analyze 
only cross-sectional data at a single point in time (Cochran 2015; Ngo et al. 2011). This is 
a significant limitation as Agnew (2005) states that data drawn from multiple time points 
are essential to properly estimating the contemporaneous and lagged effects of life 
domains. Agnew argues that cross-sectional data may allow researchers to observe 
associations between life domains; however, they do not permit the determination of 
causes for such associations. Even when previous tests do incorporate longitudinal data, 
some rely on data from specific waves to supplement missing data from previous waves 
(Zhang et al. 2012). 
Many of the previously-mentioned empirical tests also have sample limitations. 
For example, Ngo and associates (2011) draw data from respondents who range in age 
from 16 to 35. This wide range arguably includes two stages of development, which is 
problematic for an age-graded theory. The samples from some studies only include a 
specific age group, like adolescence (Cochran 2015; Muftić et al. 2014; Zhang et al. 
2012). As a result of examining a single stage of development, the effects of the life 
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domains on crime during other developmental stages cannot be evaluated. A more 
complete test of the general theory will test the effects during multiple stages.  
Additionally, Ngo and colleagues’ (2011) sample consists solely of male 
participants who had previously been convicted of drug offenses. Further, the data are 
racially-skewed with 83% of participants identifying as African American. As such, this 
study only examines the effects of life domains on crime for a single sex that had already 
been punished for having committed a crime in the past. It is unclear how the life 
domains affect crime for females, whites, or those who have not been convicted of crime 
in the past. Muftić and colleagues (2014) also use a racially homogenous sample. These 
are notable limitations as the general theory seeks to explain crime in all contexts, 
including crime committed across these social strata. Finally, Cochran (2015) 
incorporates a relatively small convenience sample, which seriously calls into question 
the validity of reported findings. 
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CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY 
Sample 
Data for this dissertation are drawn from the Kaplan Longitudinal and Multi-
Generational Study (KLAMS), which is a panel study spanning two distinct generations 
of respondents conducted by researchers at the Texas A & M University (Kaplan 1980). 
Dr. Howard B. Kaplan’s research efforts were supported by a number of grants issued by 
the National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA) within the National Institutes of Health 
(NIDA DA00105, DA00136, DA02497, and DA04310) (Pals et al. 2016). Though a brief 
overview of the entire KLAMS sample will be presented, the current research 
concentrates on the second generation of participants, who are children of the original 
respondents that completed interviews between 1994 and 2008.  
Data for the first generation were initially collected in 1971 as KLAMS 
researchers interviewed a random selection of 50% of seventh grade students in the 
Houston Independent School District in Houston and Harris County, Texas (Pals et al. 
2016). This initial wave initiated in-school interviews for a sample of 7,627 participants 
(Pals and Kaplan 2013). These students were tested at six additional time points over a 
period spanning nearly four decades. Nearly 5,500 respondents participated in the final 
wave of data collection, ranging from 35 to 39 years of age (Kaplan and Lin 2000; Pals et 
al. 2016). 
It was during this final wave that first-generation participants were asked to 
identify all of their biological, adoptive, and foster children (Kaplan and Lin 2000). This 
led to the inception of an additional study in which the children of first-generation 
respondents who had already reached middle-school age, or early teenagerhood, were 
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interviewed with instruments similar to those completed by their parents in decades prior 
(Pals and Kaplan 2013). Specifically, the first wave of collection for the second 
generation (G2T1) consisted of a 171-item self-administered questionnaire completed in 
the respondent’s home and a structured comprehensive in-home interview from 1994 to 
2000 (N = 7,519) (Kaplan, Liu and Kaplan 2005; Pals and Kaplan 2013). This was 
followed up three years later (G2T2) with identical survey instruments, though funding 
issues precluded re-interviewing the entire G2T1 sample (N = 1,074). Consequently, the 
researchers shifted their focus to young adulthood and followed up with G2T1 
respondents who were approaching 21 years of age. This wave (G2T3) once again 
incorporated similar instruments and interviewed 1,629 of the original generation two 
respondents from 2002 to 2007. Notably, KLAMS provides data for the second 
generation at two distinct stages of development: adolescence (G2T1) and adulthood 
(G2T3). 
 As previously stated, this study focuses on the second generation of respondents 
by utilizing the first and third waves of data, with each representing distinct stages of 
development. The first wave of generation two forms the adolescent sample (in the 
dissertation referred to as T1) with respondents ranging in age from 11 to 13, while the 
third wave forms the young adult sample (henceforth referred to as T2), with participant 
ages ranging from 19 to 26. As a result, the final sample (N = 1,629) is limited to only 
those respondents who completed both waves of data collection.  
 Thus, the final sample consists of students (N = 1629) from the Houston 
Independent School District, which range in age from 11 to 13 during adolescence (M = 
12.12, SD = 0.47) and 19 to 26 during adulthood (M = 21.51, SD = 0.97). The sample is 
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predominantly female, with 52.42% and 52.61% reporting as such during adolescence 
and adulthood, respectively. Additionally, the sample is slightly overrepresented by racial 
minorities: 40.73% at T1 and 28.93% at T2. Note that this sharp decrease in respondents 
identifying as a racial minority is likely an artifact of the T2 questionnaire, as it included 
a different set of possible responses. Respondents perceive themselves primarily to be 
situated in the middle-class, as it is the modal response for each time period (T1 = 
49.47%, T2 = 49.1%). A large majority of the sample is religious during adolescence, 
with 92.92% belonging to a religion and 91.91% considering religion to be important. 
However, this proportion falls slightly during adulthood, with 84.57% of adults belonging 
to a religion and 83.73% considering religion to be important.  
Measures 
Dependent variables: Rates of varying forms of crime.  
The first step in the analytic process is to construct the dependent variables for the 
sample during adolescence (T1) and adulthood (T2). Both Agnew’s GTCD (2005) and 
Cochran’s GTCD-E (2015) are described as general theories capable of explaining 
diverse forms of criminal behavior. Therefore, this study incorporates self-reported 
measures of several types of criminal behavior as the dependent variables. These are T1 
person/property crime, T1 drug crime, T1 general crime, T2 person/property crime, T2 
drug crime, and T2 general crime. The researcher measures each form of crime as a count 
of self-reports of related criminal behaviors that the respondent reports having committed 
in the preceding 12 months.  
Person/property crime includes the following acts (1 = yes, 0 = no): (1) 
committing petty theft between $2.00 and $50.00, (2) committing petty theft less than 
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$2.00, (3) starting a fist fight, (4) taking part in a gang fight, (5) using force to obtain 
money or valuables from another person, (6) breaking into a home, store, or building, (7) 
purposefully damaging public or private property, (8) taking a car for a ride without the 
owner’s consent, (9) beating up someone who had done nothing wrong, and (10) taking 
items worth $555.00 or more.  
Drug crime is measured according the admitted use of the following substances in 
the past year without a prescription (1 = true/yes, 0 = false/no): (1) marijuana, (2) 
steroids, (3) inhalants, (4) stimulants, (5) sedatives or barbiturates, (6) tranquilizers, (7) 
non-prescription drugs to get high, (8) psychedelics or hallucinogens, (9) powdered 
cocaine, (10) crack cocaine, (11) heroin, (12) opiates, (13) PCP, phencyclidine, or angel 
dust, and (14) designer drugs.  
Lastly, general crime is a count that combines all of the person/property acts (10) 
and drug behaviors (14). The exact same items are used to measure criminal behavior 
during both waves of data collection. Approximately 20.69% of respondents report 
committing at least one general crime act during adolescence (M = 0.37), while 42.60% 
admit as such during adulthood (M = 1.04). Next, 19.95% of the sample admits 
committing at least one type of person/property crime during adolescence (M = 0.33) and 
19.64% report such behavior during adulthood (M = 0.29). Finally, only 2.46% of 
respondents acknowledge using at least one type of drug during adolescence (M = 0.04), 
while 34.01% report a drug crime during adulthood (M = 0.75).  
Independent variables: Life domains.  
The second step in this process is to use GTCD to inform the selection and 
assignment of items from the KLAMS dataset into the six life domains (i.e., self, family, 
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peer, school, work, and religion) for each stage of development. This study utilizes 18 
indicators of GTCD’s and GTCD-E’s life domains during adolescence, most of which are 
indices composed of dichotomous items: two for religion, seven for school, two for peer, 
five for family, and two for self. Further, it incorporates 15 life domain variables during 
adulthood: two for religion, four for employment, one for school, one for peer, five for 
family, and two for self. 
Recall that most items assessed with the KLAMS instrument are dichotomous in 
nature (1 = true/yes, 0 = false/no). Those measured along different levels are 
dichotomized and coded in the direction towards deviance according to Agnew’s 
theoretical arguments. For example, affirmative responses to question 91 at T1 (“I often 
act without stopping to think”) are coded as 1, and negative responses are coded as 0. 
Additionally, a number of items are reverse coded to maintain directional consistency. 
For instance, negative responses to question 41 at T1 (“My family obeys the law”) were 
originally coded as 0. Consequently, this item is reverse coded such that 1 = my family 
does not obey the law.  
Scales are constructed from these dichotomous items for the key variables within 
each life domain. A Kuder-Richardson Formula 20 (KR-20) coefficient of reliability is 
calculated for each scale to empirically verify that the groupings of these dichotomous 
indicators hang together, or, are internally consistent (Agnew 2005). The data are well 
suited for such a calculation because each scale item is coded as either 0 or 1, which is a 
requirement of calculating a KR-20 coefficient (Thye 2000). For this reason, calculating 
Cronbach’s alpha coefficients to assess internal consistency is not appropriate, as doing 
so necessarily requires items that contain a range of possible responses. Scales that 
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produce moderate (0.5 - 0.79) or high (0.8 - 1.0) KR-20 coefficients are immediately 
accepted (Salvucci et al. 1997). Those producing low coefficients (KR-20 > 0.5) are 
indicative of weak reliability. Therefore, they are further examined, and measures are 
taken to improve internal consistency. Specifically, those items that poorly correlate are 
re-examined in light of Agnew’s (2005) theory and dropped from the scales.  
Ultimately, reliability coefficients for all accepted indices are between moderate 
and high. Note Nunnally’s (1967) argument that this threshold of 0.5 to 0.6 is sufficient 
during “the early stages of research” (226). Refer to Begun (1979) for an example of 
research published in the American Sociological Association’s Journal of Health and 
Social Behavior that incorporates indices with KR-20 reliability coefficients as low as 
0.53, to which the author refers as indicative of “modest” internal consistency (384). See 
also Kaplan, Damphousse, and Kaplan (1996) for research using KLAMS data that 
justifies a similar range of reliability values. 
Additionally, polychoric principal components analysis (PCA) is used to create 
each index within the six life domains, constraints, and motivations at both time points. 
Polychoric PCA determines which factors should be retained. Where the KR-20 
coefficient measures internal consistency and shows whether items hang together, PCA 
verifies that these items are actually measuring a common construct. Agnew (2005) 
argues that this step is necessary to empirically verify whether such variables cluster 
according to a given underlying construct (i.e., life domain). In this instance, each set of 
factors explains at least 80% of the common variance (Floyd and Widaman 1995). PCA 
is preferable to common factor analysis because it better accounts for missing responses 
in the KLAMS data. While common factor analysis deletes listwise, PCA allows the 
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researcher to keep cases that may have not responded to one or more scale items. Each 
index is then rescaled to a value from 0 to 1 to facilitate interpretation (see Pals et al. 
2016).  
Agnew identifies low self-control and irritability as the two principal variables 
within the self domain during adolescence. Low self-control is evidenced by a 20-item 
index, consisting of true/false items that measure impulsivity, low ambition, feeling 
unbound by conventional norms, and being wild or out of control (KR-20 = 0.71). Again, 
this index is created via polychoric PCA. The eigenvalue drops from 6.08 for the first 
factor to 1.73 for the second factor. 97.05% of the sample is missing 2 or less items out of 
20. Therefore, the researcher allows for up to 2 missing cases out of the original 20 items 
to calculate the self-control index (N = 1,581). Upon transforming this index to a range 
from 0 to 1, the mean self-control score is 0.18. 
Additionally, irritability is measured by a 10-item scale comprised of items to 
which respondents indicated attributing aversive events to the malicious behavior of 
others, affording little concern to the rights and feelings of others, an antagonistic or 
adversarial interactional style, and mean spiritedness (KR-20 = 0.60). For this index 
constructed using polychoric PCA, the eigenvalue drops from 3.77 to 1.31 from the first 
factor to the second. 98.16% of the sample is missing 1 or less items out of 10 (N = 
1,599). Again, the researcher allows for up to 1 missing case out of the original 10 items 
to calculate the irritability index (M = 0.24). 
 The family life domain is comprised of 5 variables: a 9-item scale measuring 
negative bonding to parents (KR-20 = 0.67), a 16-item index of poor parental supervision 
and discipline (KR-20 = 0.51), a 14-item scale of family conflict and abuse (KR-20 = 
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0.60), a 13-item scale measuring absence of positive parenting practices (KR-20 = 0.71), 
and a 4-item index of family criminality (KR-20 = 0.52). Though omitted from the text in 
order to conserve space due to the large number of scales, the essential information 
regarding each polychoric PCA indices for both adolescence and adulthood (i.e., 
eigenvalue drops from the first to second factor, proportion of explained variance, and 
missing cases) is presented in Table 1 and Table 2. 
Agnew’s third life domain concerns itself with peer relations. The peer life 
domain includes the following variables: a 16-item index of peer delinquency (KR-20 = 
0.77) and a 7-item scale measuring peer conflict or abuse (KR-20 = 0.60).  
The school life domain is comprised of seven principal variables. These include a 
12-item index of negative bonding to teachers or school (KR-20 = 0.60), a single-item 
indicator of poor academic performance (“Received a failing grade in one or more school 
subjects during the previous grading period”), a single-item measure of little time spent 
completing homework (“Below average hours spent per day completing homework or 
reading for school assignments” [dichotomized]), a single-item indicator of low 
educational and occupational aspirations (“Does not expect to engage in post-high school 
education”), a 4-item index of poor school supervision and discipline (KR-20 = 0.50), a 
single-item measure of negative treatment by teachers (“My teachers usually put me 
down”), and a single-item indicator of the absence of positive teaching practices (“When 
I work hard on schoolwork, my teachers tell me I’m doing a good job [reverse coded]”). 
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Table 1 Index Construction for Adolescent Life Domain, Constraint, and Motivation 
Variables using Polychoric Principal Components Analysis 
Life 
Domain, 
Constraint, 
Motivation 
Index Name 
Eigenvalue 
Drop 
Proportion 
of 
Explained 
Variance 
% Missing 
Index Items 
# of Missing 
cases 
permitted 
N µ 
Self Low Self-Control 6.08 to 1.73 .304 97.05% 
missing 2 
items or less 
2 of 20 1581 .18 
 Irritability 3.77 to 1.31 .377 98.16% 
missing 1 
item or less 
1 of 10 1599 .24 
Family Negative 
Bonding 
4.96 to .88 .551 98.83% 
missing 1 
item or less 
1 of 9 1610 .10 
 Poor Supervision 4.15 to 2.58 .259 97.54% 
missing 2 
items or less 
2 of 16 1589 .15 
 Family Conflict 4.24 to 1.69 .354 98.77% 
missing 2 
items or less 
2 of 12 1609 .19 
 Poor Parenting 5.35 to 1.60 .412 98.47% 
missing 0 
items or less 
0 of 13 1604 .13 
 Family 
Criminality 
2.29 to .89 .572 98.59% 
missing 0 
items 
0 of 4 1606 .09 
Peer Peer 
Delinquency 
9.36 to 2.02 .585 98.77% 
missing 1 
item or less 
1 of 16 1609 .04 
 Peer Conflict 3.21 to 1.36 .458 96.99% 
missing 1 
item or less 
1 of 7 1580 .15 
School Negative 
Bonding 
4.06 to 2.00 .338 98.40% 
missing 1 
item or less 
1 of 12 1603 .12 
 Poor Supervision 1.58 to .42 .790 98.28% 
missing 0 
items 
0 of 2 1601 .27 
Constraint Likelihood of 
Others’ Poor 
Reaction 
5.62 to 2.73 .312 99.08% 
missing 0 
items 
0 of 18 1614 .39 
Motivation Positive 
Reinforcement 
for Crime 
1.73 to .27 .864 99.69% 
missing 0 
items 
0 of 2 1624 .19 
 Crime is 
Desirable in 
Some Instances 
9.95 to 2.22 .622 98.04% 
missing 2 
items or less 
2 of 16 1597 .03 
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Table 2 Index Construction for Adult Life Domain and Motivation Variables using 
Polychoric Principal Components Analysis 
Life Domain, 
Constraint, 
Motivation 
Index Name 
Eigenvalue 
Drop 
Proportion 
of 
Explained 
Variance 
% Missing 
Index 
Items 
# of Missing 
cases 
permitted 
N µ 
Self Low Self-
Control 
4.82 to 1.71 .301 97.97% 
missing 3 
item or less 
3 of 16 1596 .106 
 Irritability 3.57 to 2.26 .325 97.42% 
missing 2 
item or less 
2 of 11 1587 .304 
Family Negative 
Bonding 
1.82 to .17 .913 99.82% 
missing 0 
items 
0 of 2 1626 .154 
 Spousal Conflict 2.96 to .55 .739 99.69% 
missing 0 
items 
0 of 4 1624 .035 
 Low Spousal 
Support 
1.86 to .14 .932 100% 
missing 0 
items 
0 of 2 1629 .003 
Peer Peer 
Delinquency 
3.18 to .56 .795 99.45% 
missing 1 
item or less 
0 of 4 1607 .061 
Employment Poor Working 
Conditions 
6.75 to 1.77 .482 99.75% 
missing 1 
item or less 
1 of 14 1625 .300 
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The final life domain for adolescence is religion, since employment is not 
included at this stage. The major variables in this domain are religiousness and 
religiosity. Respondents were first asked, “How important would you say religion is in 
your life?” Response options were 1 = very important, 2 = somewhat important, 3 = not 
very important, and 4 = not at all important. This variable is dichotomized and reverse 
coded so that 1 = not very or not all important and 0 = very or somewhat important. 
Regarding religiosity, students were asked to indicate how often they attended religious 
services. Possible responses include 1 = about once a week or more, 2 = about two or 
three times a month, 3 = about once a month, 4 = a few times a year, as on important 
holidays or special occasions, and 5 = hardly ever or never. Again, this item is 
dichotomized and reverse coded such that 1 = a few times a year, hardly ever, or never 
and 0 = between once a week and once a month. 
As an age-graded theory, the principal variables affecting crime are different 
during adulthood from those in adolescent (Agnew 2005). As before, low self-control and 
irritability are the major variables in the self domain. The former is measured by a 16-
item index consisting of items to which respondents reported being impulsive, preferring 
high-risk activities, having little ambition or motivation, feeling unbound by conventional 
norms, and being wild or out of control (KR-20 = 0.67). The latter is represented by an 
11-item scale comprised of true/false items measuring experiencing events as aversive, 
experiencing intense emotional reactions to aversive events, showing little concern for 
the rights and feelings of others, having an antagonistic or adversarial interactional style, 
and meanness (KR-20 = 0.64). 
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The family domain contains five variables during adulthood. A single true/false 
item to which respondents indicated being currently unmarried measured failure to marry. 
This domain also includes a two-item index indicating negative bonding to spouse or 
children (KR-20 = 0.73). In this case, respondents that currently do not have a spouse or 
partner are coded as 0 since they are not exposed to this negative bond. It also includes a 
single true/false item to which respondents indicate their spouse or partner having ever 
been convicted of a crime. Again, respondents that currently do not have a spouse or 
partner are coded as 0 since they are not exposed to this influence. A four-item scale 
measuring family conflict or abuse (KR-20 = 0.63) and a two-item index indicating low 
levels of spousal social support (KR-20 = 0.57) are the final two variables within this 
domain. As before, respondents that currently do not have a spouse or partner are coded 
as 0 since they are not exposed to these influences. 
The peer domain at this stage incorporates only peer delinquency. This variable is 
comprised of a 4-item scale of true/false items to which respondents indicated good 
friends being charged with, found guilty of, or sentenced to prison for a criminal offense 
or entering a substance abuse treatment facility (KR-20 = 0.75).  
The school domain also includes only a single variable during adulthood. Here, 
low educational attainment is indicated by a single item measuring respondent highest 
achieved level. This is an ordinal level of measurement with higher responses indicating 
higher levels of education. Therefore, this item is dichotomized such that 1 = high school 
or less and 0 = greater than high school. Agnew (2005) cautions that the school life 
domain at this stage likely exerts an indirect effect on crime. 
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The employment domain includes three key variables. The first is a single item to 
which respondents identified their current employment status. This is recoded so that 1 = 
not currently employed for pay and 0 = currently employed for pay. This domain also 
includes a single item measuring negative bonding to work to which respondents 
identified not being proud of their job. This is reverse coded so that 1 = yes/true and 0 = 
no/false. Unemployed respondents are coded as 0 since they are not exposed to this 
negative bond. This domain also includes a single-item measure of poor work 
performance to which respondents identified ever having been fired or laid off and a 14-
item scale indicating poor working conditions (KR-20 = 0.83). 
As in adolescence, the religion domain incorporates religiousness and religiosity. 
Each of these was measured with the same single-item indicators used previously. The 
item measuring the importance of religion in one’s life is dichotomized and recoded so 
that 1 = not very or not all important and 0 = very or somewhat important. The religiosity 
item indicating frequency of attending religious services is also dichotomized such that 1 
= a few times a year, hardly ever, or never and 0 = between once a week and once a 
month. 
Independent variables: Constraints and motivations.  
Agnew (2005) argues that life domain variables affect the constraints against and 
motivations towards crime, either increasing or decreasing one’s likelihood of criminal or 
deviant behavior. He also notes that a proper test of GTCD should incorporate these as 
predictor variables. Items related to both constraint and motivation variables are 
identified for both developmental periods according to Agnew’s (2005) theoretical 
arguments. Constraints during adolescence include two primary variables. The first is an 
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18-item index consisting of items to which respondents indicated the likelihood that 
others would react negatively to their deviant behavior (KR-20 = 0.73). The second 
measures one’s own negative reaction to crime with a single item that asked respondents 
how they react after doing something wrong (“When I do something wrong, I usually 
admit it and take my punishment”). This item was dichotomized and reverse coded such 
that 1 = no/false and 0 = yes/true. 
 Motivations towards crime during adolescence are comprised of four variables: a 
single-item indicator of level of short-term negative emotions (“Often gets angry, 
annoyed, or upset.”), a single-item measure of inability to adapt to strain with conformity 
(“If someone insulted me, I would probably hit him.”), a 2-item indicator of level of 
positive reinforcement for criminal behavior (KR-20 = 0.64), and a 16-item indicator of 
crime being desirable in certain instances (KR-20 = 0.79).  
Control variables.  
All multivariate models include control variables for sex, age, race, and perceived 
social class. As noted in the previous chapter, these are identified by Agnew (2005) as 
important biological features and characteristics of one’s social context. These also 
represent similar control variables incorporated in previous tests of GTCD (Cochran 
2015; Muftić et al. 2014; Ngo et al. 2011; Ngo and Paternoster 2014; Zhang et al. 2012). 
These controls include respondent’s sex (1 = male, 0 = female), age (years), race (1 = 
white, 0 = other race), and a six-point ordinal measure of perceived social class (1 = 
upper, 2 = upper-middle, 3 = middle, 4 = lower-middle, 5 = working, and 6 = lower).  
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Analytic Plan 
Noting the potential difficulty of a complete test of GTCD, Agnew (2005) states 
that it is “probably best tested in bits and pieces” (185). The present study follows this 
directive, aiming to explore a number of research questions pertaining to the propositions 
of Agnew’s (2005) GTCD and Cochran’s (2015) GTCD-E. To address these questions, a 
string of multivariate nested negative binomial and Poisson regression models are 
examined, as the dependent variables are counts of crime acts. Table 3 reviews each 
research question and its accompanying research hypothesis for the present dissertation. 
Sequential multivariate regression analysis.  
The researcher estimates a series of 12 nested negative binomial regression 
models (NBRM) and Poisson regression models (PRM) using the “nestreg” command in 
STATA 13.1. This permits an examination of the contemporaneous and lagged effects of 
life domains on all forms of self-reported crime during both developmental stages. This 
technique categorizes the independent variables into separate groups and sequentially 
adds each block to the regression model until all are included (Acock 2012). This method 
is well suited for this dissertation research because it employs count outcome measures of 
criminal behavior at both time points and because both theories already categorized the 
independent variables into distinct blocks in the form of life domains. Nested regression 
analysis in STATA also produces a Wald Chi2 test for each block of predictor variables, 
indicating whether its addition to the regression equation significantly to an 
understanding of the dependent variable. 
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Table 3 Review of Research Questions and Corresponding Hypotheses 
Research Question Research Hypothesis 
RQ1: Are all five life domains directly related to 
recent criminal behavior? Specifically, do each of 
Agnew’s (2005) five life domains, and the 
variables within them, exhibit a direct effect on 
such crime? 
H1: All adolescent (T1) life domains are 
significantly related to adolescent (T1) general 
crime. 
H2: All adult (T2) life domains are significantly 
related to adult (T2) general crime. 
RQ2: Are the effects of life domain variables on 
recent crime mediated by constraints against it and 
motivations towards it? 
H3: T1 constraint and motivation variables 
mediate the effect of T1 life domain variables on 
T1 general crime. 
RQ3: Do the life domain variables with the largest 
relative effect on crime vary according to one’s 
developmental stage in the manner predicted by 
the general theory? That is, do the life domain 
variables with the greatest effect in adolescence 
differ from those in adulthood? 
H4a: T1 self and peer life domains produce a 
larger effect on T1 general crime relative to the 
other T1 life domains. 
H4b: T1 irritability, low self-control, and peer 
delinquency produce the largest relative effects on 
T1 general crime. 
H5a: T2 self, peer, family, and employment life 
domains produce a larger effect on T2 general 
crime relative to the other T2 life domains. 
H5b: T2 irritability, low self-control, peer 
delinquency, no/bad marriage, unemployment, and 
bad jobs produce the largest relative effects on T2 
general crime. 
RQ4: Does the general theory predict all types of 
crime and deviance? Specifically, do the causal 
variables and the size of their effects differ in 
predicting general crime, person/property crime, 
and drug crime? 
H6: The same T1 life domain variables predict all 
types of T1 crime and deviance (i.e., general 
crime, person/property crime, and drug crime). 
H7: The same T2 life domain variables predict all 
types of T2 crime and deviance (i.e., general 
crime, person/property crime, and drug crime). 
RQ5: Are the life domains more strongly related 
to recent, rather than future, criminal behavior? 
H8: The effects of T1 life domain variables on T1 
general crime are greater than those of T1 life 
domain variables on T2 general crime. 
RQ6: Do religious variables affect crime enough 
to warrant inclusion as a separate life domain? 
Specifically, does introducing religion as a 
separate life domain increase the explanatory 
power of the general theory to describe crime? 
H9a: T1 religion life domain exerts a significant 
effect on T1 general crime, controlling for all other 
life domain variables. 
H9b: T1 religiosity and religiousness significantly 
negatively affect T1general crime. 
H10a: T2 religion life domain exerts a significant 
effect T2 general crime. 
H10b: T2 religiosity and religiousness 
significantly negatively affect T2 general crime. 
RQ7: Does Cochran’s (2015) theory predict all 
types of crime and deviance? Specifically, do the 
causal variables and the size of their effects differ 
in predicting general crime, person/property crime, 
and drug crime? 
H11: The same T1 life domain variables (with 
religion) predict all types of T1 crime (i.e., general 
crime, person/property crime, and drug crime). 
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Additionally, overdispersion of variance is examined for each model. NBRM is 
employed when the presence of overdispersion is confirmed, as it is more appropriate 
than PRM under such circumstances (Long and Freese 2006). Conversely, PRM is 
utilized when overdispersion of the variance is not present in the distribution. Since the 
predictor variables take the form of polychoric PCA scales, the effect of each life domain 
variable on crime is observed and directly compared to the others. Each effect is 
presented as an incidence-rate ratio (IRR), which is interpreted as a factor change in the 
expected count of crime incidents given a one-unit change in an independent variable. 
The researcher checks for multicollinearity among predictor variables for each model. 
The order of block entry into the regression equation begins with individual-level 
social psychological variables, like self-control and irritability, and moves outward to 
increasingly broader structural life domains. Agnew (2005) attributes great significance 
to the influence of self-control and irritability on criminal behavior. Therefore, such 
ordering allows the researcher to examine the ways in which the effects of these variables 
evolve as additional predictor variables are incorporated into the regression equation. 
Variables for each model are entered in up to seven consecutive blocks: control variables, 
self domain, family domain, peer domain, school domain, work domain, and religion 
domain. The dependent variable in each regression is substituted according to the 
associated research question at hand. In one set of regression models (i.e., the second set 
of models), two additional blocks are added: constraints against crime and motivations 
towards crime. 
The first set of models regresses T1 general crime on T1 life domains. This 
permits an examination of the contemporaneous effects of life domains on crime (RQ1). 
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The second set of models regresses T1 general crime on T1 life domains, T1 constraints 
against crime, and T1 motivations towards crime. This set of models is compared to the 
first set of models, allowing the researcher to gauge whether the observed effects of life 
domains on crime were mediated by those of constraints and motivations (RQ2).  
A third set of models is estimated, which regresses T2 general crime on T2 life 
domains. This illustrates the contemporaneous effects of life domains on crime during 
this stage of development (RQ1). This set of models is then compared to the first in order 
to assess whether the relative effect sizes of each life domain variable vary according to 
developmental stage (RQ3).  
Next, a fourth set of models is estimated in which T2 general crime is regressed 
on T1 life domains. This is compared to the first set of models in order to determine 
whether the effects of life domains on crime are largely contemporaneous (RQ5). 
Specifically, the contemporaneous effects of life domains on T1 general crime are 
directly compared to the lagged effects of the same life domains on T2 general crime. 
The fifth and sixth sets of models regress T1 person/property crime and T1 drug 
crime on T1 life domains, respectively. These sets of models are then compared to the 
first model to explore whether the contemporaneous effects of life domains vary 
according to type of criminal behavior (RQ4). This process is repeated using the seventh 
and eighth sets of models to assess whether the contemporaneous effects of T2 life 
domains vary according to type of crime: T2 person/property crime and T2 drug crime. 
These sets of models are subsequently compared to the second set of regression models. 
Religion is included as a predictor life domain for adolescence in the ninth set of 
models. Specifically, T1 general crime is regressed on all T1 life domains, including 
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religion. This is subsequently compared to the first set of models, allowing the researcher 
to determine whether such variables significantly influence criminal behavior and 
whether Cochran’s (2015) GTCD-E improves the explanatory power of Agnew’s (2005) 
GTCD in adolescence (RQ6). This process is repeated for adulthood, with the tenth set of 
models regressing T2 general crime on all of GTCD-E’s T2 life domains. Similarly, this 
set of models is then compared to the second set of models to ascertain whether it 
improves GTCD’s explanatory ability during adulthood (RQ6). 
The eleventh and twelfth sets of models regress T1 person/property crime and T1 
drug crime on Cochran’s (2015) T1 life domains, respectively. These are compared to the 
ninth set of models in order to examine the generality of GTCD-E. That is, does GTCD-E 
predict all forms of criminal behavior equally, or do the causal variables and their effect 
sizes vary according to type of behavior (RQ7)?  
In sum, this chapter identified the sample, variables, and analytic plan for the 
present dissertation. A series of nested NBRM and PRM are estimated to address the 
study’s research questions, namely the effects of GTCD’s (2005) and GTCD-E’s (2015) 
life domain variables on three forms of criminal behavior at two time points.  
 94 
CHAPTER 5: TESTING BOTH THEORIES OF CRIME AND DELINQUENCY 
Descriptive Summary Analysis 
Data were drawn from the Kaplan Longitudinal and Multigenerational Study 
dataset and the final sample is comprised of students (N = 1629) from the Houston 
Independent School District. Table 4 presents the descriptive statistics for each variable 
incorporated in the present study. The sample was representative of minorities and 
women, as it was about 40% minority and 53% female during adolescence, and 29% 
minority and 53% female during adulthood. The mean age of respondents during 
adolescence (T1) was 12.1, with a range of 11 to 13 years of age. The mean age during 
adulthood (T2) was 21.5, ranging from 19 to 26 years of age. The modal perceived social 
class for both time points was the middle class, with about 49% of the sample reporting it 
as their own each time.  
Adults generally tended to report higher rates of crime. Approximately one fifth 
of participants reported committing at least one general crime act during adolescence, 
compared to 42.60% that reported as such during adulthood. The samples were 
comparable in terms of person/property crime, however. Specifically, 19.95% of the 
sample reported committing at least one such crime during adolescence, and 19.64% 
reported doing so in adulthood. Lastly, only 2.46% of participants reported committing a 
drug crime during adolescence, but 34.01% reported doing so during adulthood. 
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Table 4 Descriptive Statistics for All Dependent and Independent Variables 
Variable N µ 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min. Max. 
Controls      
Age 1629 12.117 .469 11 13 
Sex (Male) 1629 .476 .295 0 1 
Race (White) 1626 .603 .489 0 1 
Social Class (Higher values = lower classes) 1427 2.673 .938 1 6 
Age 1629 21.513 .967 19 26 
Sex (Male) 1629 .474 .499 0 1 
Race (White) 1604 .711 .454 0 1 
Social Class (Higher values = lower classes) 1621 3.156 1.010 1 6 
Forms of Crime      
General 1629 .366 .938 0 11 
Person/Property 1629 .328 .796 0 8 
Drug 1629 .038 .295 0 7 
General 1629 1.044 1.827 0 13 
Person/Property 1629 .295 .694 0 6 
Drug 1629 .749 1.478 0 11 
Life Domains      
Self      
Low Self-Control* 1581 .182 .178 0 1 
Irritability* 1599 .240 .206 0 1 
Low Self-Control* 1596 .106 .228 0 1 
Irritability* 1587 .304 .216 0 1 
Family      
Negative Bond to Parents* 1610 .099 .153 0 1 
Poor Supervision/Discipline* 1589 .146 .163 0 1 
Family Conflict/Abuse* 1609 .187 .165 0 1 
Absence of Positive Parenting* 1604 .129 .161 0 1 
Criminal Parents/Siblings* 1606 .091 .192 0 1 
Failure to Marry 1629 .889 .314 0 1 
Negative Bond to Spouse/Children* 1626 .154 .320 0 1 
Criminal Spouse or Partner 1604 .016 .124 0 1 
Spousal Conflict/Abuse* 1624 .035 .125 0 1 
Poor Social Support from Spouse* 1629 .003 .046 0 1 
School      
Negative Bond to School/Teachers* 1603 .115 .152 0 1 
Poor Academic Performance 1603 .197 .398 0 1 
Little Time Spent on Homework 1605 .112 .316 0 1 
Lower Educational/Occupational Goals 1597 .052 .222 0 1 
Poor Supervision/Discipline* 1601 .271 .359 0 1 
Poor Treatment by Teachers 1605 .026 .160 0 1 
Absence of Positive Teaching 1604 .080 .272 0 1 
Low Educational Achievement 1629 .251 .434 0 1 
Peer      
Criminal Peers* 1609 .037 .097 0 1 
Peer Conflict/Abuse* 1580 .148 .191 0 1 
Criminal Peers* 1607 .061 .182 0 1 
(continued) 
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Table 4 (continued) 
Variable  N µ 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min. Max. 
Life Domains      
Employment      
Unemployed 1629 .274 .446 0 1 
Negative Bond to Work 1624 .110 .313 0 1 
Poor Work Performance 1622 .245 .430 0 1 
Poor Working Conditions* 1625 .300 .253 0 1 
Religion      
Religiousness 1627 .155 .361 0 1 
Religiosity 1629 .280 .449 0 1 
Religiousness 1629 .162 .369 0 1 
Religiosity 1629 .527 .499 0 1 
Constraints against Crime      
Likelihood of Others’ Neg. Reaction*  1614 .394 .200 0 1 
Likelihood of One’s Own Neg. Reaction 1606 .257 .437 0 1 
Motivations towards Crime      
Level of Short-Term Neg. Emotions 1609 .466 .499 0 1 
Ability to Cope with Strain with Conformity 1597 .741 .438 0 1 
Likelihood of Pos. Reinforcement for Crime* 1624 .190 .336 0 1 
Crime is Desirable in Some Instances* 1597 .028 .085 0 1 
Note: Adolescent variables are highlighted with a gray background and adult variables are highlighted with 
a white background. 
* Scale constructed using polychoric principal components analysis 
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Results of Sequential Multivariate Regression Analysis 
Contemporaneous and variable effects by age: Adolescence (1st set of models). 
 The first research question asks whether all of GTCD’s life domains are related 
to crime. That is, does each domain exhibit a direct contemporaneous effect on crime. 
The first set of models specifically examines the contemporaneous effect of adolescent 
life domains on crime. To test this, the researcher estimated nested multivariate NBRM 
with adolescent self-reported general crime incidents as the dependent variable. 
Independent variables were sequentially added to the regression as five blocks: Block 1: 
control variables, Block 2: self domain, Block 3: family domain, Block 4: peer domain, 
and Block 5: school domain. Table 5 presents the contemporaneous effects of adolescent 
life domains on general crime and summarizes the empirical contribution of each life 
domain as a predictor of the rate of crime acts.  
Several control variables were associated with general crime acts in the first 
model. Older adolescents (IRR = 1.50, p < 0.01), males (IRR = 1.68, p < 0.001), and 
those from a lower perceived social class (IRR = 1.23, p < 0.01) reported a higher rate of 
general crime incidents. Race was not a significant predictor in this model. In Model 2, 
the self domain was entered into the regression. All control variables were reduced to 
non-significance. However, both low self-control (IRR = 2.76, p < 0.05) and irritability 
(IRR = 26.32, p < 0.001) significantly increased the rate of reported crime acts.  
In Model 3, the family domain was incorporated. Sex regained significance in this 
model, with males reporting more crime acts (IRR = 1.34, p < 0.05). The effects of the 
self domain were reduced with this addition. Specifically, low self-control was reduced to 
non-significance and the magnitude of the effect of irritability fell to 15.41 (p < 0.001).  
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Table 5 Summary of Nested Negative Binomial Regression Analysis of Agnew’s Adolescent 
Life Domain Variables Predicting Contemporaneous General Crime Incidents (N = 1276) 
 Model 1 
Controls 
Model 2 
+ Self 
Model 3 
+ Family 
Variable  IRR SE  IRR SE  IRR SE  
Block 1: Controls       
Age 1.502** .203 - - - - 
Male 1.680*** .234 - - 1.339* .176 
White - - - - - - 
Low Social Class 1.228** .091 - - - - 
Life Domains       
Block 2: Self       
Low Self-Control   2.760* 1.084 - - 
Irritability   26.324*** 9.194 15.413*** 5.334 
Block 3: Family       
Negative Bond      - - 
Poor Supervision     2.210* .845 
Family Conflict     - - 
Poor Parenting     - - 
Criminal Family     4.154*** 1.222 
Block 4: Peer       
Criminal Peers       
Peer Conflict       
Block 5: School       
Negative Bond        
Poor Performance       
Little Time HW       
Lower Goals       
Poor Supervision       
Poor Treatment        
Poor Teaching       
Pseudo-R2 .016  .086  .110  
       
LR Chi2 31.54***  165.93***  212.64***  
G2 294.91***  173.47***  127.67***  
Wald Chi2 for each block 31.06***  128.34***  46.33**  
(continued) 
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Table 5 (continued) 
 Model 4 
+ Peer 
Model 5 
+ School 
  
Variable  IRR SE  IRR SE    
Block 1: Controls       
Age - - - -   
Male 1.467** .184 1.390** .174   
White - - - -   
Low Social Class - - - -   
Life Domains       
Block 2: Self       
Low Self-Control - - - -   
Irritability 10.380*** 3.358 7.704*** 2.518   
Block 3: Family       
Negative Bond  - - - -   
Poor Supervision - - 2.201* .773   
Family Conflict - - 2.421* 1.045   
Poor Parenting - - - -   
Criminal Family - - - -   
Block 4: Peer       
Criminal Peers 137.627*** 72.323 100.773*** 48.930   
Peer Conflict - - - -   
Block 5: School       
Negative Bond    3.692** 1.518   
Poor Performance   1.412* .197   
Little Time HW   - -   
Lower Goals   1.601* .375   
Poor Supervision   - -   
Poor Treatment    - -   
Poor Teaching   1.613** .285   
Pseudo-R2 .163  .180    
       
LR Chi2 317.19***  349.00***    
G2 78.72***  51.87***    
Wald Chi2 for each block 88.03***  33.10***    
Notes: IRR refers to incidence rate ratio, which presents a factor change in expected count; % presents a percent 
change in expected count. Only significant effects are reported. 
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001 (two-tailed tests) 
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 Additionally, poor parental supervision (IRR = 2.21, p < 0.05) and family 
criminality (IRR = 4.15, p < 0.001) significantly increased the rate of self-reported 
general crime acts. There were no significant effects for negative family bond, family 
conflict and abuse, or negative parenting practices within the family domain. 
Model 4 added the peer domain. Among control variables, sex (IRR = 1.47, p < 
0.01) maintained a significant influence in the same direction. The effect of irritability 
was further reduced to 10.38 (p < 0.001) within the self domain. Both poor parental 
supervision and family criminality within the family domain failed to produce a 
significant effect in this model. Only peer criminality (IRR = 137.63, p < 0.001) exerted a 
significant effect within the peer domain, as that of peer conflict and abuse was not 
significant. 
The school domain was added to the regression equation in Model 5. With this 
inclusion, Agnew’s (2005) final model was represented, including all life domain 
variables. Sex was the only significant control variable, as males reported a rate of 
general crime incidents that was 1.39 (p < 0.01) times greater than females, holding all 
other variables constant. Age, race, and perceived social class remained unrelated to the 
rate of adolescent crime acts. Within the self domain, each one-unit increase in 
respondent irritability increased the expected rate of general crime incidents by a factor 
of 7.70 (p < 0.001), controlling for all other independent variables. Self-control remained 
a non-significant variable. Two variables within the family domain significantly impacted 
general criminal behavior. One-unit increases in poor parental supervision and family 
conflict and abuse scores increased the rate of general crime incidents by factors of 2.20 
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(p < 0.05) and 2.42 (p < 0.05), respectively. Negative parenting practices and family 
criminality were not significant in the final model.  
Peer criminality within the peer domain was significantly positively related to 
crime, while peer conflict and abuse was not. Specifically, a one-unit increase in 
respondent peer criminality score increased the rate of general crime incidents by a factor 
of 100.77 (p < 0.001).  Finally, four school domain variables significantly affected the 
rate of contemporaneous crime during adolescence. Each additional unit increase in 
respondent negative school bond score raised the expected rate of general crime acts by a 
factor of 3.69 (p < 0.01), while a unit increase in negative teaching practices score 
resulted in a 1.61-factor (p < 0.01) increase. Additionally, students that performed with 
poor academic performance and those with low educational goals reported rates of 
general crime acts that were 1.41 (p < 0.05) and 1.60 (p < 0.05) times higher, 
respectively. Neither little time spent on homework, poor academic supervision, nor poor 
treatment by teachers significantly affected the rate of crime in the final model. 
The overall model was a good fit to explain general crime at this developmental 
stage (LR Chi2 = 349.00, p = < 0.001), yielding a pseudo-R2 coefficient of 0.180. The 
pseudo-R2 increased steadily as each block of independent variables was added to the full 
model, indicating an improvement in model fit. Similarly, the Wald Chi2 test for each 
regression model was sufficiently large and highly significant, leading to the conclusion 
that each grouping of variables contributed significantly to an understanding of general 
crime during adolescence. Significant evidence of overdispersion of the variance (G2 = 
51.87, p < 0.001) indicated that NBRM was preferred to PRM with the current data 
(Long and Freese 2006). Tests for multicollinearity identified no such issues. 
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Specifically, none of the calculated variance inflation factor (VIF) values exceeded 2.6 
and no tolerance coefficient fell below 0.38 (Menard 1995). 
Mediating effects of constraints and motivations (2nd set of models).  
The second research question inquiries whether the effects of life domain 
variables on crime are mediated by constraints against crime and motivations towards it. 
Therefore, the second analysis specifically examined contemporaneous adolescent life 
domain effects as they are influenced by adolescent constraints against crime and 
motivations towards it. Nested multivariate NBRM was again utilized with adolescent 
self-reported general crime acts as the dependent variable. However, constraints and 
motivations were incorporated as separate blocks of predictor variables in addition to the 
life domain blocks utilized in the first set of regression analysis: Block 6: constraints 
against crime, and Block 7: motivations towards crime. Table 6 summarizes the 
contemporaneous effects of adolescent life domains, constraints, and motivations on 
general crime incidents as well as the empirical importance of each block of predictor 
variables.  
Model 6 was the penultimate model and added constraints against crime as independent 
variables. Sex (IRR = 1.38, p < 0.05) remained the only significant control variable in 
this model. Irritability (IRR = 7.15, p < 0.001) significantly increased the rate of crime 
acts, while low self-control did not within the self domain. Within the family domain, 
poor parental supervision (IRR = 2.30, p < 0.05) and family conflict and abuse (IRR = 
2.37, p < 0.05) continued to exert a significant effect in this model. Peer criminality (IRR 
= 96.19, p < 0.001) was the only significant predictor within the peer domain. Variables 
that significantly affected the rate of crime incidents within the school domain include 
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negative school bond (IRR = 3.64, p < 0.01), poor academic performance (IRR = 1.39, p 
< 0.05), and negative teaching practices (IRR = 1.58, p < 0.05). The effect of low 
educational goals failed to reach significance in this model. Lastly, none of the variables 
within the constraints against crime block were significantly associated with self-reported 
general crime acts. That is, neither the probability of others’ negative reaction to criminal 
behavior nor the probability of one’s own negative reaction to crime exerted a significant 
impact. 
Finally, Model 7 introduced motivations towards crime as a block of independent 
variables and represented the full regression model. As with Model 6, sex remained the 
only significant control variable in the final model, with male adolescents reporting an 
expected rate of general crime incidents that is 1.38 (p < 0.05) times greater than female 
respondents, holding all other variables constant. Age, race, and perceived social class 
were non-significant in the final model. Within the self domain, each one-unit increase in 
respondent level of irritability raised the number of reported criminal acts by a factor of 
7.13 (p < 0.001), controlling for all other predictor variables. Self-control remained 
unrelated to crime incidents in the final model. Poor parental supervision was the lone 
variable within the family domain that exerted a significant effect on self-reported general 
crime incidents, as the effect of family conflict and abuse was reduced to non-
significance. Specifically, each additional unit increase in poor parental supervision 
increased the rate of general crime incidents by a factor of 2.30 (p < 0.05). Negative 
family bond, negative parenting practices, and family criminality were not significantly 
associated with general crime.  
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Table 6 Summary of Nested Negative Binomial Regression Analysis of Agnew’s Adolescent Life 
Domain, Constraint, and Motivation Variables Predicting Contemporaneous General Crime 
Incidents (N = 1276) 
 Model 6 
+ Constraints 
Model 7 
+ Motivations 
  
Variable IRR SE IRR SE     
Block 1: Controls         
Age - - - -     
Male 1.376* .174 1.376* .174     
White - - - -     
Low Social Class - - - -     
Life Domains         
Block 2: Self         
Low Self-Control - - - -     
Irritability 7.150*** 2.367 7.150*** 2.367     
Block 3: Family         
Negative Bond  - - - -     
Poor Supervision 2.302* .810 2.302* .810     
Family Conflict 2.374* 1.031 2.374* 1.031     
Poor Parenting - - - -     
Criminal Family - - - -     
Block 4: Peer         
Criminal Peers 96.200*** 46.41
5 
96.200*** 46.415     
Peer Conflict - - - -     
Block 5: School         
Negative Bond  3.636** 1.488 3.636** 1.488     
Poor Performance 1.393* .194 1.393* .194     
Little Time HW - - - -     
Lower Goals - - - -     
Poor Supervision - - - -     
Poor Treatment  - - - -     
Poor Teaching 1.578* .279 1.578* .279     
Block 6: Constraints         
Prob. of Others’ Neg. 
Reaction 
- - - -     
Prob. of Own Neg. 
Reaction 
- - - -     
Block 7: Motivations         
Level of Short-Term Neg. 
Emotions 
        
Ability to Cope with 
Strain with Conformity 
        
Positive Reinforcement for 
Crime 
        
Crime is Desirable in 
Some Instances 
        
Pseudo-R2 .182  .182      
         
LR Chi2 352.90***  352.90***      
G2 50.67***  50.67***      
Wald Chi2 for each block 3.89  3.89      
Notes: IRR refers to incidence rate ratio, which presents a factor change in expected count; % presents a percent change in 
expected count. Only significant effects are reported. 
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001 (two-tailed tests)) 
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Within the peer domain, only peer criminality was a significant predictor variable, 
with one-unit increases in this score increasing the rate of general crime incidents by a 
factor of 83.19 (p < 0.001).  Low self-control did not significantly affect crime in this 
model. Three school domain variables were significant. Each one-unit increase in 
negative school bond score increased the expected rate of self-reported general crime acts 
by a factor 3.63 (p < 0.01). Additionally, adolescents with poor academic performance 
and those that experienced negative teaching practices reported rates of general crime 
incidents that were 1.40 (p < 0.05) and 1.57 (p < 0.05) times higher than other 
respondents, respectively. Little time spent on homework, low educational goals, poor 
academic supervision, and negative treatment by teachers were not significantly related to 
crime in the full model.  
Both of the constraints variables (i.e., the probability of others’ negative reaction 
to crime and the probability of one’s own negative reaction to crime) remained unrelated 
to the rate of general crime acts in the final model. Similarly, none of the motivation 
variables emerged as significantly related to general crime. Specifically, neither one’s 
level of short-term negative emotions, one’s inability to cope with strain with conformity, 
positive reinforcement for crime, nor the perception of crime as desirable in some 
instances significantly affected the rate of self-reported general crime incidents.  
While the final model was a good fit for the data (LR Chi2 = 354.14, p = < 0.001), 
it was not a significantly better fit than the life domain only model. The pseudo-R2 
coefficient of 0.183, increased steadily from 0.016 to 0.180 as each life domain block was 
added to the equation. However, the pseudo-R2 value plateaued after the peer domain 
was added, only increasing by an increment of 0.002 beyond 0.180 as both the constraints 
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and motivations blocks were added, indicating no improvement. Along the same lines, 
the Wald Chi2 test was sufficiently large and highly significant for each regression model 
except those which incorporated constraint and motivation variables. This empirically 
demonstrated that the addition of the control and life domain blocks significantly 
improved the overall model’s ability to explain adolescent crime acts, while the addition 
of the constraint and motivation blocks failed to do so. An examination of overdispersion 
of the variance (G2 = 50.03, p < .001) identified NBRM as the preferred method of 
analysis. Again, multicollinearity posed no problem since none of the calculated VIF 
values exceeded 2.6 and no tolerance value fell below 0.38 (Menard 1995). 
Contemporaneous and variable effects by age: Adulthood (3rd set of models).  
The third research question asks whether life domain variables exerting relatively 
large effects on crime vary according to developmental stage? Specifically, do the life 
domain variables with the greatest effect in adolescence differ from those in adulthood? 
To test this, and whether all life domains are related to crime during adulthood (RQ1), the 
researcher estimated nested multivariate NBRM with adult self-reported general crime 
incidents as the dependent variable. In this case, independent variables were sequentially 
entered as six blocks: Block 1: control variables, Block 2: self domain, Block 3: family 
domain, Block 4: peer domain, and Block 5: school domain. Table 7 summarizes the 
contemporaneous effects of adult life domains on general crime and the empirical 
contribution each life domain makes as a predictor of the rate of crime incidents.  
Two control variables were associated with general crime acts in the first model. 
Male (IRR = 1.58, p < 0.001) and white respondents (IRR = 1.51, p < 0.001) reported a 
higher rate of general crime incidents. Age and perceived social class were not 
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significantly related to general crime in this model. In Model 2, the self domain was 
entered. Both sex (IRR = 1.61, p < 0.001) and race (IRR = 1.49, p < 0.001) continued to 
exert significant effects among control variables. Within the self domain, both low self-
control (IRR = 1.85, p < 0.01) and irritability (IRR = 3.99, p < 0.001) significantly raised 
the rate of reported crime incidents.  
The family domain was introduced in Model 3. Respondent sex (IRR = 1.65, p < 
0.001) and race (IRR = 1.59, p < 0.001) continued to exert significant effects. The self 
domain also maintained significance, with low self-control (IRR = 1.89, p < 0.01) and 
irritability (IRR = 3.52, p < 0.001) each increasing the rate of general crime acts. Two 
variables within the family domain yielded significant impacts: failure to marry (IRR = 
1.91 p < 0.001) and spouse/partner criminality (IRR = 3.38, p < 0.001). Negative 
spouse/partner bond, spouse/partner conflict and abuse, and low spouse/partner social 
support did not significantly affect the rate of general crime incidents. 
Model 4 incorporated the peer domain. Sex (IRR = 1.56, p < 0.001) and race (IRR 
= 1.56, p < 0.001) continued to exert significant impacts among control variables. 
Similarly, the effects of low self-control (IRR = 1.58, p < 0.01) and irritability (IRR = 
3.03, p < 0.001) remained significant within the self domain. Failure to marry (IRR = 
1.91, p < 0.001), and spouse/partner criminality (IRR = 2.61, p < 0.01) remained the only 
variables within the family domain that were significantly associated with crime. The 
lone peer domain variable, peer criminality (IRR = 5.39, p < 0.001) exerted a significant 
effect on the rate of general crime acts. 
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Table 7 Summary of Nested Negative Binomial Regression Analysis of Agnew’s Adult Life 
Domain Variables Predicting Contemporaneous General Crime Incidents (N = 1480) 
 Model 1 
Controls 
Model 2 
+ Self 
Model 3 
+ Family 
Model 4 
+ Peer 
Variable IRR SE IRR SE IRR SE IRR SE 
Block 1: Controls         
Age - - - - - - - - 
Male 1.581*** .144 1.605*** .143 1.654*** .147 1.555*** .134 
White 1.513*** .159 1.494*** .154 1.587*** .164 1.559*** .156 
Low Social Class - - - - - - - - 
Life Domains         
Block 2: Self         
Low Self-Control   1.846** .351 1.886** .357 1.579* .289 
Irritability   3.989*** .826 3.517*** .726 3.030*** .602 
Block 3: Family         
Failure to Marry     1.907*** .331 1.915*** .323 
Negative Bond     - - - - 
Criminal Spouse     3.380*** 1.074 2.608*** .799 
Conflict/Abuse     - - - - 
No Social Support     - - - - 
Block 4: Peer         
Criminal Peers        5.391*** 1.124 
Block 5: School         
Low Achievement          
Block 6: Work         
Unemployed         
Negative Bond         
Poor Performance         
Poor Conditions         
Pseudo-R2 .011  .029  .037  .055  
         
LR Chi2 43.22***  115.59***  150.25***  222.97***  
G2 973.34***  818.66***  772.42***  618.69***  
Wald Chi2 for each 
block 
43.60***  70.20***  31.75***  65.31***  
(continued) 
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Table 7 (continued) 
 Model 5 
+ School 
Model 6 
+ Work 
    
Variable IRR SE IRR SE     
Block 1: Controls         
Age - - - -     
Male 1.522*** .131 1.464*** .125     
White 1.606*** .161 1.641*** .164     
Low Social Class - - - -     
Life Domains         
Block 2: Self         
Low Self-Control 1.524* .279 - -     
Irritability 3.037*** .601 2.954*** .598     
Block 3: Family         
Failure to Marry 1.997*** .338 1.935*** .326     
Negative Bond - - - -     
Criminal Spouse 2.616** .800 2.143* .649     
Conflict/Abuse - - - -     
No Social Support - - - -     
Block 4: Peer         
Criminal Peers  5.034*** 1.052 4.770*** .974     
Block 5: School         
Low Achievement 1.359** .139 1.301** .132     
Block 6: Work         
Unemployed   - -     
Negative Bond   1.367* .196     
Poor Performance   1.566*** .149     
Poor Conditions   - -     
Pseudo-R2 .057  .065      
         
LR Chi2 232.06***  261.65***      
G2 605.26***  560.39***      
Wald Chi2 for each 
block 
9.04***  29.58***      
Notes: IRR refers to incidence rate ratio, which presents a factor change in expected count; % presents a percent change in 
expected count. Only significant effects are reported. 
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001 (two-tailed tests) 
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Model 5 denotes the inclusion of the school domain.  The same significant 
variables from Model 4 remained as such in this model. Specifically, male (IRR = 1.52, p 
< 0.001) and white (IRR = 1.61, p < 0.001) respondents reported higher rates of general 
crime acts. Low self-control (IRR = 1.52, p < 0.05) and irritability (IRR = 3.04, p < 
0.001) within the self domain maintained significance. Failure to marry (IRR = 2.00, p < 
0.001) and spouse/partner criminality (IRR = 2.62, p < 0.01) continued to exert the only 
significant effects among family domain variables. Peer criminality (IRR = 5.03, p < 
0.001) remained significantly positively associated with general crime during adulthood. 
The effect of low educational achievement (IRR = 1.36, p < 0.01) achieved significance 
within the school domain in adulthood. 
The employment domain was added to the regression equation in Model 6. With 
this inclusion, Agnew’s (2005) final theoretical model was represented, including all life 
domain variables. Among control variables, males and white respondents reported rates 
of general crime acts that were 1.46 (p < 0.001) and 1.64 (p < 0.001) times higher than 
others, holding all other independent variables constant. Age and perceived social class 
did not produce significant effects in the final model. Within the self domain, the effect of 
low self-control was diminished to the point of non-significance. However, irritability 
continued to exert a significant impact, as each unit increase in respondent score for this 
variable raised the rate of general crime acts by a factor of 2.95 (p < 0.001). 
The effects of failure to marry and spouse/partner criminality maintained 
significance among family domain variables. Specifically, unmarried respondents and 
those with criminal spouses/partners reported rates of general crime incidents that were 
1.93 (p < 0.001) and 2.14 (p < 0.05) times higher than others, respectively. Neither poor 
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spouse/partner bond, spouse/partner conflict and abuse, nor low spouse/partner social 
support significantly impacted the rate of contemporaneous general crime acts in the final 
model. The peer domain remained significantly related to general crime in the final 
model. Each additional unit increase in respondent peer criminality score increased the 
rate of general crime incidents by a factor of 4.77 (p < 0.001), controlling for the effects 
of all other variables. 
  Low educational achievement continued to exert a significant positive effect 
within the school domain, as those whose highest level of education was high school 
reported a rate of general crime acts that was 1.30 (p < 0.01) times greater than those with 
more education than a high school degree or its equivalent. Finally, two variables within 
the employment domain significantly affected the rate of general crime acts. Those with a 
negative work bond reported a rate of general crime incidents that was 1.37 (p < 0.05) 
times greater than others. Additionally, those with poor work performance reported a rate 
of contemporaneous general crime acts that was 1.57 (p < 0.001) times higher. Non-
significant effects in this domain included unemployment and poor working conditions. 
The full model provided the best fit for the data (LR Chi2 = 349.00, p = < 0.001) 
and produced a pseudo-R2 coefficient of 0.065. The pseudo-R2 value increased from 
0.011 to 0.065 as independent variables were added to subsequent models. Additionally, 
the Wald Chi2 test for each regression model was large and highly significant, 
demonstrating that the addition of each block contributed significant to an understanding 
of general crime during adulthood. Significant evidence of overdispersion of the variance 
(G2 = 560.39, p < .001) confirmed NBRM as preferable to PRM (Long and Freese 2006). 
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Multicollinearity among predictor variables was not a problem, as none of the calculated 
VIF values exceeded 2.6 and no tolerance coefficient fell below 0.38 (Menard 1995). 
Comparison of contemporaneous and lagged effects (4th set of models).  
The fifth research question explores Agnew’s claim regarding the 
contemporaneous and lagged effects of life domains on crime. It specifically questions 
whether life domains are more strongly related to recent crime rather than future crime. 
This analysis tested whether adolescent life domains exerted a significant lagged effect 
on crime and whether this effect is weaker than contemporaneous effects. Therefore, the 
researcher employed nested multivariate NBRM with adult self-reported general crime 
incidents as the dependent variable. As before, independent variables were added to the 
regression as five consecutive blocks: Block 1: control variables, Block 2: self domain, 
Block 3: family domain, Block 4: peer domain, and Block 5: school domain. Table 8 
summarizes the lagged effects of adolescent life domains on general crime acts in 
adulthood. It also presents the empirical contribution of each life domain as a predictor of 
the rate of crime acts.  
Two of four control variables were associated with general crime acts in the first 
model. Males (IRR = 1.65, p < 0.001) and white adolescents (IRR = 1.37, p < 0.01) 
reported a higher rate of general crime acts in adulthood. Age and perceived social class 
did not significantly affect the rate of crime incidents in this model. The self domain was 
incorporated in Model 2. The effects of sex (IRR = 1.55, p < 0.001) and race (IRR = 1.38, 
p < 0.01) remained significant. Only irritability (IRR = 2.26, p < 0.01) within the self 
domain significantly affected the rate of self-reported general crime incidents, as low 
self-control was not significantly related.  
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In Model 3, the family domain was added. Sex (IRR = 1.60, p < 0.001) and race 
(IRR = 1.43, p < 0.01) continued to exert the only significant effects among control 
variables. Irritability (IRR = 2.21, p < 0.01) retained significance within the self domain. 
Only one variable from the family domain produced a significant effect on adult self-
reported crime incidents in this model: family criminality (IRR = 1.76, p < 0.05). Neither 
negative family bond, poor parental supervision, family conflict and abuse, nor negative 
parenting practices significantly influenced the rate of self-reported general crime acts in 
this model.  
The peer domain was introduced in Model 4. The effects of sex (IRR = 1.63, p < 
0.001) and race (IRR = 1.45, p < 0.001) maintained significance. Irritability (IRR = 2.27, 
p < 0.01) also remained the only significant predictor within the self domain.  
Within the family domain, family criminality was reduced to non-significance. 
Within the peer domain, peer criminality did not exert a significant effect, but peer 
conflict and abuse significantly negatively influenced lagged crime in adulthood (IRR = 
0.46, p < 0.01). 
The school domain was added to the regression equation in Model 5. This model 
represents Agnew’s (2005) final model. Respondents that were male and white were 
reported rates of lagged general crime acts that were 1.64 (p < 0.001) and 1.41 (p < 0.01) 
times higher than others, respectively. Non-significant effects among control variables 
included age and perceived social class. Irritability was the only significantly associated 
variable within the self domain, as low self-control did not exert an effect. 
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Table 8 Summary of Nested Negative Binomial Regression Analysis of Agnew’s Adolescent 
Life Domain Variables Predicting Lagged General Crime Incidents (N = 1276) 
 Model 1 
Controls 
Model 2 
+ Self 
Model 3 
+ Family 
Variable  IRR SE  IRR SE  IRR SE  
Block 1: Controls       
Age - - - - - - 
Male 1.654*** .160 1.552*** .153 1.605*** .159 
White 1.368** .139 1.385** .144 1.433** .151 
Low Social Class - - - - - - 
Life Domains       
Block 2: Self       
Low Self-Control   - - - - 
Irritability   2.258** .631 2.211** .641 
Block 3: Family       
Negative Bond      - - 
Poor Supervision     - - 
Family Conflict     - - 
Poor Parenting     - - 
Criminal Family     1.755* .462 
Block 4: Peer       
Criminal Peers       
Peer Conflict       
Block 5: School       
Negative Bond        
Poor Performance       
Little Time HW       
Lower Goals       
Poor Supervision       
Poor Treatment        
Poor Teaching       
Pseudo-R2 .010  .013  .015  
       
LR Chi2 36.46***  45.94***  54.90***  
G2 872.17***  849.96***  834.29***  
Wald Chi2 for each block 36.89***  9.40*  8.69  
(continued) 
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Table 8 (continued) 
 Model 4 
+ Peer 
Model 5 
+ School 
  
Variable  IRR SE  IRR SE    
Block 1: Controls       
Age - - - -   
Male 1.627*** .161 1.635*** .162   
White 1.454*** .153 1.406** .150   
Low Social Class - - - -   
Life Domains       
Block 2: Self       
Low Self-Control - - - -   
Irritability 2.269** .658 2.074* .610   
Block 3: Family       
Negative Bond  - - - -   
Poor Supervision - - - -   
Family Conflict - - - -   
Poor Parenting - - - -   
Criminal Family - - - -   
Block 4: Peer       
Criminal Peers - - - -   
Peer Conflict .455** .133 .424** .126   
Block 5: School       
Negative Bond    - -   
Poor Performance   - -   
Little Time HW   - -   
Lower Goals   - -   
Poor Supervision   - -   
Poor Treatment    - -   
Poor Teaching   - -   
Pseudo-R2 .018  .020    
       
LR Chi2 63.81***  71.43***    
G2 819.01***  801.67***    
Wald Chi2 for each block 8.94*  7.59    
Notes: IRR refers to incidence rate ratio, which presents a factor change in expected count; % presents a percent change in 
expected count. Only significant effects are reported. 
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001 (two-tailed tests) 
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Specifically, a one-unit increase in the respondent irritability score increased the rate of 
lagged general crime incidents by a factor of 2.07 (p < 0.05), controlling for the effect of 
all other variables.  
All family domain variables (i.e., negative parental bond, poor parental 
supervision, family conflict and abuse, and negative parenting practices) remained 
unrelated to lagged crime acts in the final model. Within the peer domain failed to reach 
significance, peer conflict and abuse continued to negatively influence the rate of crime 
acts. Specifically, a one-unit increase in level of peer conflict and abuse decreased the 
rate of expected lagged general crime incidents by a factor of 0.58 (p < 0.01). Lastly, 
none of the variables within the school domain exerted significant effects on crime in 
adulthood in the final model, including negative school bond, poor academic 
performance, little times spent on homework, low educational goals, poor academic 
supervision, poor treatment by teachers, and negative teaching practices.  
The final model fit the data well as an explanation for lagged general crime acts 
(LR Chi2 = 71.43, p = < 0.001), producing a pseudo-R2 value of 0.020. However, not all 
models provided a significant improvement. The Wald Chi2 test for the following models 
was significant: Model 1 (control variables), Model 2 (+ self domain), and Model 4 (+ 
peer domain). This indicates that each of these three blocks significantly improved the 
overall model. However, the Wald Chi2 test for Model 3 (+ family domain) and Model 5 
(+ school domain) failed to reach significance, suggesting no improvement. PRM was 
less appropriate than NBRM for this data due to significant evidence of overdispersion of 
the variance in the distribution (G2 = 801.67, p < .001) (Long and Freese 2006). Tests for 
 117 
multicollinearity identified no such issues, as none of the calculated VIF values exceeded 
2.6 and no tolerance coefficient fell below 0.38 (Menard 1995). 
Variable effects by crime type: Adolescence (5th and 6th sets of models).  
The fourth research question explores whether Agnew’s (2005) life domains 
affect all types of crime in the same manner. Therefore, the next two analyses examined 
the contemporaneous effects of adolescent life domains on two additional forms of 
criminal behavior: person/property crime and drug crime. First, nested multivariate 
NBRM was employed with adolescent self-reported person/property crime incidents as 
the dependent variable. The independent variables were sequentially entered as five 
consecutive blocks: Block 1: control variables, Block 2: self domain, Block 3: family 
domain, Block 4: peer domain, and Block 5: school domain. Table 9 presents the 
contemporaneous effects of adolescent life domains on person/property crime incidents 
and summarizes the empirical each block of predictor variables makes to the full model. 
Most of the control variables influenced general crime incidents in the initial 
model. Older adolescents (IRR = 1.39, p < 0.05), males (IRR = 1.75, p < 0.001), and 
those from a lower perceived social class (IRR = 1.23 p < 0.01) reported higher rates of 
person/property crime acts during adolescence. Respondent race was not significantly 
related to the dependent variable in Model 1. Model 2 included the self domain. With this 
inclusion, the effects of all previously-significant control variables were diminished to 
non-significance. Both self domain variables exerted a significant effect, as low self-
control (IRR = 2.46, p < 0.05) and irritability (IRR = 26.69, p < 0.001) each increased the 
rate of expected person/property crime acts among the sample.  
   
 118 
 
  
Table 9 Summary of Nested Negative Binomial Regression Analysis of Agnew’s Adolescent 
Life Domain Variables Predicting Contemporaneous Person/Property Crime Incidents (N = 
1276) 
 Model 1 
Controls 
Model 2 
+ Self 
Model 3 
+ Family 
Variable  IRR SE  IRR SE  IRR SE  
Block 1: Controls       
Age 1.394* .189 - - - - 
Male 1.755*** .242 - - 1.392**  .183 
White - - - - - - 
Low Social Class 1.227** .090 - - - - 
Life Domains       
Block 2: Self       
Low Self-Control   2.457* .939 - - 
Irritability   26.694*** 9.143 16.536*** 5.674 
Block 3: Family       
Negative Bond      - - 
Poor Supervision     - - 
Family Conflict     2.577* 1.207 
Poor Parenting     - - 
Criminal Family     2.812*** .834 
Block 4: Peer       
Criminal Peers       
Peer Conflict       
Block 5: School       
Negative Bond        
Poor Performance       
Little Time HW       
Lower Goals       
Poor Supervision       
Poor Treatment        
Poor Teaching       
Pseudo-R2 .017  .092  .110  
       
LR Chi2 32.35***  170.60***  203.23***  
G2 202.87***  107.52***  82.14***  
Wald Chi2 for each block 31.93***  133.16***  33.06***  
(continued) 
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Table 9 (continued) 
 Model 4 
+ Peer 
Model 5 
+ School 
  
Variable  IRR SE  IRR SE    
Block 1: Controls       
Age - - - -   
Male 1.472** .188 1.402* .179   
White - - - -   
Low Social Class - - - -   
Life Domains       
Block 2: Self       
Low Self-Control - - - -   
Irritability 11.489*** 3.777 8.346*** 2.767   
Block 3: Family       
Negative Bond  - - - -   
Poor Supervision - - 2.082* .742   
Family Conflict - - 2.543* 1.111   
Poor Parenting - - - -   
Criminal Family - - - -   
Block 4: Peer       
Criminal Peers 75.165*** 40.432 55.395** 27.490   
Peer Conflict - - - -   
Block 5: School       
Negative Bond    4.138** 1.713   
Poor Performance   1.395* .197   
Little Time HW   - -   
Lower Goals   1.627* .384   
Poor Supervision   - -   
Poor Treatment    - -   
Poor Teaching   1.508* .273   
Pseudo-R2 .151  .167    
       
LR Chi2 279.09***  310.14***    
G2 56.40***  38.56***    
Wald Chi2 for each block 64.59***  32.25***    
Notes: IRR refers to incidence rate ratio, which presents a factor change in expected count; % presents a percent change in 
expected count. Only significant effects are reported. 
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001 (two-tailed tests) 
 120 
Model 3 incorporated the family domain. Sex (IRR = 1.39, p < 0.01) regained 
significance and was the only significant predictor among the control variables. The 
effects of the self domain were diminished in this model. The effect of low self-control 
was attenuated to non-significance and the effect of irritability fell to 16.54 (p < 0.001). 
Family conflict and abuse (IRR = 2.58, p < 0.05) and family criminality (IRR = 2.81, p < 
0.001) emerged as the only variables within the family domain that were significantly 
related to person/property crime. Negative family bond, poor parental supervision, family 
conflict and abuse, and negative parenting practices did not exhibit a significant impact in 
this model.  
The peer domain was introduced in Model 4. Sex (IRR = 1.47, p < 0.01) retained 
significance among the control variables. Irritability maintained significance within the 
self domain but its effect magnitude fell to 11.50 (p < 0.001). All family domain variables 
were reduced to non-significance in this model. Only peer criminality (IRR = 75.17, p < 
0.001) within the peer domain significantly impacted the rate of adolescent 
person/property crime, as peer conflict and abuse was unrelated. 
Model 5 included the school domain and represented Agnew’s (2005) final 
theoretical model. Male adolescents reported a rate of contemporaneous person/property 
crime incidents that was 1.40 (p < 0.05) times higher than females, controlling for all 
other predictor variables. Non-significant effects among control variables in the final 
model included age, race, and perceived social class. Irritability exerted the only 
significant effect among self domain variables, with each unit increase in irritability level 
increasing the rate of contemporaneous person/property crime acts by a factor of 8.35 (p 
< 0.001). Self-control did not significantly affect crime in the final model. 
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Within the family domain, poor parental supervision and family criminality 
exerted significant impacts in the final model. Specifically, each additional unit increase 
in parental supervision and family criminality scores raised the rate of person/property 
crime incidents by factors of 2.08 (p < 0.05) and 2.54 (p < 0.05), respectively. Negative 
family bond, negative parenting practices, and family criminality continued to be non-
significant variables in the final model. Only peer criminality within the peer domain 
significantly affected crime in the final model, as peer conflict and abuse was non-
significant. Specifically, a one-unit increase in level of peer criminality raised the rate of 
expected contemporaneous adolescent person/property crime incidents by a factor of 
55.40 (p < 0.001), holding all other variables constant.  
Among school domain variables, negative school bond, poor academic 
performance, low educational goals, and negative teaching practices were significantly 
positively related to person/property crime during adolescence. Specifically, a one-unit 
increase in negative school bond score increased the rate of person/property crimes by a 
factor of 4.14 (p < 0.001). Additionally, respondents that perform poorly in school and 
those that experience negative teaching practices reported rates of person/property crimes 
that were 1.40 (p < 0.05) and 1.51 (p < 0.05) times higher, respectively. Finally, those 
that have low educational goals reported a rate of person/property crime that was 1.63 (p 
< 0.05) times higher than those with higher goals. Non-significant effects in this domain 
included little time spent on homework, poor academic supervision, and poor treatment 
by teachers.  
The overall model provided the best fit for explaining person/property crime 
during adolescence (LR Chi2 = 310.14, p = < 0.001). The pseudo-R2 coefficient for each 
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model increased consistently from 0.017 to 0.167. Each block of predictor variables 
added to the overall model’s ability to explain person/property crime during adolescence, 
as indicated by large and significant Wald Chi2 tests. PRM was less appropriate than 
NBRM for this data due to significant evidence of overdispersion of the variance in the 
distribution (G2 = 38.56, p < .001) (Long and Freese 2006). Again, multicollinearity was 
not an issue since tests revealed that no calculated VIF values exceeded 2.6 and no 
tolerance coefficient fell below 0.38 (Menard 1995). 
As mentioned previously, the proceeding analysis is the second of two related 
analyses measuring the contemporaneous effects of adolescent life domains on specific 
forms of crimes. This next analysis utilized PRM with adolescent drug crime incidents as 
the dependent variable. Similar to the previous analyses, independent variables were 
entered sequentially in five blocks: Block 1: control variables, Block 2: self domain, 
Block 3: family domain, Block 4: peer domain, and Block 5: school domain. Table 9 
presents the contemporaneous effects of adolescent life domains on drug crime acts and 
summarizes the empirical contribution each block of predictor variables makes to the full 
model.  
Model 1 included only control variables. Within this model, age (IRR =2.94, p < 
0.001) significantly affected the rate of drug crime incidents during adolescence for this 
initial model. Respondent sex, race, and perceived social class produced non-significant 
effects. Model 2 introduced the self domain. With this addition, the effect of age 
remained significant and positive (2.43, p < 0.01). Within the self domain, only 
irritability (IRR = 16.55, p < 0.01) was significantly associated with drug crime, as the 
effect of low self-control was not significant.   
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Table 10 Summary of Nested Poisson Regression Analysis of Agnew’s Adolescent Life 
Domain Variables Predicting Contemporaneous Drug Crime Incidents (N = 1276) 
 Model 1 
Controls 
Model 2 
+ Self 
Model 3 
+ Family 
Variable  IRR SE  IRR SE  IRR SE  
Block 1: Controls       
Age 2.938*** .870 2.425** .708 1.949* .588 
Male - - - - - - 
White - - - - - - 
Low Social Class - - - - - - 
Life Domains       
Block 2: Self       
Low Self-Control   - - - - 
Irritability   16.552*** 13.488 - - 
Block 3: Family       
Negative Bond      - - 
Poor Supervision     6.212* 4.764 
Family Conflict     - - 
Poor Parenting     - - 
Criminal Family     39.634*** 19.179 
Block 4: Peer       
Criminal Peers       
Peer Conflict       
Block 5: School       
Negative Bond        
Poor Performance       
Little Time HW       
Lower Goals       
Poor Supervision       
Poor Treatment        
Poor Teaching       
Pseudo-R2 .039  .094  .250  
       
LR Chi2 15.35**  37.29***  99.53***  
Wald Chi2 for each block 16.14**  23.71***  71.85***  
(continued) 
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Table 10 (continued) 
 Model 4 
+ Peer 
Model 5 
+ School 
  
Variable  IRR SE  IRR SE    
Block 1: Controls       
Age - - - -   
Male - - - -   
White 2.356* .940 2.926* 1.340   
Low Social Class - - - -   
Life Domains       
Block 2: Self       
Low Self-Control - - - -   
Irritability - - - -   
Block 3: Family       
Negative Bond  - - - -   
Poor Supervision - - - -   
Family Conflict - - - -   
Poor Parenting .061* .074 .033* .046   
Criminal Family 9.136*** 5.749 8.569** 5.760   
Block 4: Peer       
Criminal Peers 330.989*** 248.890 894.031*** 704.223   
Peer Conflict - - - -   
Block 5: School       
Negative Bond    - -   
Poor Performance   2.674* 1.237   
Little Time HW   - -   
Lower Goals   - -   
Poor Supervision   - -   
Poor Treatment    - -   
Poor Teaching   5.145*** 2.059   
Pseudo-R2 .427  .493    
       
LR Chi2 170.39***  196.66***    
Wald Chi2 for each block 59.59***  29.26***    
Notes: IRR refers to incidence rate ratio, which presents a factor change in expected count; % presents a percent change in 
expected count. Only significant effects are reported. 
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001 (two-tailed tests) 
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The family domain was entered into the regression in Model 3. Age (IRR = 1.95, 
p < 0.05) maintained its significant positive effect in this model. The effect of irritability 
within the self domain was reduced to non-significance. Two family domain variables 
significantly impacted the rate of adolescent drug crime incidents: poor parental 
supervision (IRR = 6.21, p < 0.05) and family criminality (IRR = 39.63, p < 0.001). Non-
significant effects include those of negative family bond, family conflict and abuse, and 
negative parenting practices. 
Model 4 introduced the peer domain. The effect of age was reduced to non-
significance, while that of race (IRR = 2.36, p < 0.05) emerged as significant in this 
penultimate model. Both self domain variables continued to exert non-significant effects. 
Family criminality (IRR = 9.14, p < 0.01) and negative parenting practices (IRR = 0.06, p 
< 0.05) exerted the only significant effects with the family domain since the effect of 
parental supervision became non-significant. Peer criminality (IRR = 330.99, p < 0.001) 
emerged as the only significant variable within the peer domain. Peer conflict and abuse 
was unrelated to adolescent drug crime in this model. 
The school domain was included in Model 5, which incorporated all of Agnew’s 
(2005) life domains. The effects of race continued to be significant in the final model, as 
white students reported a rate of drug crime incidents that was 2.93 (p < 0.05) times 
greater than others, controlling for the effects of all predictor variables. Neither age, sex, 
nor perceived social class exerted a significant impact on the rate of contemporaneous 
adolescent drug crime. Both self domain variables remained non-significant. Family 
criminality and negative parenting practices continued to exert the only significant effects 
with the family domain. Specifically, a one-unit increase in family criminality score 
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increased the rate of contemporaneous adolescent drug crime incidents by a factor of 8.57 
(p < 0.01). Additionally, a one-unit increase in negative parenting practice score 
decreased the rate of drug crime acts by a factor of 0.97 (p < 0.05), controlling for all 
other variables. Non-significant effects in this domain include negative family bond, poor 
parental supervision, and family conflict and abuse. 
Only peer criminality within the peer domain exerted a significant effect in the 
final model since peer conflict and abuse remained non-significant. Specifically, a one-
unit increase in level of peer criminality increased the rate of contemporaneous 
adolescent drug crime incidents by a factor of 894.03 (p < 0.001), holding all other 
predictor variables constant. Poor academic performance and negative teaching practices 
within the school domain were significantly positively related to drug crime. Specifically, 
adolescents with poor school performance exhibited rates of drug crime acts that were 
2.67 (p < 0.05) times higher than others, holding all other variables constant. 
Additionally, those that experienced negative teaching practices reported rates of drug 
crime incidents that were 5.14 (p < 0.001) times higher than other respondents. Negative 
school bond, little time spent on homework, low educational goals, poor academic 
supervision, and poor treatment by teachers each produced non-significant effects in this 
model.  
As was the case with other forms of adolescent crime, the full model yielded the 
best fit for the data (LR Chi2 = 196.66, p = < 0.001). The pseudo-R2 value increased from 
0.039 to 0.493 as additional blocks were incorporated into regression models. The Wald 
Chi2 test produced for each model is large and significant, leading to the conclusion that 
each significantly contributed to the ability to explain contemporaneous drug crime acts 
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during adolescence. This indicates support for GTCD’s ability to explain this type of 
crime during adolescence. Having calculated both the NBRM and Poisson models, 
NBRM was less appropriate, as a test for overdispersion of the variance in this 
distribution was not significant (Long and Freese 2006). There were no issues with 
multicollinearity among predictor variables, as tests revealed that no calculated VIF 
values exceeded 2.6 and no tolerance coefficient fell below 0.38 (Menard 1995).  
Variable effects by crime type: Adulthood (7th and 8th sets of models).  
The following analyses continue to address the fourth research question, which 
questions the generality of Agnew’s (2005) theory, or its ability to influence multiple 
types of crime. However, the next two sets of regression models apply this question to 
adulthood, rather than adolescence. Therefore, the first analysis tested whether adult life 
domains contemporaneously affected person/property crime. As such, nested multivariate 
NBRM was first estimated with adult self-reported person/property crime acts as the 
dependent variable. Again, independent variables were added to the regression in six 
consecutive blocks: Block 1: control variables, Block 2: self domain, Block 3: family 
domain, Block 4: peer domain, Block 5: school domain, and Block 6: employment 
domain. Table 11 presents the contemporaneous effects of adult life domains on 
person/property crime and summarizes the empirical contribution each life domain makes 
as it is related to the rate of crime incidents.  
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Table 11 Summary of Nested Negative Binomial Regression Analysis of Agnew’s Adult Life 
Domain Variables Predicting Contemporaneous Person/Property Crime Incidents (N = 1480) 
 Model 1 
Controls 
Model 2 
+ Self 
Model 3 
+ Family 
Model 4 
+ Peer 
Variable IRR SE IRR SE IRR SE IRR SE 
Block 1: Controls         
Age .835* .059 .861* .059 - - - - 
Male 2.242*** .285 2.220*** .276 2.278*** .288 2.192*** .275 
White - - - - - - - - 
Low Social Class - - - - - - - - 
Life Domains         
Block 2: Self         
Low Self-Control   - - - - - - 
Irritability   9.844*** 2.693 9.061*** 2.493 7.564*** 2.069 
Block 3: Family         
Failure to Marry     - - - - 
Negative Bond     - - - - 
Criminal Spouse     2.694* 1.058 2.294* .891 
Conflict/Abuse     - - - - 
No Social Support     - - - - 
Block 4: Peer         
Criminal Peers        3.644*** .912 
Block 5: School         
Low Achievement          
Block 6: Work         
Unemployed         
Negative Bond         
Poor Performance         
Poor Conditions         
Pseudo-R2 .023  .066  .070  .083  
         
LR Chi2 46.22***  131.96***  140.30***  166.33***  
G2 127.54***  77.74***  73.29***  63.21***  
Wald Chi2 for each 
block 
45.80***  86.09***  8.45  26.67***  
(continued) 
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Table 11 (continued) 
 Model 5 
+ School 
Model 6 
+ Work 
    
Variable IRR SE IRR SE     
Block 1: Controls         
Age - - - -     
Male 2.137*** .267 2.103*** .263     
White - - - -     
Low Social Class - - - -     
Life Domains         
Block 2: Self         
Low Self-Control - - - -     
Irritability 7.510*** 2.041 7.115*** 1.986     
Block 3: Family         
Failure to Marry - - - -     
Negative Bond - - - -     
Criminal Spouse 2.276* .876 - -     
Conflict/Abuse - - - -     
No Social Support - - - -     
Block 4: Peer         
Criminal Peers  3.355*** .837 3.276*** .815     
Block 5: School         
Low Achievement  1.341* .183 - -     
Block 6: Work         
Unemployed   - -     
Negative Bond   - -     
Poor Performance   - -     
Poor Conditions   - -     
Pseudo-R2 .085  .087      
         
LR Chi2 170.83***  174.50***      
G2 56.96***  55.75***      
Wald Chi2 for each 
block 
4.62*  3.69      
Notes: IRR refers to incidence rate ratio, which presents a factor change in expected count; % presents a percent change in 
expected count. Only significant effects are reported. 
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001 (two-tailed tests) 
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Model 1 included only control variables. Older (IRR = 0.84, p < 0.05) 
respondents reported a smaller rate of person/property crime acts, while male respondents 
(IRR = 2.24, p < 0.001) reported an increased rate. Race and perceived social class did 
not exert significant effects in this model. Model 2 incorporated the self domain. The 
effects of age (IRR = 0.86, p < 0.05) and sex (IRR = 2.22, p < 0.001) retained 
significance among control variables. Only irritability (IRR = 9.84, p < 0.001) 
significantly impacted crime within the self domain, as the effect of low self-control 
failed to achieve significance. 
The family domain was introduced in Model 3. The effect of age was reduced to 
non-significance, but that of sex (IRR = 2.28, p < 0.001) continued to be significant. 
Irritability (IRR = 9.06, p < 0.001) remained the only significant predictor among the self 
domain. Within the family domain, only spouse/partner (IRR = 2.69, p < 0.05) criminality 
produced a significant impact on adult person/property crime. Failure to marry, negative 
spouse/partner bond, spouse/partner conflict and abuse, and low spouse/partner social 
support did not exert significant impacts in this model. 
Model 4 added the peer domain. The same variables from Model 3 retained 
significance in this model. Among control variables, male (IRR = 2.19, p < 0.001) 
respondents reported higher rates of person/property crime incidents. Irritability (IRR = 
7.56, p < 0.001) continued to exert the only significant effect among self domain 
variables. Similarly, spouse/partner criminality (IRR = 2.29, p < 0.05) remained the only 
significant predictor within the family domain. The peer domain significantly impacted 
crime, as peer criminality (IRR = 3.64, p < 0.001) increased the rate of person/property 
crime acts. 
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The school domain was introduced in Model 5. Sex (IRR = 2.14 p < 0.001) 
remained the only significant variable within the block of control variables. The self 
domain positively impacted person/property crime through respondent irritability (IRR = 
7.51, p < 0.001). Spouse/partner criminality (IRR = 2.28, p < 0.05) continued to be the 
only variable within the family domain that was significantly associated with 
person/property crime during adulthood. Peer criminality (IRR = 3.36, p < 0.001) 
maintained significance within the peer domain. The school domain achieved a 
significant impact, as low educational achievement (IRR = 1.34, p < 0.01) increased the 
rate of contemporaneous person/property crime incidents. 
Model 6 introduced the employment domain and included all of GTCD’s life 
domain variables. Within the block of control variables, only respondent sex yielded a 
significant effect. That is, male respondents reported a rate of contemporaneous 
person/property crime incidents that was 2.10 (p < 0.001) times higher than female 
respondents. Age, race, and perceived social class did not significantly affect the 
dependent variable in this model. Each one-unit increase in respondent level of irritability 
raised the rate of person/property crime incidents by a factor of 7.12 (p < 0.001), holding 
all other variables constant. The effect of the other self domain variable, low self-control, 
did not reach statistical significance. The family domain did not affect crime in the final 
model, as no variable produced a significant effect. The effect of spouse/partner 
criminality was diminished to non-significance along with those of failure to marry, 
negative spouse/partner bond, spouse/partner conflict and abuse, and low spouse/partner 
social support.  
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The peer domain maintained its significant impact on crime in the final model. A 
one-unit increase in respondent peer criminality score raised the rate of contemporaneous 
person/property crime incidents by a factor of 3.28 (p < 0.001) during adulthood, 
controlling for the all other independent variables. Within the school domain, the effect 
of low educational achievement was attenuated to non-significance. Lastly, the 
employment domain did not produce significant effects on crime. None of the variables 
in this domain (i.e., unemployment, negative work bond, poor work performance, and 
poor working conditions) significantly impacted the rate of person/property crime acts.  
While the full model was a good fit for the data (LR Chi2 = 196.66, p = < 0.001), 
a couple of life domains did not significantly improve the model’s ability to explain 
person/property crime during adulthood. The pseudo-R2 value increased from 0.023 to 
0.087, but plateaued as the family, school, and employment domains were incorporated in 
to the regression. On a related note, the Wald Chi2 test for the following models was 
significant: Model 1 (control variables), Model 2 (+ self domain), Model 4 (+ school 
domain), and Model 5 (+ peer domain). This indicates that the addition of each of these 
three blocks of variables significantly contributed to an understanding of person/property 
crime during adulthood. Note, that the test statistic for Model 4 (+ school domain) 
reached a lower level of significance (p < 0.05) than the other significant models. Further, 
the Wald Chi2 for Model 3 (+ family domain) and Model 6 (+ employment domain) failed 
to reach statistical significance, suggesting no improvement. Significant evidence of 
overdispersion of the variance (G2 = 55.75, p < .001) indicated that NBRM was preferred 
over PRM (Long and Freese 2006). A test for multicollinearity revealed no issues. None 
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of the calculated VIF values exceeded 2.6 and no tolerance coefficient fell below 0.38 
(Menard 1995).  
In the same manner as before, the following analysis tested the contemporaneous 
effect of adult life domains on drug crime. Nested multivariate NBRM was employed in 
which adult self-reported drug crime incidents were the dependent variable. As was the 
case in previous analyses, predictor variables were added to the regression in six 
consecutive blocks: Block 1: control variables, Block 2: self domain, Block 3: family 
domain, Block 4: school domain, Block 5: peer domain, and Block 6: employment 
domain. Table 12 presents the contemporaneous effects of adult life domains on drug 
crime. It also shows the empirical contribution each life domain makes when added to the 
model.  
Model 1 was restricted to control variables. Among these, respondent sex (IRR = 
1.39, p < 0.01) and race (IRR = 1.88, p < 0.001) impacted the rate of drug crime acts. The 
effects of age and perceived social class did not achieve statistical significance. Model 2 
added the self domain. The effects of sex (IRR = 1.42, p < 0.01) and race (IRR = 1.81, p 
< 0.001) remained significant. Additionally, both self domain variables produced 
significant effects, as low self-control (IRR = 1.95, p < 0.01) and irritability (IRR = 2.69, 
p < 0.001) both increased the rate of expected drug crime incidents. 
The family domain was incorporated in Model 3. Both sex (IRR = 1.46, p < 
0.001) and race (IRR = 1.94, p < 0.001) remained as significant variables among control 
variables. Similarly, both low self-control (IRR = 2.02, p < 0.01) and irritability (IRR = 
2.30, p < 0.01) continued to exert significant effects from the self domain. Three variables 
within the family domain yielded significant impacts on drug crime: failure to marry (IRR 
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= 2.10, p < 0.001), spouse/partner criminality (IRR = 3.41, p < 0.01), and spouse/partner 
conflict and abuse (IRR = 2.44, p < 0.05). Non-significant effects in the family domain 
included negative spouse/partner bond and low spouse/partner social support. 
The peer domain was introduced in Model 4. Males (IRR = 1.34, p < 0.01) and 
white respondents (IRR = 1.94, p < 0.001) reported increased rates of drug crime acts. 
Low self-control (IRR = 1.65, p < 0.05) and irritability (IRR = 1.99, p < 0.001) within the 
self domain continued to yield significant positive effects. The effect of the family 
domain was diminished in this model, as that of spouse/partner conflict and abuse was 
reduced to non-significance. Additionally, failure to marry (IRR = 2.13, p < 0.001) and 
spouse/partner criminality (IRR = 2.45, p < 0.05) continued to be significantly related to 
adult drug crime. Lastly, peer criminality (IRR = 6.15, p < 0.001) within the peer domain 
produced a large effect relative to the other life domain variables. 
Model 5 added the school domain. Sex (IRR = 1.31, p < 0.01) and race (IRR = 
2.00, p < 0.001) remained the only significant control variables. The self domain 
continued to produce significant effects with low self-control (IRR = 1.57, p < 0.05) and 
irritability (IRR = 2.02, p < 0.01) each increasing the rate of drug crime incidents. Failure 
to marry (IRR = 2.24, p < 0.001) and spouse/partner criminality (IRR = 2.46, p < 0.01) 
each continued to exert a significant influence within the family domain. The peer 
domain maintained a significant impact, with peer criminality (IRR = 5.81, p < 0.001) 
exerting a significant effect. The school domain produced a significant impact on drug 
crime since low educational achievement (IRR = 1.38 p < 0.01) increased the expected 
rate of contemporaneous drug crime acts. 
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Table 12 Summary of Nested Negative Binomial Regression Analysis of Agnew’s Adult Life 
Domain Variables Predicting Contemporaneous Drug Crime Incidents (N = 1480) 
 Model 1 
Controls 
Model 2 
+ Self 
Model 3 
+ Family 
Model 4 
+ Peer 
Variable IRR SE IRR SE IRR SE IRR SE 
Block 1: Controls         
Age - - - - - - - - 
Male 1.386** .144 1.415** .145 1.460*** .150 1.340** .133 
White 1.882*** .232 1.808*** .221 1.940*** .237 1.939*** .230 
Low Social Class - - - - - - - - 
Life Domains         
Block 2: Self         
Low Self-Control   1.953** .429 2.026** 0.444 1.647* .349 
Irritability   2.689*** .645 2.302** 0.551 1.986** .459 
Block 3: Family         
Failure to Marry     2.103*** 0.42 2.129*** .419 
Negative Bond     - - - - 
Criminal Spouse     3.414** 1.235 2.450** .853 
Conflict/Abuse     2.435* 1.082 - - 
No Social Support     - - - - 
Block 4: Peer         
Criminal Peers        6.152*** 1.485 
Block 5: School         
Low Achievement          
Block 6: Work         
Unemployed         
Negative Bond         
Poor Performance         
Poor Conditions         
Pseudo-R2 .011  .022  .032  .051  
         
LR Chi2 37.37***  74.12***  107.20***  170.47***  
G2 761.78***  682.12***  639.16***  624.25***  
Wald Chi2 for each 
block 
37.81***  35.50***  29.77***  56.62***  
(continued) 
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Table 12 (continued) 
 Model 5 
+ School 
Model 6 
+ Work 
    
Variable IRR SE IRR SE     
Block 1: Controls         
Age - - - -     
Male 1.308** .131 1.246* .124     
White 2.003*** .239 2.086*** .250     
Low Social Class - - - -     
Life Domains         
Block 2: Self         
Low Self-Control 1.566* .333 - -     
Irritability 2.024*** .467 1.982** .469     
Block 3: Family         
Failure to Marry 2.235*** .443 2.110*** .415     
Negative Bond - - - -     
Criminal Spouse 2.458* .856 - -     
Conflict/Abuse - - - -     
No Social Support - - - -     
Block 4: Peer         
Criminal Peers  5.811*** 1.409 5.435*** 1.283     
Block 5: School         
Low Achievement  1.383** .165 1.311* .241     
Block 6: Work         
Unemployed   - -     
Negative Bond   1.460* .241     
Poor Performance   1.739*** .192     
Poor Conditions   - -     
Pseudo-R2 .053  .063      
         
LR Chi2 177.88***  210.62***      
G2 502.47***  453.63***      
Wald Chi2 for each 
block 
7.36**  32.67***      
Notes: IRR refers to incidence rate ratio, which presents a factor change in expected count; % presents a percent change in 
expected count. Only significant effects are reported. 
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001 (two-tailed tests) 
 137 
Model 6 was the final model and incorporated the employment domain. As such, 
it includes all of GTCD’s life domain variables. Among control variables, both sex and 
race exerted significant effects. Specifically, males and white respondents reported rates 
of drug crime acts that were 1.25 (p < 0.05) and 2.09 (p < 0.001) times higher than others, 
respectively. Respondent age and perceived social class were not related to drug crime 
acts in the final model. Within the self domain, the effect of low self-control was reduced 
to non-significance. However, each additional unit increase in irritability score increased 
the rate of drug crime incidents by a factor of 1.98 (p < 0.001), controlling for the effects 
of all other predictor variables.  
The effect of the family domain was attenuated in the final model. The effect of 
spouse/partner criminality was reduced to non-significance, while that of failure to marry 
continued to significantly influence drug crime. Specifically, unmarried respondents were 
reported a rate of drug crime acts that was 2.11 (p < 0.001) times higher than married 
ones, controlling for all other variables. Additional non-significant effects in this domain 
included negative spouse/partner bond, spouse/partner conflict and abuse, and poor 
spouse/partner social support. The peer domain retained its significant effect on crime in 
the final model, with a unit increase in respondent peer criminality score raising the rate 
of contemporaneous drug crime acts by a factor of 5.44 (p < 0.001) during adulthood, 
controlling for the effects of all other independent variables.  
The effect of low educational achievement continued to be significant within the 
school domain. Specifically, those whose highest level of education was high school were 
expected to report a rate of drug crime acts that was 1.31 (p < 0.05) times higher than 
those with more than a high school level of education. Lastly, two variables within the 
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employment domain significantly affected crime in this model. Respondents with 
negative work bonds and poor work performance reported rates of drug crime incidents 
that were 1.46 (p < 0.05) and 1.74 (p < 0.001) times higher than others, respectively. 
As with general crime during adulthood, the full model provided the best fit for an 
explanation of drug crime (LR Chi2 = 453.63, p = < 0.001). The pseudo-R2 value 
increased from 0.011 to 0.063, indicating improvement in the model’s explanatory 
ability. Similarly, the Wald Chi2 test for all models was large and highly significant, 
demonstrating that each offered a significant improvement for the overall model. 
Significant evidence of overdispersion of the variance (G2 = 453.63, p < .001) identified 
NBRM as preferable to PRM for this data (Long and Freese 2006). Multicollinearity 
among predictor variables did not pose a problem, as a test revealed no calculated VIF 
values over 2.6 or tolerance coefficient under 0.38 (Menard 1995).  
Contemporaneous effects of religion as a life domain: Adolescence (9th set of 
models). 
  Having tested Agnew’s (2005) GTCD, the final group of analyses tested 
Cochran’s (2015) GTCD-E by incorporating religion as a distinct life domain and block 
of predictor variables. The sixth research question queries whether the religion life 
domain significantly improves the ability of life domains to explain crime. This analysis 
specifically examined the contemporaneous effect Cochran’s adolescent life domains 
exert on general crime acts. Nested multivariate NBRM was again employed with 
adolescent self-reported general crime incidents as the dependent variable. This analysis 
included the religion domain (Block 6) in addition to the life domain blocks utilized in 
the first set of regression models (i.e., the initial test of Agnew’s theory on adolescent 
 139 
general crime). Table 13 presents the contemporaneous effects of Cochran’s adolescent 
life domains on general crime incidents and summarizes the contribution of each life 
domain as it is associated with the rate of general crime acts.  
With the introduction of the religion domain to GTCD’s life domains, Model 6 
was Cochran’s (2015) final model and incorporated all relevant life domain variables. 
With the exception of low educational goals, which was reduced to non-significance, all 
significant variables in the final model were the same as those in the first set of models. 
Specifically, among control variables, only sex exerted a significant impact, with male 
respondents exhibiting reported rates of contemporaneous general crime incidents that 
were 1.39 (p < 0.01) times higher than females, holding all other predictor variables 
constant. Non-significant effects among control variables included age, race, and 
perceived social class. Low self-control was not a significantly related to crime in this 
model, but a unit increase in respondent level of irritability increased the rate of 
contemporaneous general crime acts by a factor 7.51 (p < 0.001). Poor parental 
supervision and family conflict and abuse remained as the only significant variables 
within the family domain. Specifically, unit increases in each raised the rate of general 
crime incidents by factors of 2.15 (p < 0.05) and 2.45 (p < 0.05), respectively. Negative 
family bond, negative parenting practices, and family criminality continued to produce 
non-significant effects in this domain.  
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Table 13 Summary of Nested Negative Binomial Regression Analysis of Cochran’s Adolescent 
Life Domain Variables Predicting Contemporaneous General Crime Incidents (N = 1276) 
 Model 6 
+ Religion 
   
Variable IRR IRR       
Block 1: Controls         
Age - -       
Male 1.387** .174       
White - -       
Low Social Class         
Life Domains         
Block 2: Self         
Low Self-Control - -       
Irritability 7.505*** 2.469       
Block 3: Family         
Negative Bond  - -       
Poor Supervision 2.146* .760       
Family Conflict 2.451* 1.060       
Poor Parenting - -       
Criminal Family - -       
Block 4: Peer         
Criminal Peers 97.860*** 47.597       
Peer Conflict - -       
Block 5: School         
Negative Bond  3.658** 1.506       
Poor Performance 1.400* .196       
Little Time HW - -       
Lower Goals - -       
Poor Supervision - -       
Poor Treatment  - -       
Poor Teaching 1.608** .284       
Block 6: Religion         
Religiousness - -       
Religiosity - -       
Pseudo-R2 .180        
         
LR Chi2 349.68***        
G2 50.67***        
Wald Chi2 for each 
block 
.69        
Notes: IRR refers to incidence rate ratio, which presents a factor change in expected count; % presents a percent change in 
expected count. Only significant effects are reported. 
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001 (two-tailed tests) 
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Within the peer domain, peer criminality significantly increased the rate of 
general crime, while peer conflict and abuse was unrelated. Specifically, each additional 
unit increase in level of peer criminality increased the rate of expected adolescent 
contemporaneous general crime incidents by a factor of 97.86 (p < 0.001), controlling for 
all other variables. The same three school domain variables that were significant in the 
first set of regression models exerted significant effects in the final model. Specifically, a 
one-unit increase in negative school bond score increased the rate of general crime acts 
by a factor of 3.66 (p < 0.01) in this model. Next, adolescents with poor school 
performance exhibited rates of general crime incidents that were 1.40 (p < 0.05) times 
higher than others, while those experiencing negative teaching practices reported rates of 
crime acts that were 1.61 (p < 0.01) times greater than other respondents. Little time 
spent on homework, low educational goals, poor academic supervision, and poor 
treatment by teachers did not significantly impact crime in the final model. Notably, 
neither religiousness nor religiosity within the religion domain significantly affected 
general crime incidents in the final model. 
As was the case with constraints and motivations, the religion domain did not 
significantly improve the ability of the model that included only GTCD life domains to 
explain general crime during adolescence. The pseudo-R2 coefficient remained at 0.180 
and the Wald Chi2 test for the religion model was not significant. Therefore, the evidence 
does not support the assertion that Cochran’s (2015) variables improve the model’s 
ability to explain crime during adolescence. PRM was less appropriate than NBRM for 
this data due to significant evidence of overdispersion of the variance in the distribution 
(G2 = 50.67, p < .001) (Long and Freese 2006). Tests for multicollinearity revealed no 
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issues, with none of the calculated VIF values exceeding 2.6 and no tolerance coefficient 
falling below 0.38 (Menard 1995). 
Contemporaneous effects of religion as a life domain: Adulthood (10th set of 
models).  
To test the contemporaneous effect of Cochran’s (2015) adult life domains on 
general crime, the researcher estimated a series of nested multivariate NBRM with adult 
self-reported general crime acts as the dependent variable (RQ6). This tenth set of 
regression models included the religion domain (Block 7) in addition to the life domain 
blocks utilized in the third set of models, which incorporated all of Agnew’s (2005) life 
domains as they impact general crime in adulthood. Table 14 presents the 
contemporaneous effects of Cochran’s adolescent life domains on general crime incidents 
and summarizes the contribution of each life domain as a predictor of the rate of crime 
acts.  
Model 7 added the religion domain and represented Cochran’s (2015) final 
theoretical model. As such, it included all relevant life domains. All variables that were 
significant in the third set of models (i.e., that which tested the contemporaneous effects 
of Agnew’s adult life domains) were significant variables in this model. The only 
exception is that the effect of negative work bond within the employment domain lost 
significance in this final model. Males and white respondents reported rates of general 
crime incidents that were 1.43 (p < 0.001) and 1.26 (p < 0.05) times higher than others, 
respectively. Non-significant effects among control variables included age and perceived 
social class. Within the self domain, the effect of low self-control remained non-
significant. Irritability maintained significance, however, as each unit increase in this 
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score raised the reported rate of general crime acts by a factor of 3.13 (p < 0.001), 
holding all other predictor variables constant.  
Failure to marry and spouse/partner criminality continued to exert the only 
significant impacts within the family domain in the final model. Specifically, unmarried 
respondents and those with spouses/partners that engage in crime reported rates of 
general crime incidents that were 1.66 (p < 0.01) and 1.88 (p < 0.05) times higher than 
other respondents. Neither negative spouse/partner bond, spouse/partner conflict and 
abuse, nor poor spouse/partner social support significantly influenced crime in this 
model. 
The peer domain continued to exert a significant effect on crime in the final 
model. Specifically, a one-unit increase in respondent peer criminality score raised the 
rate of contemporaneous general crime acts by a factor of 4.63 (p < 0.001) during 
adulthood, holding all other independent variables constant. The effect of low educational 
achievement maintained significance within the school domain, as those with high school 
as their highest level of achievement were reported a rate of general crime incidents that 
was 1.24 (p < 0.05) times higher than those with more than a high school level of 
education. Finally, only one variable within the employment domain, poor work 
performance, significantly affected crime in this model. Respondents reporting poor work 
performance reported a rate of general crime that was 1.64 (p < 0.001) times higher than 
other respondents, controlling for the effects of all other predictor variables.  
   
 144 
 
  
Table 14 Summary of Nested Negative Binomial Regression Analysis of Cochran’s Adult Life 
Domain Variables Predicting Contemporaneous General Crime Incidents (N = 1480) 
 Model 7 
+ Religion 
   
Variable IRR IRR       
Block 1: Controls         
Age - -       
Male 1.426*** .120       
White 1.264* .128       
Low Social Class - -       
Life Domains         
Block 2: Self         
Low Self-Control - -       
Irritability 3.128*** .618       
Block 3: Family         
Failure to Marry 1.658** .275       
Negative Bond - -       
Criminal Spouse 1.880* .551       
Conflict/Abuse - -       
No Social Support - -       
Block 4: Peer         
Criminal Peers  4.627*** .900       
Block 5: School         
Low Achievement  1.240* .123       
Block 6: Work         
Unemployed - -       
Negative Bond - -       
Poor Performance 1.636*** .152       
Poor Conditions - -       
Block 7: Religion         
Religiousness 1.762*** .192       
Religiosity 1.678*** .157       
Pseudo-R2 .086        
         
LR Chi2 347.41***        
G2 493.27***        
Wald Chi2 for each block 85.76***        
Notes: IRR refers to incidence rate ratio, which presents a factor change in expected count; % presents a percent change in 
expected count. Only significant effects are reported. 
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001 (two-tailed tests) 
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Notably, the religion domain exerted a significant impact in the final model. 
Specifically, respondents that were not religious and those that did not attend religious 
services reported rates of general crime incidents that were 1.76 (p < 0.001) and 1.68 (p < 
0.001) times higher than other respondents, controlling for the effects of all other 
variables. 
In support of GTCD-E, the addition of the religion domain resulted in a better fit 
for the data in explaining general crime during adulthood. This stands in contrast to the 
that which was observed during adolescence. The LR Chi2 value increased from 261.65 to 
347.41 (p = < 0.001) and the pseudo-R2 coefficient rose from 0.065 to 0.086. Further 
support is provided by the Wald Chi2 test for each model, as it was large and highly 
significant, indicating a significant improvement to the overall model. Consequently, the 
current analysis empirically supports the proposition that Cochran’s (2015) variables 
warrant inclusion as explanatory variables for the criminal behavior during adulthood. 
NBRM was preferred over the PRM as a test revealed significant evidence of 
overdispersion of the variance in the distribution (G2 = 493.27, p < .001) (Long and 
Freese 2006). Testing revealed no evidence of problematic multicollinearity among 
predictor variables since no calculated VIF value exceeded 2.6 and no tolerance 
coefficient fell below 0.38 (Menard 1995).  
Variable effects of religion by crime type (11th and 12th sets of models).  
Continuing to test Cochran’s (2015) GTCD-E by incorporating religion as a 
distinct life domain and block of predictor variables, this analysis examined whether 
Cochran’s adolescent life domains exert a significant contemporaneous effect on 
person/property crime acts. Recall that the seventh research question explores whether 
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Cochran’s life domains affect all types of crime similarly. Therefore, nested multivariate 
NBRM was employed with adolescent self-reported general crime incidents as the 
dependent variable. The eleventh set of regression models included the religion domain 
(Block 6) in addition to the life domain blocks utilized in the fifth set of models, which 
incorporated all of Agnew’s (2005) life domains as they affect person/property crime 
during adolescence. Table 15 summarizes the contemporaneous effects of Cochran’s 
adolescent life domains on person/property crime acts and shows the empirical 
contribution of each life domain as a block of independent variables.  
Model 6 incorporated the religion domain and included all of GTCD-E’s 
theoretical life domain variables. With the exception of poor parental supervision, which 
was reduced to non-significance, all variables that were significantly related to crime in 
the fifth set of regression models (i.e., that which tested Agnew’s theory on adolescent 
person/property crime) were significant in this model. Sex maintained significance as the 
only control variable significantly impacting person/property crime. Specifically, male 
adolescents reported rates of contemporaneous drug crime acts that were 1.40 (p < 0.01) 
times higher than females, controlling for the effects of all other variables. Age, race, and 
perceived social class did not produce significant effects. Within the self domain, the 
effect of irritability maintained significance, while that of low self-control was not 
significant. Each additional unit increase in respondent level of irritability raised the rate 
of contemporaneous person/property crime acts by a factor 8.10 (p < 0.001). 
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Table 15 Summary of Nested Negative Binomial Regression Analysis of Cochran’s 
Adolescent Life Domain Variables Predicting Contemporaneous Person/Property Crime 
Incidents (N = 1276) 
 Model 6 
+ Religion 
   
Variable IRR IRR       
Block 1: Controls         
Age - -       
Male 1.398** .178       
White - -       
Low Social Class - -       
Life Domains         
Block 2: Self         
Low Self-Control - -       
Irritability 8.097*** 2.701       
Block 3: Family         
Negative Bond  - -       
Poor Supervision - -       
Family Conflict 2.591* 1.134       
Poor Parenting - -       
Criminal Family - -       
Block 4: Peer         
Criminal Peers 53.066*** 26.448       
Peer Conflict - -       
Block 5: School         
Negative Bond  4.093** 1.697       
Poor Performance 1.383* .196       
Little Time HW - -       
Lower Goals 1.596* .379       
Poor Supervision - -       
Poor Treatment  - -       
Poor Teaching 1.500* .272       
Block 6: Religion         
Religiousness - -       
Religiosity - -       
Pseudo-R2 .168        
         
LR Chi2 311.39***        
G2 38.22***        
Wald Chi2 for each 
block 
1.26        
Notes: IRR refers to incidence rate ratio, which presents a factor change in expected count; % presents a percent change in 
expected count. Only significant effects are reported. 
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001 (two-tailed tests) 
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The effect of the family domain was attenuated in this model, as the effect of poor 
parental supervision was no longer significantly associated with person/property crime. 
However, a one-unit increase in family conflict and abuse raised the rate of 
person/property crime acts by a factor of 2.59 (p < 0.05). Negative family bond, negative 
parenting practices, and family criminality yielded non-significant effects within this 
domain. 
Only one peer domain variable, peer criminality, exerted a significant effect in the 
final model. Each unit increase in peer criminality score increased the rate of adolescent 
contemporaneous person/property crime incidents by a factor of 53.07 (p < 0.001), 
holding all other variables constant. Peer conflict and abuse was unrelated to the rate of 
person/property crime acts in the final model. Four school domain variables continued to 
significantly impact person/property crime in the final model. These included negative 
school bond, poor academic performance, low educational goals, and negative teaching 
practices. Each unit increase in negative school bond score increased the expected rate of 
person/property crime incidents by a factor of 4.09 (p < 0.01). Additionally, respondents 
that perform poorly in school and those that experience negative teaching practices 
exhibited rates of person/property crime acts that were 1.38 (p < 0.05) and 1.50 (p < 0.05) 
times higher than others, holding all predictor variables constant. Finally, those with low 
educational goals were expected to report a rate of person/property crime that was 1.60 (p 
< 0.05) times higher than those with higher goals. The effects of little time spent on 
homework, poor academic supervision, and poor treatment by teachers continued to be 
non-significant.  
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Both variables within the religion domain failed to significantly impact adolescent 
contemporaneous person/property crime acts in this model, as neither religiousness nor 
religiosity produced a statistically significant effect.  
Once again, the religion domain failed to provide a significant improvement in 
the explanation of adolescent person/property crime over the model that included only 
GTCD life domains. The LR Chi2 value increased from 310.14 to only 311.39 (p < 0.001) 
and the pseudo-R2 coefficient increased by an increment of 0.001 to 0.168. Further, the 
Wald Chi2 test for the model that added the religion domain failed to achieve statistical 
significance. This demonstrates that these variables did not significantly contribute to an 
understanding of person/property crime during adolescence. These findings do not 
provide evidence that Cochran’s (2015) religion variables should be included as 
explanatory factors for person/property crime during adolescence. PRM was less 
appropriate than NBRM for this data due to significant evidence of overdispersion of the 
variance in the distribution (G2 = 38.22, p < .001) (Long and Freese 2006). 
Multicollinearity was once again not an issue, as none of the calculated VIF coefficients 
exceeding 2.6 and no tolerance value falling below 0.38 (Menard 1995).  
This final analysis also addressed the seventh research question, as it tested 
whether Cochran’s adolescent life domains significantly affect contemporaneous drug 
crime acts among adolescents. As such, nested multivariate PRM was employed with 
adolescent self-reported drug crime incidents as the dependent variable. The twelfth, and 
final, set of regression models included the religion domain (Block 6) in addition to the 
life domain blocks utilized in the sixth set of models (i.e., that which included all of 
Agnew’s (2005) life domains as they influence drug crime during adolescence). Table 16 
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presents the contemporaneous effects of Cochran’s (2015) adolescent life domains on 
drug crime incidents and summarizes the empirical contribution of each life domain as a 
predictor of the rate of crime acts.  
Model 6 incorporated the religion domain and represented Cochran’s (2015) final 
theoretical model. With the exception of three variables, all variables that were 
significant in the sixth set of regression models were the same that were significant in this 
model. These included respondent age, which gained significance, and negative parenting 
practices and poor academic performance, which were reduced to non-significance. Older 
and white adolescents exhibited rates of self-reported drug crime acts that were 2.10 (p < 
0.05) and 3.82 (p < 0.01) times higher than others, controlling for the effects of other 
predictor variables. Sex and perceived social class did not exert significant effects. The 
self domain did not significantly impact drug crime since neither low self-control nor 
irritability yielded significant effects. As in the sixth set of models, family criminality 
exerted the only significant impact within the family domain. A one-unit increase in level 
of family criminality increased the rate of contemporaneous adolescent drug crime acts 
by a factor of 11.38 (p < 0.001). The effect of poor parental supervision was not 
significant in the final model. Other non-significant effects include those of negative 
family bond, family conflict and abuse, and negative parenting practices.  
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Table 16 Summary of Nested Poisson Regression Analysis of Cochran’s Adolescent Life 
Domain Variables Predicting Contemporaneous Drug Crime Incidents (N = 1276) 
 Model 6 
+ Religion 
   
Variable IRR IRR       
Block 1: Controls         
Age 2.099* .752       
Male - -       
White 3.818** 1.848       
Low Social Class - -       
Life Domains         
Block 2: Self         
Low Self-Control - -       
Irritability - -       
Block 3: Family         
Negative Bond  - -       
Poor Supervision - -       
Family Conflict - -       
Poor Parenting - -       
Criminal Family 11.379*** 7.729       
Block 4: Peer         
Criminal Peers 1965.045*
** 
1659.268       
Peer Conflict - -       
Block 5: School         
Negative Bond  - -       
Poor Performance - -       
Little Time HW - -       
Lower Goals - -       
Poor Supervision - -       
Poor Treatment  - -       
Poor Teaching 5.706*** 2.352       
Block 6: Religion         
Religiousness .141** .093       
Religiosity - -       
Pseudo-R2 .522        
         
LR Chi2 208.17***        
Wald Chi2 for each 
block 
8.99*        
Notes: IRR refers to incidence rate ratio, which presents a factor change in expected count; % presents a percent change in 
expected count. Only significant effects are reported. 
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001 (two-tailed tests) 
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Next, peer criminality within the peer domain exerted the largest effect on the rate 
of drug crime. Specifically, each additional unit increase in peer criminality score 
increased the rate of contemporaneous adolescent drug crime acts by a factor of 1965.05 
(p < 0.001), holding all other variables constant. The effect of peer conflict and abuse 
remained non-significant. Lastly, the only variable within the school domain to produce a 
significant effect in the final model was negative teaching practices, as the effect of poor 
academic performance became non-significant. Specifically, students exposed to negative 
teaching practices exhibited a rate of reported drug crime acts that was 5.71 (p < 0.001) 
times greater than other students, controlling for the effects of all other predictor 
variables. None of the following variables within this domain produced significant effects 
on the rate of drug crime acts: negative school bond, poor academic performance, little 
time spent on homework, low educational goals, poor academic supervision, and poor 
treatment by teachers. 
Religiousness emerged as a significant predictor of adolescent drug crime within 
the religion domain. Contrary to theoretical expectations, non-religious respondents 
exhibited a rate of drug crime incidents that was 0.86 (p < 0.01) times lower percent 
lower than their religious counterparts. The effect of religiosity was not significant in the 
final model. 
Unlike with other forms of adolescent crime, the addition of GTCD-E’s religion 
domain resulted in an improved fit over the model that included only GTCD life domains 
when explaining drug crime during adolescence. Specifically, the LR Chi2 value 
increased from 196.66 to 208.17 (p = < 0.001) and the pseudo-R2 coefficient rose from 
0.493 to 0.522. Further, the Wald Chi2 test for the religion model significant, 
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demonstrating its improvement for the overall model. Note, however, that the coefficient 
for the religion domain achieved a lower level of statistical significance than the others (p 
< 0.05). Considering GTCD-E’s inability to influence general and person/property crime, 
along with the unanticipated direction of its effect on drug crime, the current analysis 
provides further evidence that religious variables are not well suited to explain crime 
during adolescence. A test for overdispersion of the variance in this distribution was not 
significant, providing no evidence of overdispersion. Therefore, PRM was preferred over 
NBRM (Long and Freese 2006). Again, tests for multicollinearity revealed no issues, 
with none of the calculated VIF values exceeding 2.6 and no tolerance coefficient falling 
below 0.38 (Menard 1995). 
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CHAPTER 6:  DISCUSSION, IMPLICATIONS, AND LIMITATIONS  
The goal of this dissertation is to evaluate the ability of Agnew’s (2005) General 
Theory of Crime and Delinquency and Cochran’s (2015) General Theory of Crime and 
Delinquency – Extended to explain crime. Therefore, the researcher estimated a series of 
12 NBRM and Poisson regression models in order to test a number of hypotheses derived 
from both theories. Results provided strong support for several of these hypotheses, and 
thus, for Agnew’s and Cochran’s theories. First, these results are discussed below as they 
relate to the current study’s research questions and corresponding hypotheses. Table 17 
provides an overview of this dissertation’s research questions, hypotheses, and level of 
support found for each hypothesis. Next, other notable findings warranting further 
consideration are discussed. 
Support for Hypotheses 
Contemporaneous effects of life domains on crime. 
 The first research question assesses the contemporaneous effects of life domains 
on crime. The results of this dissertation provide strong support for this proposition, as 
each life domain yielded at least one variable that was significantly related to 
contemporaneous general crime during adolescence and adulthood. Further, all 
significant variables were related to crime in the expected direction. Those exhibiting 
higher rates of contemporaneous adolescent general crime were male, irritable, poorly 
supervised by parents, exposed to family conflict and abuse, negatively bonded to school, 
performed poorly in school, had lower education goals, were subjected to negative 
teaching practices, and were surrounded by friends that commit delinquency. Agnew’s 
(2005) theory.   
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Table 17 Review of Research Hypotheses and Corresponding Level of Support 
Research 
Question 
Research Hypothesis 
Level of 
Support 
RQ1 
H1: All adolescent (T1) life domains are significantly related to 
adolescent (T1) general crime. 
Strong 
H2: All adult (T2) life domains are significantly related to adult 
(T2) general crime. 
Strong 
RQ2 
H3: T1 constraint and motivation variables mediate the effect of 
T1 life domain variables on T1 general crime. 
Weak 
RQ3 
H4a: T1 self and peer life domains produce a larger effect on T1 
general crime relative to the other T1 life domains. 
Strong 
H4b: T1 irritability, low self-control, and peer delinquency 
produce the largest relative effects on T1 general crime. 
Moderate 
H5a: T2 self, peer, family, and employment life domains produce a 
larger effect on T2 general crime relative to the other T2 life 
domains. 
Strong 
H5b: T2 irritability, low self-control, peer delinquency, no/bad 
marriage, unemployment, and bad jobs produce the largest relative 
effects on T2 general crime. 
Moderate 
RQ4 
H6: The same T1 life domain variables predict all types of T1 
crime and deviance (i.e., general crime, person/property crime, and 
drug crime). 
Moderate 
H7: The same T2 life domain variables predict all types of T2 
crime and deviance (i.e., general crime, person/property crime, and 
drug crime). 
Moderate 
RQ5 
H8: The effects of T1 life domain variables on T1 general crime 
are greater than those of T1 life domain variables on T2 general 
crime. 
Strong 
RQ6 
H9a: T1 religion life domain exerts a significant effect on T1 
general crime, controlling for all other life domain variables. 
Unsupported 
H9b: T1 religiosity and religiousness significantly negatively 
affect T1general crime. 
Unsupported 
H10a: T2 religion life domain exerts a significant effect T2 general 
crime. 
Strong 
H10b: T2 religiosity and religiousness significantly negatively 
affect T2 general crime. 
Strong 
RQ7 
H11: The same T1 life domain variables (with religion) predict all 
types of T1 crime (i.e., general crime, person/property crime, and 
drug crime). 
Unsupported 
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This profile is consistent with the gender gap in offending that is consistently found in the 
scholarly literature (Agnew 2005; Akers 1998; Broidy and Agnew 1997; De Coster and 
Zito 2010; Friedman and Rosenbaum 1998; Hagan et al. 1985; Hagan et al. 1987; Moffitt 
1993; Moffitt and Caspi 2001; Singer and Levine 1988; Steffensmeir and Allen 1996; 
Tittle et al. 2003). Additionally, it is generally supportive of the results of prior tests of 
Agnew’s (2005) theory that utilize adolescent samples. For instance, Muftić and 
colleagues (2014) report that male sex, higher age, low self-control, relationships with 
delinquent peers, and low parental bonding are all significantly related to three forms of 
criminal activity. While the variables may differ slightly, these results are similar in that 
nearly all life domains produce significant variables. Zhang and associates (2012) 
produce the other test that incorporates a sample of adolescents and report weaker 
support for life domain effects on delinquency. All three of their life domains produce 
significant variables, yet, all but the effects of the peer domain are reduced to non-
significance in their final model that includes constraint and motivation variables. 
Nonetheless, the finding of the important role played by peer criminality is supported by 
this study as well. 
Findings from this dissertation also reveal that those exhibiting higher rates of 
such crime during adulthood were male, white, irritable, unmarried, exposed to a 
spouse/partner that engages in crime, did not engage in post-high school education, were 
surrounded by peers that commit crime, had a negative bond to work, and performed 
poorly at work. Again, these findings lend support for the gender gap in offending. 
Additionally, the observed relationship between white racial status and crime in this 
dissertation supports Ngo and Paternoster’s (2014) findings. However, the other tests of 
 157 
Agnew’s (2005) theory that incorporate an adult sample did not find such an association 
(Cochran 2015; Ngo et al. 2011). Encouragingly, the effect of the self domain and peer 
domain is supported by the findings of Ngo and Paternoster, who report that these are 
salient to multiple forms of crime during adulthood. As is discussed in more detail later, 
these findings provide evidence that the life domains, and the variables within them, that 
relate to crime during adolescence are different from those during adulthood.  
Mediating effects of constraints and motivations.  
The second research question posits that the effects of life domains on crime are 
mediated by the effects of constraints against crime and motivations towards it. Overall, 
the present study finds only weak evidence of such effects, thus offering only minimal 
support for this theoretical proposition. Initially, 8 of the 16 life domain variables 
significantly increased the rate of contemporaneous general crime acts during 
adolescence. These variables represented all four life domains and included one from the 
self domain, two from the family domain, one from the peer domain, and four from the 
school domain. However, the effects of one variable from the family domain (i.e., family 
conflict and abuse) and one from the school domain (i.e., low educational goals) were 
reduced to non-significance in the models that included constraints and motivations. 
Further, the magnitude of the effect of peer criminality fell from the life domain models 
to the full model. This suggests that the effects of these variables (i.e., family conflict and 
abuse low educational goals, and peer criminality) were partially mediated by constraints 
and motivations. Notably, none of the constraint of motivation variables were 
significantly associated with contemporaneous crime during adolescence in the present 
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analysis and further tests reveal that neither the constraint nor motivation models 
provided significant improvement for the overall model.  
These findings diverge from those of Cochran (2015) and Zhang and associates 
(2012) who also tested for mediating effects in the same manner. Cochran finds that the 
effects of life domain variables were largely diminished due to the influence of 
constraints and motivations, as all but two previously significant life domain effects were 
reduced to non-significance in his full model. Further, several constraint and motivation 
variables emerged as significant in his model, leading him to conclude that life domain 
effects are “indirect and effectively mediated through constraints and motivations” 
(2015:18). In the only other prior test to examine constraints and motivations, Zhang and 
colleagues (2012) also found that the effects of all but two life domain variables were 
reduced to non-significance when controlling for constraint and motivation variables. 
While these findings are not perfectly in line with results of the previous studies, they 
demonstrate the importance of life domain variables in influencing crime.  
One must be cautious when considering this limited level of support, however. 
The weak evidence regarding these variables highlights the difficulty of operationalizing 
constraint and motivation variables as separate constructs from life domain variables. 
Agnew (2005) admitted that it is “difficult to distinguish the variables that we are 
examining from the constraints and motivations they allegedly affect” (181). This is 
especially difficult when using measures not specifically designed to test GTCD or 
GTCD-E. For instance, Agnew notes that irritability, a life domain variable, is often 
measured by asking a respondent to report how frequently they feel angry. However, 
doing so then confounds irritability with a motivation for crime. Cochran (2015) states 
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that most prior tests of GTCD either omitted constraint and motivation variables or 
conflated them with life domain variables. In the present study, the available data did not 
permit measurement of all theoretical constraint and motivation variables, such as one’s 
own level of condemnation or approval of crime, level of long-term negative emotions, 
level of care about one’s own positive reaction to crime, belief that crime is justifiable in 
some instances, or view that crime is excusable in some instances. Further, some were 
measured using a single item. For instance, respondent level of short-term negative 
emotions was measured by a single item to which they reported whether they often felt 
angry, annoyed, or upset. A preferable and more complete measure might include many 
items indicating the frequency with which respondents feel a wide variety of negative 
emotions, including anger, envy, guilt, fear, shame, sadness, frustration, and doubt. For 
this reason, it is imperative that future researchers afford careful theoretical consideration 
to parsing out constraint and motivation variables from life domain variables. Agnew 
suggests the best method is to thoughtfully design one’s own questions designed 
specifically to measure these variables. 
Variable effects of life domains on crime by developmental stage.  
The third research question explores whether the relative effect sizes of each life 
domain vary according to developmental stage. Agnew (2005) predicted that the self and 
peer domains would produce larger contemporaneous effects on general crime during 
adolescence, relative to the other life domains. This expectation was supported, as 
variables from these two life domains produced the largest relative effect sizes. No other 
life domain produced an effect that reached the same size or level of significance. Agnew 
further specified that irritability and low self-control within the self domain and peer 
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criminality within the peer domain would exert the largest relative effects. This assertion 
was moderately supported. While irritability and peer criminality produced the largest 
contemporaneous effects on adolescent crime, low self-control failed to exert a 
significant effect.  
GTCD also expects that the self, peer, family, and employment domains would 
produce the largest relative effects on general crime during adulthood. In support of this 
hypothesis, the school domain produced the smallest Wald Chi2 statistic. Further, the 
only variable within this domain, low educational achievement, exhibited the smallest 
significant effect in the full model. GTCD more specifically expects that irritability, low 
self-control, peer criminality, failure to marry, negative spouse/partner bond, 
spouse/partner conflict and abuse, spouse/partner criminality, unemployment, negative 
work bond, and poor working conditions should have the largest effects in adulthood. 
This prediction was modestly supported as any of these variables that were significant 
exhibited larger effects than the school domain. However, several of the variables listed 
did not produce a significant contemporaneous effect on adult crime in the final model. 
This precluded the hypothesis from garnering more robust support.  
Only Cochran (2015) and Ngo’s team (2011) incorporated samples of young 
adults in their tests of GTCD; all other tests have been administered on samples of 
adolescents. Only the self and school domains were significant in Cochran’s model, while 
Ngo and colleagues failed to find any life domain variable that was significantly related 
to their measure of crime. Mixed findings in this regard may be partially attributed to 
samples consisting of relatively young adults. Specifically, the mean age of Cochran’s 
sample was 21.2 and that of Ngo and associates was 23.   
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This dissertation also employed sample of adults that were relatively young, 
ranging from 19 to 26, with a mean age of 21.5. It may be the case that this age group is 
substantively different from older adults with respect to Agnew’s (2005) theoretical 
propositions. For instance, the school domain does not account for the possible influence 
of school bonds, teacher interactions, or educational activities in adulthood. However, 
many young adults in the United States attend postsecondary educational institutions. 
Similarly, GTCD emphasizes negative employment as important element in relation to 
crime. Yet, employment experiences may be less frequent and less salient during this 
period of young adulthood. As a result, the participants in these samples may fall between 
adolescence and adulthood in terms of Agnew’s theoretical predictions. These results 
highlight a specific age grouping for which theoretical revision may be appropriate. 
Overall, the findings regarding general crime during both stages of development 
provide evidence that the life domains, and the variables within them, that are related to 
crime during adulthood vary markedly from those in adolescence, as expected. This is 
encouraging and provides strong support for the age-graded component of GTCD, which 
specifies that the life domain variables that influence crime and their effect sizes vary 
according to one’s stage of development. No other direct test of Agnew’s theory has 
examined the contemporaneous effects of life domains at two time points, prohibiting a 
comparison with the results of others in terms of this proposition. Despite this, the present 
findings align with those of more general scholarly literature, particularly life-course 
criminology, that propose distinct causes of crime at differing stages of development 
(Moffitt 1993; Moffitt and Caspi 2001; Sampson and Laub 1992, 1995; Thornberry 
1987). 
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Variable effects of life domains on crime by type of crime.  
The fourth research question addresses whether the contemporaneous effects of 
life domains vary according to type of criminal behavior, as GTCD predicts that the same 
life domains significantly affecting general crime should also affect person/property and 
drug crime.  
This expectation was largely supported with regard to general crime as compared 
to person/property. Each life domain produced at least one variable that significantly 
affected the rate of crime acts for person/property crime. Many of these were the same as 
those that influenced general crime. Further, all significant effects were in the expected 
direction. As was the case with contemporaneous adolescent general crime, irritability 
from the self domain and peer criminality from the peer domain exerted the largest 
relative effects on person/property crime. However, the effect of peer criminality on 
person/property crime was nearly half the size of its effect in the general crime model. It 
may be the case that the large effect of peer criminality on drug crime is responsible for 
its larger effect on general crime. For this reason, it is less salient in relation to 
person/property crime. The importance of the peer domain on adolescent and drug crime 
is discussed later in this chapter along with other notable findings.  
The proposition positing similar effects for contemporaneous adolescent drug 
crime and general crime was not supported, however. The self domain failed to produce a 
variable that significantly predicted drug crime in the final model. Unlike with adolescent 
general crime, the effect of irritability failed to achieve statistical significance in affecting 
drug crime. Another key difference is that the effect size of peer criminality was nearly 
nine times larger than its effect on general crime. These findings suggest that the family 
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and peer domains play a larger role in influencing drug crime during adolescence, while 
the self domain was less important in explaining it. This may suggest that substance use is 
more strongly associated with family strain and social learning among peers for 
adolescents than elements of low self-control or irritability. Agnew’s (2005) theory may 
require modification in predicting drug crime among adolescents since the self domain 
failed to produce the relatively large effect expected of it.   
Next, the researcher assessed whether the contemporaneous effects of adult life 
domains vary according to type of crime. The expectation was that the same life domain 
variables influencing general crime during adulthood would also affect person/property 
and drug crime during this developmental stage. This hypothesis was only modestly 
supported with regard to person/property crime since, as was not the case with general 
crime, the family, school, and employment domains did not produce any variables that 
significantly impacted person/property crime. Additionally, while 7 of 13 adult life 
domain variables produced significant contemporaneous effects on general crime, only 2 
significantly affected person/property crime. This indicates that GTCD was weaker in 
predicting person/property crime than general crime. Again, this lack of support may be 
due to the present study’s use a relatively young adult sample.  
The theory was better able to predict drug crime in adulthood, however, which 
provided stronger support for the theory’s proposition. Each life domain produced at least 
one variable that significantly influenced adults’ reported engagement in drug crime. 
Further, many of the same variables that significantly predicted general crime also 
predicted drug crime, including irritability, failure to marry, low educational 
achievement, peer criminality, negative work bond, and poor work performance. The 
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increased ability of GTCD to explain drug crime and general crime in adulthood may be 
due to the influence of peer criminality on drug crime among this relatively young 
sample. Again, the large effect of the peer domain is discussed later. 
Taken together, these findings speak to the generality of Agnew’s (2005) GTCD 
and provide evidence of its ability to explain multiple forms of criminal behavior. 
Though it varied in some respects, the theory’s variables were significantly related to 
three forms of criminal behavior within two stages of development.  
Lagged effects of life domains on crime.  
The fifth research question posits whether the effects of life domains on crime are 
largely contemporaneous. As such, Agnew (2005) predicts that contemporaneous life 
domain effects should be larger than any observed lagged effects. Recall that 8 of 16 
adolescent life domain variables exerted a significant contemporaneous influence on 
general crime. Offering strong support for this hypothesis, all but one of these variables, 
irritability, was reduced to non-significance as it affected lagged general crime. Further, 
even though irritability remained a significant variable, its lagged effect was smaller than 
its contemporaneous effect. This provides further support for Agnew’s (2005) 
observation that crime is largely a product of one’s immediate context, rather than that of 
the past.  
This support was hampered somewhat, however. Peer conflict and abuse did not 
produce a significant contemporaneous effect on crime but yielded a significant negative 
lagged effect. That is, the experience of peer conflict and abuse during adolescence was 
associated with a significantly lower rate of general crime during adulthood. Ngo and 
Paternoster (2014) are the only other researchers to examine the lagged effects of life 
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domains in their test of GCTD. They also found that these effects were generally smaller 
than their contemporaneous counterparts. As with the present study, Ngo and Paternoster 
also found that a life domain variable was contemporaneously unrelated to crime but 
produced a significant lagged effect. 
This finding may seem confounding on the surface. However, it may be the case 
that peer conflict and abuse during adolescence results in positive change that acts as a 
protective factor against crime during adulthood. For example, peer conflict and abuse 
during adolescence may increase the likelihood of marriage or decrease the odds of peer 
criminality during adulthood. For instance, Opotow’s (1991) research suggests that the 
experience of peer conflict during adolescence may lead to a variety of positive, or 
constructive outcomes, like the development of problem-solving skills and personal 
development. Peer conflict may draw adult attention, leading those experiencing it to 
receive instruction on cooperation and collaboration, taking the perspective of others, and 
dispute resolution. These skills may then mitigate the impact of other risk factors 
associated with crime at a later stage. In support of this, Johnson and Johnson’s (1996) 
review of the literature found that conflict resolution and peer mediation programming 
during adolescence leads to constructive outcomes for participants (e.g., increased self-
esteem or reduced discipline problems) and that success in conflict resolution is 
associated with a decrease in the frequency of peer conflicts. Therefore, this observed 
effect may operate largely through its association with the other life domain variables in 
adulthood. Future studies should not only investigate the lagged effects that life domains 
have on crime, but also the lagged effects they have on each other. For instance, Agnew 
(2005) argues that T1 low self-control and irritability have a large lagged effect on 
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themselves at T2 and that they indirectly affect poor parenting practices at T2. 
Systematically exploring such effects would clarify the relationships between life domain 
variables.   
Contemporaneous effects of religion as a life domain on crime.  
The sixth research question examines whether Cochran’s (2015) GTCD-E 
improves the explanatory power of Agnew’s (2005) GTCD at both developmental stages. 
First, the effect of both of GTCD-E’s religion variables (i.e., religiousness and religiosity) 
on contemporaneous general crime during adolescence is discussed. The prediction of 
their effect was not supported in the current analysis, as the religion domain did not 
impact general crime during adolescence when controlling for the effects of GTCD’s life 
domain variables. Supplemental analyses showed that, when entered as the only block, 
religiosity significantly increased the rate of contemporaneous general crime. However, 
this effect was quickly diminished to non-significance and neither religiousness nor 
religiosity significantly predicted crime in the final model. Though contrary to study 
expectations, these findings are in line with those of Cochran’s (2015) testing efforts. The 
religion domain showed promise in his initial model, but its effect was reduced to non-
significance in the final model that included all predictor variables. Therefore, religion 
variables did not produce effects that warranted inclusion as a separate life domain when 
predicting general crime among adolescents. 
Next, these variables’ effects on contemporaneous general crime during adulthood 
were explored. Expectations of an effect were strongly supported in this analysis. Both 
religiousness and religiosity exhibited a consistent positive contemporaneous effect on 
general crime during adulthood. As such, the evidence suggests that Cochran’s (2015) 
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variables merit inclusion as a separate life domain when predicting general crime among 
adults. This provides evidence that religious context, belief, and practices are more 
salient for adult perpetration of crime, and as such, GTCD-E is better suited to explain 
adult crime.  
Why might GTCD-E be unable to explain adolescent crime, while offering insight 
into adult crime? The present study’s null finding regarding the religion domain and 
crime during adolescence is incongruous with the expectations of GTCD-E but is in line 
with Agnew’s (2005) use of Bernard and Snipes’ (1996) variable centered approach when 
building his initial theory. Agnew’s (2005, 2017) review of the literature did not find a 
consistent moderate to large relationship between religious variables and crime. It is 
important to note that the majority of literature regarding religion and crime focus on the 
period of adolescence. Therefore, these variables were not included in his initial 
formulation. Indeed, the academic literature on the relationship between religious 
variables and adolescent crime is somewhat mixed, though less so when specifically 
examining substance use. Religiousness and religiosity generally provide a protective 
effect against crime, but this effect is consistently weak or modest (Bridges and Moore 
2002; Johnson, De Li, Larson, and McCullough 2000; Regnerus, Smith, and Fritsch 
2003; Smith 2003). Notably, the impact of religious variables on crime is often 
diminished when other variables (e.g., social bond) are controlled for (Bridges and Moore 
2002; Cochran 2015). Some studies found non-significant associations and others, though 
rare, found that religiosity acted as risk factors for delinquency and substance use for 
adolescence, even among more rigorous studies (Chitwood, Weiss, and Leukefeld 2008; 
Johnson et al. 2000). As such, the current findings contribute to the mixed literature on 
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religion and criminal behavior and may suggest that religious variables are not salient to 
crime among adolescents but are for adults. 
Adult participants were less likely to report attending religious services and that 
religion is an important part of their life. This is consistent with prior research on 
religious development that finds both religious beliefs and practices decrease during the 
transition from adolescence to adulthood (Desmond, Morgan, and Kikuchi 2010). It is 
also in line with the finding that, while both religious variables decrease, that decrease in 
religious attendance is greater. The key to understanding the theory’s inability to explain 
adolescent crime and its ability to explain adult crime may lie in this decline. One 
explanation for the importance of religion in predicting crime among adults is that they 
possess greater agency and, thus, have increased responsibility for choosing to be 
religious or attend religious services (Yonker, Schnabelrauch, and DeHaan 2012). As 
such, these variables may have greater consequences for behavior for adults than 
adolescents.  
Research on the development of spirituality and religiosity shows that religion, 
religiousness, and religiosity for youth are strongly influenced by parental religion 
(Landor et al. 2011; Meyers 1996; Regnerus, Smith, and Fritsch 2003; Smith 2003). That 
is, evidence of “intergenerational transmission and parental socialization” exists in which 
parental religious beliefs and practices exerting a significant influence on those of their 
children (Regnerus, Smith, and Fritsch 2003:9). As such, the effects of religious practices 
and beliefs may not impact their behavior like it does adults. Children and adolescent 
religious practices tend represent those of their parents, as they are less likely to decide 
the religion to which they belong, the place of worship they attend, or the frequency with 
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which they attend religious services. When one does not make a decision of their own 
volition, they may be less invested in that decision. Even if a child does not enjoy or want 
to attend religious services, they may be compelled to do so by their parents. By contrast, 
adults that attend religious services possess the autonomy to go or not and still choose to 
attend. Consequently, even though fewer adults tend to engage in religious practices, 
doing so may exert a stronger impact on them. 
While spirituality is developing during childhood and adolescence, these youth 
may lack the cognitive ability to fully comprehend the abstract existential and 
philosophical questions that religion often addresses (e.g., the nature of right and wrong, 
human nature, free will) (Benson, Roehlkepartain, and Rude 2003; Bridges and Moore 
2002; Fowler and Dell 2006). As such, they may not understand that which they claim to 
believe. Therefore, a given religion’s underlying philosophy may not affect an 
adolescent’s behavior in the same what it might an adult adherent’s behavior. However, 
emerging adults enjoy more social autonomy and possess the capacity to thoughtfully 
consider such topics. It is within this developmental stage that emerging adults closely 
“examine previously-socialized beliefs to establish a more mature sense of self of the 
religious self” (Stoppa and Lefkowitz 2010:23). As a result, they either drop such beliefs 
or choose to hold onto them. The key is that those claiming to be religious at this 
developmental stage may do so after reflective thought and critical examination. 
Therefore, religiousness and religiosity may play greater roles in affecting the behavior of 
adults (Yonker et al. 2012). Consequently, the hypothesized protective influence of 
religious factors against criminal behavior is not realized for adolescents. 
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Variable effects of religion as a life domain on crime by type of crime.  
The seventh and final research question explores whether GTCD-E predicts 
multiple types of crime. Correspondingly, GTCD-E’s life domains were assessed as they 
relate to person/property crime and drug crime. Recall that the religion domain initially 
emerged as significant but was reduced to non-significance in all subsequent models 
predicting general crime. A similar pattern appeared with regard to person/property crime 
in which the religion domain initially produced a significant variable, however its effect 
was again diminished to non-significance in subsequent models. As such, neither religion 
domain variable impacted person/property crime during adolescence. This finding does 
not offer support for the inclusion of religion as a life domain for person/property crime 
during adolescence. 
The religion domain significantly affected adolescent drug crime, however. 
Specifically, non-religious status acted as a protective factor against drug crime. Unlike 
in previous models, irritability did not produce a significant effect. Additionally, peer 
criminality exhibited the largest effect. These mixed findings regarding the impact of 
religious variables on adolescent crime provide further evidence that GTCD-E is less 
suited to explain any type of adolescent crime in its current form. Again, while not 
supportive of this dissertation’s expectations, this finding is consistent with Agnew’s 
(2005) choice to omit such variables from his theoretical framework.  
 Other Notable Findings 
As alluded to at the beginning of this chapter, a number of interesting findings 
emerged that deserve further attention. First to be addressed is the finding that irritability 
consistently exhibited significant effects across crime type and developmental stage, 
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while low self-control was consistently unrelated. In fact, irritability was a significant 
predictor in 10 of 12 sets of regression models. Low self-control, on the other hand, 
routinely experienced initial significance, but was always diminished to non-significance 
in final models. Some may be surprised by this finding given the level of support for self-
control variables demonstrated in the literature (Pratt and Cullen 2000; de Ridder et al. 
2012). Agnew (2005) distinguished irritability from low self-control in his formulation of 
GTCD, a decision which provides a more nuanced portrait of the effect of these 
personality traits on criminal behavior.  
However, the concept of low self-control is often analyzed in light of Gottfredson 
and Hirschi’s (1990) general theory of crime. The authors define crime as acts that are 
immediately gratifying, simple, risky, provide few long-term benefits, require little skill, 
and cause pain or discomfort to victims. For this reason, they identify the elements of low 
self-control as impulsivity, insensitivity, physicality, and short-sightedness. Presumably, 
Hirschi and Gottfredson link low self-control to crime through the likelihood of crime to 
cause harm or pain to victims. That is, since crime tends to cause harm or physical pain to 
victims, those low in self-control exhibit a short-fuse and bad temper. Specifically, they 
have “minimal tolerance for frustration and little ability to respond to conflict through 
verbal as opposed to physical means” (Gottfredson and Hirschi 1990:90). 
Agnew (2005) characterizes those low in self-control as being “wild” or “out of 
control” in everyday language. Those low in self-control lack motivation, are self-
centered, fail to consider long-term consequences, feel unbound by conventional norms, 
lack motivation, prefer excitement, and act without thinking. However, he also admits 
that Gottfredson and Hirschi’s (1990) definition of low self-control is broader in that it 
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incorporates elements of a lack of control and irritability. Consequently, Agnew’s 
definition of low self-control is stricter since it omits elements of irritability.  
Agnew (2005) characterizes irritable persons as being “mean,” “nasty,” “having a 
short fuse,” and feeling as though others are “out to get them.” Irritability in GTCD 
involves a lack of concern for the feelings of others, exhibiting an antagonistic or 
adversarial interaction style, being overcome with anger, experiencing events as aversive, 
and attributing aversive events to the malicious behavior of others. Since Gottfredson and 
Hirschi’s (1990) definition of low self-control includes the concept of irritability, most 
empirical tests of the general theory incorporate constructs of low self-control that 
include irritability. Importantly, the oft-cited scale measuring low self-control developed 
by Grasmick and associates (1993) also incorporates elements of irritability and poor 
temperament. This is also true of many of its variants, as they are often comprised of 
items related to (1) risk-seeking, (2) preferring simple tasks, (3) physical activity, (4) self-
centeredness, (5) impulsiveness, and (6) bad temperament (see Vazsonyi et al. 2001). 
Consequently, unlike Agnew (2005), many empirical tests measuring low self-control do 
not separate irritability from low self-control.  
  Agnew (2005) does not provide an explicit justification for his choice to separate 
the two personality constructs, other than that both are demonstrated to reduce constraints 
against crime and increase motivations towards it. It is important to consider, then, that 
many studies demonstrating a positive relationship between irritability and criminal 
behavior pre-date Gottfredson and Hirschi’s (1990) general theory. Therefore, evidence 
demonstrating the effect irritability on crime when measured as a distinct construct 
existed prior to their general theory. This is consistent with Agnew’s (2005) variable-
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centered approach to theoretical integration which identifies variables that the have been 
demonstrated in the literature to exhibit a moderate to large effect on criminal acts. It is 
important to remember that the current study is not a test of Gottfredson and Hirschi’s 
(1990) general theory, but rather a test Agnew’s (2005) GTCD. It may also be that most 
criminological constructs of self-control tend to incorporate both personality traits 
because they are specifically testing Gottfredson and Hirschi’s general theory. In this 
case, the two constructs are not combined because this study is not testing their theory. 
  The findings of this dissertation suggest that irritability affects crime 
independently of low self-control. This conclusion is reached because irritability 
significantly predicts multiple forms of crime, while low self-control fails to exert a 
significant effect on any form of crime. A separate analysis omitted irritability from the 
regression equation that estimated the contemporaneous effects of adolescent life 
domains on general crime. In this case, low self-control exerted a large, highly significant 
effect when initially entered, but was quickly diminished to non-significance when all life 
domain variables were incorporated. This is further evidence that irritability produces its 
own effect on crime and that separating these two personality traits in the manner 
suggested by Agnew (2005) provides a more nuanced understanding of their effects on 
crime.  
Another notable finding is the primacy of peer criminality as a correlate of 
criminal behavior during adolescence. While this variable significantly predicted crime 
for adolescents and adults, its effect on the former was large. Specifically, the effect of 
peer criminality ranged from 43.77 to 682.09 in the final models of equations that 
estimated adolescent crime. For comparison, no other effect magnitude exceeded 15 in 
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these models. This finding is in line with past research that demonstrates the importance 
of peer behavior as a predictor of juvenile delinquency (Haynie et al. 2005; Haynie, 
Doogan, and Soller 2014; Warr and Stafford 1991). The evidence that peer criminality 
plays a smaller role during adulthood specifically supports findings of the extant 
literature that suggest the susceptibility to peer pressure and influence in adolescence 
peaks at age 14 and declines linearly until age 18 (Steinberg and Monahan 2007:1531). 
The sample in this dissertation supports this trend. Though peers play a significant role at 
both time points, the effect of this domain was the largest during adolescence, when 
respondents were between 11 and 13 years of age. 
The salience of peer criminality is also supported among prior tests of Agnew’s 
(2005) GTCD. For instance, peer criminality and time spent with peers produced the 
strongest effects on deviance in Cochran’s (2015) life domain model and yielded the only 
significant effects among life domains in his full model that controlled for constraints and 
motivations. Specifically, Cochran’s measure of peer pressure to commit deviance 
produced the third largest effect when controlling for all variables. Similarly, peer 
criminality produced the only significant effect in Zhang and colleagues’ (2012) full 
model. The peer domain consistently provided the strongest support for GTCD in all 
other tests (Muftić et al. 2014; Ngo and Paternoster 2014; Ngo et al. 2011).  
Peer criminality is an especially salient variable regarding drug crime. The effect 
size for this variable predicting adolescent general crime or person/property crime ranged 
from 43.77 to 83.71. However, it ranged from 398.87 to 682.09 when predicting 
adolescent drug crime. Family criminality was also important, though it did not produce 
the same magnitude of effects. These findings highlight the importance of social learning 
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from peers as a cause of drug crime and suggest that this influence outweighs that of 
family members (Akers 1973, 1998; Bandura 1977; Burgess and Akers 1966; Sutherland 
1939; Sykes and Matza 1957; Thornberry 1987).  
The salience of peer criminality in relation to drug crime at both stages of 
development is supported in the literature. In Winfree and Bernat’s (1998) tests of social 
learning and self-control theories for eighth grade students in two cities, the social 
learning variables explained more than twice the amount of variance at each location. 
Notably, one of their four social learning indicators was an index of six items measuring 
the perceived benefits of belonging to a gang. This variable yielded the largest effect in 
several of their regression models. In another study, Johnson and associates (1987) 
examined the “complex etiology” of substance use among adolescents and found that the 
“proportion of one’s friends that uses drugs is by far the most influential factor in 
adolescent drug use” (333) when controlling for social learning and social control 
variables. As with the current dissertation, parental criminality also played a role in 
influencing adolescent drug use, but this impact was quite small when all variables were 
accounted for. This is further supported in Allen and associates’ (2003) meta-analytic 
review of the literature, in which they concluded that peer group affiliation provides a 
stronger influence on the use of multiple types of substances than parental drug use. In 
Akers (1998) extensive review of the literature on social learning variables and crime, he 
concluded that “other than one’s own prior deviant behavior, the best single predictor of 
the onset, continuance, or desistance of delinquency is differential association with law-
violating or norm-violating peers” (164). This is also shown in Akers and Cochran’s 
(1985) review of the relative efficacy of social learning, social control, and strain 
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variables in which differential peer associations yielded the largest effect on crime of any 
single variable under study. 
One possible explanation for the particularly large effect of social learning 
variables on drug crime is that perhaps, by nature, substance use is a particularly social 
form of crime, relative to others (Akers 1998). Criminal peers often provide first access 
to illicit substances and teach the methods of consumption that are less likely to be 
learned in a conventional context or through trial and error (e.g., injecting drugs 
intravenously) (Akers 1998; Kaplan, Martin, and Robbins 1984). Peers also create a 
sense of pressure to engage in substance use. Peer pressure is important because, while 
parents that use drugs may show definitions favorable towards crime, they are unlikely to 
create situational pressure in the way that peers do. Johnson and colleagues (1987) argue 
that “emotion-laden situational pressure is a stronger force than is more rational 
contemplation of less immediately pressing values, attachments, and role models in 
determining the behavior of adolescents (337).  
Finally, several notes regarding the effects of control variables should be 
mentioned. Respondent sex played a consistent role, with males reporting increased rates 
of crime in 10 of 12 sets of regression models. This is supportive of the well-established 
gender gap in offending (Agnew 2005; Akers 1998; Broidy and Agnew 1997; De Coster 
and Zito 2010; Friedman and Rosenbaum 1998; Hagan et al. 1985; Hagan et al. 1987; 
Moffitt 1993; Moffitt and Caspi 2001; Singer and Levine 1988; Steffensmeir and Allen 
1996; Tittle et al. 2003).  
Respondent age played a relatively minor role in this study as it only significantly 
impacted the rate of crime in two sets of regression models. This is somewhat surprising 
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given what is known about the age-crime curve (Agnew 2005; Akers 1998; Friedman and 
Rosenbaum 1988; Hirschi and Gottfredson 1983; Moffitt 1993; Moffit and Caspi 2001; 
Tittle et al. 2003). Perhaps the age ranges at each time point are too narrow to 
demonstrate the existence of this phenomenon. The age ranges utilized in this dissertation 
capture the onset of the age-crime curve during adolescence (11-13) and the peak during 
adulthood (19-26) (Moffitt 1993; Moffitt and Caspi 2001). Therefore, another way to 
examine this is to consider the rates of various crimes at each time point. The adult 
sample should exhibit higher mean rates of general, person/property, and drug crime 
during adulthood. This is confirmed with an examination of the descriptive statistics, as 
respondents report committing more general crime acts during adulthood than 
adolescence. Additionally, respondents reported committing a greater number of drug 
crime incidents during adulthood than adolescence. However, the rates of person/property 
crime incidents did not vary by much.  
Respondent race was significantly associated with crime in 5 of 12 sets of 
regression models, with white respondents reporting increased rates of crime acts. Also, 
perceived social class was not related to crime in any set of models. These findings 
regarding race and social class are congruous with previous studies that find little to no 
differences in self-reported crime among races and income levels, despite significant 
observed differences in arrest rates, incarceration rates, and other official statistics 
(Agnew et al. 2014; Pager 2007; Tittle and Meier 1990; Travis and Western 2014). 
Study Implications 
 A number of implications arise from the analyses in this dissertation. Both 
Agnew’s (2005) GTCD and Cochran’s (2015) GTCD-E explain criminal behavior. The 
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results indicate that the causes of crime vary according to developmental stage and crime 
type. Agnew’s GTCD is sufficient to predict crime during adolescence, but GTCD-E’s 
religion domain warrants inclusion as a predictor of adult crime. As such, peer 
criminality and irritability tend to exert the largest effects during adolescence. However, 
peer criminality, spouse/partner criminality, irritability, religiousness, and religiosity tend 
to be the strongest predictors of crime during adulthood. Similarly, the causes of crime 
vary according to crime type. For instance, irritability, a personality trait, exerts a 
stronger influence on general crime and person/property crime, while strain and social 
learning variables from the family and peer domains play larger roles in predicting drug 
crime.  
These theoretical insights should inform the formulation of crime intervention and 
prevention policies and programs. Crime prevention and intervention should not focus on 
a single life domain. This dissertation’s findings highlight the importance of targeting 
multiple, or all, life domains at once. The causes of crime are multiple and span life 
domains. Consequently, efforts to address the impact of these variables, or risk factors, 
should likewise span life domains.  
Not only should such efforts target multiple life domains, they should also be 
tailored to specific developmental stage and form of crime. Though often convenient and 
less expensive, the use of broad, generalized policies and programs is strongly 
discouraged in light of the evidence suggesting the causes and correlates of crime vary by 
developmental stage and crime type. For instance, a program attempting to reduce drug 
crime among adolescents should aim to address all four adolescent life domains in 
general (Agnew 2005). However, it should pay special attention to counteracting the 
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strong influences of peer and family criminality. Agnew (2005) also argues that 
prevention programs should begin early in life so as to intervene before one “becomes 
enmeshed in the web of crime” (201).  
What does such a program look like in practice? One may draw inspiration from 
Rios’ (2011) concept of a community-based youth support complex. This multi-
institutional support complex provides youth with a variety of pro-social programs and 
activities that decrease their involvement and association with criminal others, like 
afterschool sports, tutoring sessions, and skill-building workshops. It should also involve 
a mentorship component through which participants can cultivate strong relationships 
with productive community members. Miller (2008) notes the importance of including 
female participants as leaders since they are traditionally underrepresented in such 
programs. The provision of role models will produce a multitude of benefits and should 
facilitate the cultivation of social capital, broadening networks of social support and 
weakening criminal networks. Another benefit is that the relationships formed with these 
conventional role models will function to counteract the social learning influence of 
criminal peers and family members.  
In line with this approach is the Big Brothers Big Sisters Community-Based 
Mentoring program, which promotes mentorship and engagement in pro-social 
recreational activities. An evaluation of this program demonstrated the efficacy of such 
an approach, as participants were nearly half as likely to engage in drug use and more 
than a quarter less likely to engage in alcohol use than the control group (Tierney, 
Grossman, and Resch 2000).  
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 Efforts aiming to reduce general crime or person/property crime among 
adolescents should follow this general format but introduce a strong focus on combating 
the influence of irritability as a personality trait. Activities and mentors within this 
support complex may effectively reduce crime by teaching participants conventional 
conflict resolution tactics, pro-social problem-solving approaches, and anger management 
skills. LifeSkills Training (LST) is an example of a crime prevention program that 
targets these risk factors. LST aims to improve decision making, promote prosocial 
coping with strain, and increase social skills among adolescents in an effort to counteract 
the effects of peer pressure and stress. Encouragingly, this approach has been 
demonstrated as effective in delaying onset of substance use among participants (Trudeau 
et al. 2003). 
Similarly, efforts that seek to reduce crime among adults should also employ a 
broad support complex. However, they may consider expanding their focus to include the 
employment and religion domains, as these domains provided significant, though modest, 
positive relationships to crime. For instance, they may provide employment opportunities 
as well as the skill-building and training necessary to secure employment. Additionally, 
mentors may play a large role for adults in this regard. Seibert and colleagues (2001) 
highlight the importance of developing higher-level contacts by demonstrating that they 
provide access to particularly useful benefits, like higher levels of career sponsorship. 
The authors also posit that mentorships can produce benefits beyond merely being a good 
role model. They can also introduce the mentee to influential actors that can function as 
additional mentors. Combined, these efforts may reduce the negative influence of 
unemployment or poor employment experiences among adults. Similarly, strategies that 
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target adults may incorporate religious institutions, as higher levels of religiousness and 
religiosity were associated with lower rates of crime.  
Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
Although the current data enhance scholarly understanding of the life domains 
associated with GTCD and GTCD-E and crime, important limitations must be 
considered. First, this dissertation incorporates self-reported measures of crime as the 
dependent variables. Thornberry and Krohn (2000) note potential threats to reliability and 
validity that may result from reliance on self-reports of delinquency and other potentially 
sensitive behaviors (see also Krohn et al. 2010). Additionally, the questionnaires were 
lengthy and respondent fatigue may be a concern. Future studies should incorporate 
measures designed to combat these potential threats to validity and reliability.  
Along the same lines, the sample in this study was technically one of 
convenience. As such, concerns may arise regarding representativeness and 
generalizability. Despite this, it is encouraging that the sample is proportionate to a 
random sample of the United States population in terms of a number of demographic 
variables, like sex and race (U.S. Census Bureau 2017). It is further encouraging that 
current findings generally support theoretical propositions. Future testing efforts are 
strongly encouraged to include a large, random sample that is nationally representative. 
Doing so should assuage generalizability concerns and paint a more complete picture of 
the effects of life domains, constraints, and motivations on crime. 
This study utilized a narrow age range to represent adulthood. As alluded to 
previously, this age group may be substantively different from older adults with respect 
to the propositions of GTCD. Consequently, this age range may not be fully 
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representative of adulthood. It may be better characterized as young, or early, adulthood. 
For this reason, findings regarding the impact of life domains on crime during adulthood 
may be unique to this strict age grouping, differing from those incorporating wider age 
ranges to represent adulthood. It is advisable that future research in this area incorporate 
an age range that more fully captures adulthood as a developmental stage. Though, to 
facilitate a more nuanced understanding, future research may consider creating separate 
periods of adulthood (e.g., early, middle, and late) and exploring potential differences.  
On a related note, no test of GTCD to date has utilized a sample that captures the 
childhood developmental stage. As such, the theory’s ability to explain this important 
stage remains unexamined. Therefore, future studies should also incorporate the 
childhood developmental stage to more fully assess the age-graded component of GTCD.  
This study also incorporates two waves of data. While this is a strength, as it 
permits the examination of multiple developmental stages, one must be cautious when 
speaking in terms of causality and prediction. Agnew (2005) notes that at least three 
waves of data are necessary to estimate contemporaneous and lagged effects 
simultaneously. In light of this, future testing efforts should utilize longitudinal designs 
that incorporate more than two waves of data collection. 
Similarly, this dissertation analyzed secondary data that was not designed for the 
express purpose of testing GTCD or GTCD-E. As such, the present analyses suffer from 
imperfect measures of theoretical constructs. Specifically, some variables, like poor 
school performance or negative teaching practices during adolescence were measured 
using a single item, rather than an index. Notably, this was also the case with the 
measures of religiousness and religiosity employed at both time points. A stronger 
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measure of these concepts that incorporates multiple items into an index is highly 
desirable. Along the same lines, other indices incorporated in this dissertation produced 
weaker reliability coefficients than desired. The KLAMS data also did not permit the 
inclusion of all theoretical variables. Some life domain, constraint, and motivation 
variables simply could not be measured using KLAMS items and were, therefore, omitted 
(e.g., time spent in unstructured activities with friends during adolescence and co-worker 
criminality during adulthood). Future studies are encouraged to collect primary data using 
instruments designed to measure elements of GTCD and GTCD-E. This will increase 
face validity and ensure that all theoretical variables are represented, protecting against 
the threat of omitted variable bias. Agnew states that this is the best way to fully test 
GTCD, though he admits that it would be expensive and time consuming.  
 There are likely other potentially important variables that would refine scholarly 
understanding of the religion domain as it is related to crime in the context of GTCD-E. 
For instance, Pargament (2008) posits that a variety of other characteristics of religion 
may influence its efficacy in producing beneficial outcomes (e.g., whether the motivation 
for religion intrinsic or extrinsic, the degree to which the religion is integrated into the 
larger social context, and the approach to coping the religion advances). The nature of the 
KLAMS data precluded such exploration in the current study, as such items were not 
asked of respondents. It is imperative that future research efforts employ methodologies 
that permit a more nuanced exploration of how a variety of religious variables operate 
alongside other life domains, constraints, and motivations in affecting crime. 
Finally, this study was a partial test of GTCD and GTCD-E that examined only a 
handful of theoretical propositions. Future studies should strive to achieve a more 
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complete test by examining a variety of other theoretical propositions, like the 
contemporaneous and lagged effects of life domain variables on each other, non-linear 
effects of life domains on crime, effects of prior crime on future crime, and interaction 
effects among life domain variables.  
Conclusion 
To conclude, results from this dissertation address a key gap in the literature 
surrounding an understudied, though potentially important criminological theory. 
Agnew’s (2005) General Theory of Crime and Delinquency is broad in scope and highly 
complex. It is difficult to test all propositions or to even fully test a number of 
propositions. Consequently, this theory has only been subjected to a handful of empirical 
tests (Cochran 2015; Muftić et al. 2014; Ngo et al. 2011; Ngo and Paternoster 2014; 
Zhang, Day, and Cao 2012). This dissertation provides one of the most complete tests of 
Agnew’s (2005) GTCD and only the second test of Cochran’s (2015) GTCD-E. It 
achieves this by utilizing a large number of predictor variables drawn from two waves of 
data. This permitted an examination of the contemporaneous and lagged influence of life 
domains on three forms of crime (i.e., general crime, person/property crime, and drug 
crime) at two distinct stages of development (i.e., adolescence and adulthood). Consistent 
with prior empirical tests, results provide mixed support for Agnew’s propositions, 
highlighting the complexity of the theory.  
Specifically, general support is provided for the direct effects of both theories’ 
variables, indicating they are important to the explanation of crime. Also, in line with 
Cochran's (2015) findings, initial observed effects of religious variables on criminal 
behavior in a sample of adolescents are reduced to non-significance when all other 
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predictors are introduced in most regression models, hinting that the incorporation of 
such variables may be incongruous with Agnew's chosen method of theoretical 
integration. However, religious variables emerge as significant predictors of general 
crime during adulthood, suggesting that the relationship between these variables and 
crime is more complex than anticipated. Additionally, strong support is found for the 
proposition that the effects of life domains are primarily contemporaneous. Results offer 
weaker support, however, for the assertion that life domain effects are largely mediated 
by constraints against crime and motivations towards it. The findings also highlight the 
utility of integrated theoretical frameworks in criminology as a means to improve the 
discipline’s ability to explain criminal and deviant behavior. 
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